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In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture

In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of CultureIn My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture by Kwame Anthony Appiah
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Kwame Anthony Appiah successfully describes the difficults involved in relating lived experience in Africa with the globalized agency of Africa as a group. Without hammering the post-colonial apparatus too heavily, Appiah navigates the difficult area of defining what makes Africa Africa from as many points of view simultaneously. For Appaih the post-colonial condition is characterized by a variety of competing identities, groupifications from tribal, regional, racial, national, ethnocentric, religious, eurocentric and otherwise. All of these necessitate that the individual successfully navigate as many areas as possible in order to figure out who they are. Identity is destablized because after we reject nationalism as a modernist aesthetic derived from european identity of the 18th+ centuries, what have we got to replace it with? In post-colonial countries, there is a harsh identity that the educated elites begin to have problems with creating — as their uneducated peers do not have access to the same historic basis to define themselves. Yet having a historic basis means losing the very centeredness of those “good ole days” when we were young, and life seemed very clear and stable.

We experience some of this daily, in non-colonized countries as well, but our sense of legitimacy is different. The problem of post-colonialism is that all groupings of identity are competing and yet equally legitimate, in some sense. One can’t deal with the world and completely ignore how the world sees one. The problem is complicated by the fact that many Africa groups do not identify with one another, coming from incompatible worlds, speaking a variety of incompatible languages with incompatible customs. The epilogue Appiah provides detailing his father’s identity and how his father’s death presented a complicated problem dealing with different competing sensibilities of how to honor the man and yet submit to the variety of powers that be.

All in all, a good read, one which suggests that the solution is of yet an unnamed composite identity that only time can seal. Appiah is aspecially adept at navigating the different areas of art, capitalistation, globalisation and identities that characterize a contemporary Africa, a final global limit of capitalist hegemony that is constructed from the top down, leaving the middle confused as to the desired orientation. It’s not a matter of having too many choices, it’s a matter of not even knowing what the proper choice can be, as the competing value systems require constant renegotiation, differentiation and redifferentiation depending on the the multivalience of the identities of the actors on the ground.

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Toward the Postmodern

Toward the PostmodernToward the Postmodern by Jean-François Lyotard
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

In this collection of essays you get to experience the intellectual prowess of one Jean-Francois Lyotard. I’ve only read one of his other works; but here you get to see him as he varies his approaches from the literal, transfigural to the metaphorical. Although, all relations are possible, as he shows us. He is able to connect disparate parts together and get a larger shape of how we compile sense making. No wonder he was the one to mark our epoch as the post-modern, he kind of sits outside common sense already, and thus can reflect on what we are up to.

I’m not sure why the sections are partitioned in the way they are, perhaps this is not a good introductory text of his works. In a way, reading him was like riding a bucking bronco, I wasn’t sure what he was going to say or connect with next. I would urge patience in reading this book, it’s not one to skim lightly through.

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A Treatise of Human Nature

A Treatise of Human NatureA Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Much simpler shorter and less expansive than An Enquiry into Human Understanding but all the same, intensely interesting.

Karatani is correct, for Hume all knowledge is synthesis save for math, and counting, which Hume doesn’t seem to be able to account for at all — so he claims such a thing is innate. Indeed, we can grasp that such an ability (counting) and spacial-motoral skills seem to be bred into us, as innate mental structures. Still, Kant in this one area is more radical than Hume, claiming that math is also synthetic knowledge.

What I found startling was a passage here, in which Hume posits in paragraph section 122, that the nature of modern enquirers understand that qualities are separate than the objects themselves. Here he lays groundwork for a phenomenal and noumenal distinction, something Kant later picks up, through the transcendental framework if abstraction… that the ideas we have are innate to us, as such ideas require material expression which we get from senses and feelings. Kant also takes serious the conjoined nature of two objects; where Hume takes sufficient reason to task, Kant understands this as an ex post facto (retroactive) synthesis, one that later on Bergson utilizes to tie together disparate fields despite their different culturally determined signifying functions.

Hume is pretty fantastic.

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Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates

Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related DatesWelcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates by Slavoj Žižek
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Of course, here is Zizek again. Second time reading this book. This is a light book for him, as the chapters are short and the theory isn’t thick. Nonetheless, as always, with his dialectical switching, Zizek is interesting and insightful. One of the primary problems with those equating philosophy with truth is that it needs to be true all the way through.

Yes, okay so much of what Zizek says is sometimes conjecture. But the point is taken, and if it’s not then it doesn’t stick and it’s not useful.

What Zizek is doing here is presented 9/11 as an event in which we have a choice about the kind of world we want to live in. Nonetheless, 9/11 allowed for a further refinement in division as separate entities, like the American government, went ahead to define the field for itself (we are the victims), rather than melding the field. That conservative move to hole up created a differential in logic which of course, creates the antagonisms that we face today. This is perhaps the underlying motif that Zizek wishes to highlight through the figure of homo sacer, that much of our laws and understandings of class are determined through the difference of who is left out and how that leaving out is expressed beyond whatever political justifications may be given.

All in all entertaining to read, but simple in his point. The complexity involved is how he builds his simple point through the mediation of abstract universal figures. After all, only through mediated complexity can one arrive at a more abstract point of reference. Without that mediation, a given simple object is only itself, without extension.

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Social Behavior Of Female Vertebrates

Social Behavior Of Female VertebratesSocial Behavior Of Female Vertebrates by Samuel Wasser
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

The preface in this book notes that sexism within human culture is reflected in animal behavior studies by casting males and females within human roles. This favors males of a species as having more agency than females of a species. This collection of essays seeks to demonstrate that females have, at times, greater agency in competing with each other and determining which mates they should choose.

While many of these essays are not about humans, they all note that resource allocation and wealth division plays a role in organizing the nature of sexual interaction (monogamy, polygamy, and so on) between all individuals. This goes on, even between birds, to demonstrate that some level of trust is required between individuals, even when child rearing is mostly limited to sitting on eggs.

It would be of great interest to analyze and then test an economic hypothesis of animal behavior. While animals do not use money, so money cannot be a metric to determine value, we can see that valuation is passed between individuals as a way of evaluating the desirability of mates and what mates can offer. For instance, in courtship rituals, male birds often demonstrate their ability to hold onto territory. I would have liked this book to be larger, with more variety of essays, but considering the amount of work it takes, I suppose this is a rare sampling to begin with.

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The Rule of Metaphor

The Rule of MetaphorThe Rule of Metaphor by Paul Ricoeur
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

I’ve decided that Ricoeur is more of a meta-rhetorician, a philosopher of rhetoric in the sense that unlike many other rhetoricians and semioticians, he doesn’t do any hard low level analysis himself. He may analyze terms, other’s uses of terms, and with encyclopedic mastery, run the gambit of tearing through collected works of so many others to pull the threads he needs to weave a larger discourse, but he almost never takes you through line by line synthesis and application. Stranger too, he never presents you a diagramatic appraisal of the field. He presents you choice snippets and then at the end provides you his tact conclusion. Ever so polite, his writing generally doesn’t explode off the page either.

In this book, he tackles metaphor. Tries to find a place for it, and in the end results in universalizing it. While he goes through the figure of metaphor across many discourses relating to metaphor (poetics, tropes, semantics of word and discourse, and finally reference and philosophy) Ricoeur is able to construct a place for metaphor such that metaphor is a kind of column, a null point from which each of these fields can be organized and made coherent. His conclusions is that the zero sum signifier of the copula (to be) is only a nullified designator of which metaphor is the rule — not the exception. Copula’s nullification is only made possible because of the height of its position within semantic conception — metaphors serve more as the general binder for various arrangements. In this way, Ricoeur flips the relation of metaphor and positivist discourse on its head; metaphor is the general mode of presentation.

While this seems to presents a kind of detachment of language from the field of designation (or reality is composed only of language) it would be a mistake to jump to this relativist position, as Ricoeur makes clear, words need to be of something in order for there to be the stability of difference, even if expression can always be overcoded through metaphorization.

What Ricoeur wants to talk about rather, is the possibility of discourse. Rhetoric doesn’t decide what is said it only describes what it is possible to say, and how we can connect one part to another, to get to One or many ones, although for Ricoer there is no One, although as he notes Heidigger and many others are looking still for the magical word, the One that will designate One upon which justification is self-justified without appeal to semantic slippage.

All in all, I found this book to be a good read, although I was less interested in what others have said than what he says. Ricoeur still remains worth while to read, though he is less flashy and in that way more down to earth as one who goes through the widely ignored field of rhetoric to find the stabilizing struts of discourse itself, at a tactical level, rather than the starry-eyed strategies of ones like Deleuze, Foucault or Zizek.

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On the New

On the NewOn the New by Boris Groys
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Groys is a formalist. He recasts the dialectic of subject and object in terms of valorized-profane in order to talk about the production of culture. Through the figure of art (and then conceptual theory), Groys notes the production of new as necessary to stablize the meta-position of culture. He makes these positions independent of specific content and that makes him not only a formalist but also an idealist.

One of the issues with this, is that this ideation remain ungrounded in material practices, that valorization and the profane are “indistinguishable”. Perhaps this makes him a lazy philosopher, but it’s unwelcome since the very ability for one to distinguish the two is the entire point of valorization. A stronger critique of this thought would be to say that all that we can recognize is already included in culture, and that what isn’t in culture is only recognizable through the filter of culture, so it is “not yet itself”, which begs the question of schema.

At first glance I thought he was going to outline a scheme of becoming. Umberto Eco did so in order to talk about how new information can create new categories for the new, but Groys avoided doing this difficult task. Instead he retreated into the familiar dialectical play of cultural difference to pull the new from the auspices of the void… this puts him strictly within the history of formalization as outlined in Foucault’s The Order of Things, wherein the question today becomes how can one pull content from form alone? The appeal to the void (or the Other of thought) or the attempt to think the unthinkable isn’t a new attempt. Groys puts forth a well researched and tightly knit but conservative book. In this sense, he is pretty easy to read, and serves more as a text for a sophomore for an aesthetic reading of familiar forms instead of as an earth shaking opus.

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The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences

The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human SciencesThe Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences by Michel Foucault
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

In this impressive book, Foucault takes on the basic organizational episteme of our current epoch. He highlights the contemporary modality of our post-modern world by tracing the development of our episteme from the 16th century to the present day.

While this may seem to be a simple tale of historical causation Foucault says explicitly on several occasions that he cannot account for the break between the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century. What he is referring to has several possible angles to it, which strongly emphasizes that in our current era we have not processed this break fully, that we are still within this logic and therefore unable to account for it.

One way to speak of this break is to note that in the Classical era, knowledge was mediated through a reference to the infinite. This had the happy consequence of making language transparent. If there was a limit to our knowledge it lay in the fact that human beings were finite and unable to extend to the fullest reaches of knowing, which would otherwise be available. When one contrasts this with the current epoch, we have the condition of knowing being mediated by man. As Zizek might say, a subject-hood is self-realized selfhood, that all conditions of knowing pass through the self.

While it may be tempting to digress into philosophical contemplation with this idealist twist, Foucault is quick to add that this subjectivity is only made possible because the inherent formalization of various fields have fragmented into their own logic (for him, biology, economics and philology are the ones he looks at, but by no means are these positions foundational). What I mean by immanent logic is that the formalization, which is expressed as the adoptation of mathesis as a neutral symbology by which to express immanent logic, forces each of these fields to define the conditions of their knowledge by an appeal to a central agency that is both immanent to the field and conditioned beyond it. What ends up happening is that we chase our own shadow. Human beings created these fields of knowledge to solve specific tasks relating to how we valuate our situation. We want to know certain things and value knowing those things in the way that we do; thus these fields come to reflect our basis premises as to who we are and how we are.

To say this in another way, these different fragmented sciences are created from and simultaneously inform the cultural biases which outlines these various fields of study. In these areas (biology, economics, language and so on) ultimately reflect back how we create knowing, so that when we attempt to know these fields completely we end up chasing our own reflection. Foucault uses the Diego’s painting Las Meninas as the metaphor for this knowing. The various figures in the field become stabilized in our attempt to see what is going on, and in that moment we catch a faint glimpse of our own reflection in the distance. For this reason, man and subjecthood, as Foucault notes, are in fact recent authorizations which did not exist previous to this break.

You can find many ideas that he skims here as echoing positions by other thinkers, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, Meillasoux, Baudrillard… they all arrange our situation differently but their arrangement of our situation isn’t a genuine stepping out of it. In much the same way, writers like Kafka and Beckett are only made possible because of the epoch; they are already expressing the confusion of the order which refers back to us, they are not creating the order nor are they recording its transition.

One of the most telling features that Foucault writes about, telling in the sense that this is an Event, is how he recasts time as a matter of epistemological entrapment. Our inability to decide for ourselves an origin for consciousness is a sign that consciousness exists outside our ability to know because it is the condition of how we know. This strongly matches Badious writing on the Event, signaling that our criteria for knowing remains invisible to us. Consciousness like the figure of Man remains the limit to our knowledge because we are the figure by which we can come to know everything else around us.

Foucault would like to realize the historical causality in the rising of this event but he can’t explain it. There can be no causality because our methods of understanding will not be able to account for itself. In fact, I am expressing this episteme right now, as the current trace of philosophy and knowledge today (sciences included) wish to think the unthinking, to bring about consciousness to the real conditions of knowing. This of course is a problem because if our human parameters for what matters isn’t objective enough for us, and in fact can only bring about the cultural biases which are expressed in how we decide what is, worthy of knowing and how we should know something (what terms are relevant) then what should be the basis for the creation of a new knowledge?

Foucault offers Nietzche’s superman as a possible condition of the new. The Eternal Return marks a horrifically new epoch for which we can have new conditions. (The Nazi trauma as it were, was not it, because it was not enough to mark a difference– that false event was too conditioned already by recent and ancient histories, its baggage signaled an allegiance to the current epoch in much the same way Mao or Stalinism did the same.) Of course, a new condition also means a new history, also means the end of philosophy… but I digress.

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The Sickness unto Death

The Sickness unto DeathThe Sickness unto Death by Søren Kierkegaard
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

I’d like to give this 3.5 stars, but I guess since that’s not possible, let’s go with 3 stars, since the ending fell flat.

Kierkegaard follows the Hegelian dialectic through the realization of spirit from self. Different from other readings, but not incompatible, Kierkegaard notes that it is through God as man as the mediator that self is realized as spirit, that like Hegel, Jesus is the bridge for the insurmountable gap between man and God. What’s particularly compelling about this work is that Kierkegaard defines despair and sin as conditions of separation from God. For Kierkegaard there can be no other understanding than a relation grounded in God since God is all there is, from start to finish. We may question what it means to stand before God and accept God but with this reading, there can only be faith in acceptance since any other posturing is deceptive and a sin — since such deployments would seek to separate us from God.

So in this sense, all separation and struggle is immanent to the self, as the self is the only other position for which there can be any deception or posturing. On the one hand, this seems incredibly boring since it’s a basic dialectic form. But Kierkegaard is able to walk through a Christian conceptualization based on the work by an already very Christian philosopher.

I suppose in a way, he is detailing out his own situation in abstract, outlining for others, what he finds to be vanities of humanity. We would like to be seen a certain way, understood a certain way, and often this even before us in the eyes of God, a posture we would like to hold to be genuine, never realizing that our own wishes for a particular understanding belie our unacknowledged desires for self acknowledgement and self acceptance. In that sense, complete acknowledgement and truthfulness about who we are is only possible in the face of an all knowing, all seeing deity who is witness to even the dark depths of our soul. I suppose this is perhaps, a great function of bringing God into our lives, that we cannot lie to ourselves and must come to realize our own imperfections so that we can be better people.

This last part may not be in Kierkegaards book. I am not Christian though, nor do I seek to be Christian, but Kierkegaard makes no promises about what sickness unto death can lead us to; the absolute defiance of not-believing in God despite the option being there constantly. Instead, he leaves this off, not mentioning what comes after, perhaps because he is not there either, although for him, such despair is an all consuming struggle from which the only reprieve can be to leave it be and move on to better things.

I think if you are struggling in your life and need to find a resolve, this book could work for you in the sense that you may come to some kind peace, knowing your despair is not alone and that it is, in a very universe sense, a mode, a choice that you made for yourself. Although the solution in this book may not be one you find useful, as I did not, you may not want to read it as it kind of doesn’t really speak to you. But you wouldn’t know if it did or not though, unless you read it.

So it’s probably worth reading if you are depressed or need some guidance at least for a while. All in all, it’s not a thick book, so why not?

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Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution

Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific RevolutionThird Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution by John Brockman
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

The preface of this book sets out to debunk the place of literary intellectuals with the very heavy hand that such intellectuals are jargonistic, anti-realist, arrogant pricks who would usurp the place of the real intellectuals, humble scientists whose work has been long misunderstood. Or something like that. The introduction is kind of off putting, with the claim that literature isn’t applicable to anything whereas science is. This position isn’t very interesting, although it’s been present as a debate between these two sides for too long.

The essays in this book however, are far more interesting and don’t have anything to do with the frame of the introduction. Much of the work of these scientists is theoretical, yet they speak in clear mostly unambiguous terms. Brockman seeks to create an intercourse with the public and these scientists who work, often, in the fringes of their communities. That’s what he means by third culture. And to some extent it’s kind of successful, I think. There’s plenty to pick from, and lots of different ideas to choose from. Frankly, it’s a little overwhelming. But this is a good introductory text. It’s difficult sometimes to make the claim that science is only useful if it yields a useful application. But useful is such a subjective term. And theoretical works are more about reframing issues so as to create new relationships in familiar areas which may be dismissed by traditional methods of inquiry.

So really, this book is exploratory, as theorists tend to be. Interesting reading but it’s truly undecidable. Food for thought, really.

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