The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition by David Carr
My rating: 5 of 5 stars
Carr presents us with an interesting puzzle, that speaks about the role of self in the transcendental tradition. In some sense, it’s not a puzzle at all. Kantian scholars often look to the point of “subjectivity” as central to Kant’s critique in inquiry. This is not so. If you read Critique of Pure Reason closely, you will see that Kants main critique is about reason itself; the way in which reason works to supplement understanding, often extending understanding beyond the bounds of what is “reasonable” for reason to speculate on.
Carr shows us at first, the bumbling that rises from the transcendental tradition. He starts off with Heidegger in order to critique him, going through Husserl and then ending later on with Kant. About halfway through we get a glimpse that the two “selves” empirical and transcendental have in fact no bearing within the tradition as a kind of truth. Rather these two points are bracketed speculations. Towards the end then, Carr, goes against the tradition of scholars that wish to push Husserl and Kant into “metaphysical” speculation, tentatively stating that
Both philosophers recognized, I think, that their transcendental procedure did not authorize the transition to metaphysical claims
And this is so! The paradox is rightly present because the scholars that follow misread and wished to pursue their own agenda of subjectivity. In this sense, this already short book, could be even shorter, as the paradox lies wholly within trying to make a round hole squared. For what Carr sets out to do, he does it quite well. Not an easy book to read, because of its heavy terminology, but it is in fact still an introductory book, although it serves as an introduction to a very complex topic.
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