Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being

Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into BeingWhere Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being by George Lakoff
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Cognitive linguistics has at its underlying aesthetic the very literal understanding that how we think of things is what they are. This follows post-structural rhetoricians like Paul Ricoeur who argue that the connective tissue of language is metaphor — where metaphor is the substantiation of the naked copula form is through content. We forget the form of the copula in metaphors and thus experience the content as a variation of the copula form instead of being the actual connection. In other words we understand our world through representations, never understanding that an ontologically reified point of view is only possible because metaphors position the copula through its latent content so that the form of the copula becomes seen as the “ding as such”. In other words, representations only appear to be representations because one of the formal representations comes to represent nothing but the pure presence of its own linguistic connectivity.

Having said this, I was surprised (but also not surprised) by the comments below. Many people were confused by this book, blaming either the psychologists for not living up to their expectations (of not being neurologists), or blaming the thickness of the mathematical concepts presented. We often think of the pure formalism of math as being objectively isometric (as one reviewer said) to the proposition that reality is always present beneath our representations. One key connection that Lakoff and Nunez being up repeatedly is that many mathematical formalisms (such as zero, negative numbers, complex numbers, limits, and so on) were not accepted even long after their calculatory prowess was proven effectual… what made these concepts acceptable wasn’t their caculatory significance, but rather their introduction to the cannon of mathematical concepts via metaphoric agency. For instance, we take zero for granted as being “real” even though we understand it to not be a true number. It only was after a new metaphoric concept was presented for zero to be sensible (numbers as containers and origin on a path) was then zero incorporated into the cannon of what was acceptable. This understanding proves to be the very “twist” needed for Lakoff and Nunez to write this book. While many of the concepts are perhaps difficult for some of us non-mathematicians to grasp, I found their presentation to be concise and illuminating. Their tabulatory presentation of metaphors side by side allow us to grasp the mapping of logically independent factors from one domain into another. This basic movement is in fact a methodology they may have picked up from analytic geometry as invented by Rene Descartes: the translation of continuums into discrete points.

While it is understandable that they trace the building of conceptual metaphors via simple to the more complex, I did find their delay of speaking of analytic geometric to be confusing. When a topic is presented I want it to be explained, rather than having to wait half a book to read on it again. This is really my only possible complaint.

Overall, this book helped me connect the observation of formalism being prevalent as an organizing feature of pretty much all procedure and knowledge formation today with the root of that formalization, being the atomization of discrete epistemes of knowledge, whether that knowledge is granular or point or vector, or some other kind of rigor. We can also thus understand mathematics as being synthetic, contrary to what most philosophers in the west (excluding the great Immanuel Kant, Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze) understood.

Today, through our rockstar mathematicians and physicists we revisit the old Platonic hat that math is somehow natural, only apparent in our minds and yet more real than anything else this world has to offer. This is a troubling and definitely cold and etymologically naive sentiment. It’s mysterious that anything in this world is the way that is, let alone consistent as though following laws, but that isn’t any reason to be hypnotized by our own intellectual conceptions. As Lakoff and Nunez point out, while some math is applicable in the physical world most conceptual math remains beyond application of the physical world, as there is no physical correlation with those domains. Such application may be possible in alternate universes, but such universes remain the sole conception of our mind.

In other words, how we think of something is what we understand it to be, that is true, but it’s also how we experience what we understand to be to be what it is. To get into that deeper thought requires an unpacking of the most erudite philosophical concept of all — that of the number One, arguably the only number there ever has been and in fact the only thing there has ever been. Understandably this is beyond the scope of mathematics itself, or at least beyond the tenants of what most mathematicians are willing to go. I don’t want to belabor the point here, but I will state that the case study at the back of the book is quite compelling. If Euler’s equation may work in formal procedure alone, but as Lakoff and Nunez point out, the construction of that equation is only possible through the discrete projections of layered metaphors to understand equivalence of conception regardless of the different construction domains these metaphors originate from (logarithms vs trigonometry, vs Cartesian rotation vs complex numbers)… ultimately a unity is made possible because such closure is driven by the singular domain of our minds. In our minds, with their ornate metaphors, their clearly trained disciplines and their innate mechanisms of spacial orientation, we are able to combine complex concepts into the most brilliant of abstractions.

As such this book may be too difficult for most of us to read, because it requires we re-orient our thinking along different parameters, different assumptions about who we are and what we are doing when we study and create math. This probably won’t jive with most people, as it seems for most people, knowledge is less about reworking what they already know into a new arrangement, and more about filling in gaps in the arrangements they already have.

I’m not saying that this cognitive linguistic approach is equivocally true, I’m saying that truth is more than how we arrange something, but the entire range of what we can conceive of to be a relation that brings to light new connections. In the end, I think for most of us, the only legitimatizer of reason remains one’s singular emotions, of what feels to be acceptable. To get around this, requires the most stern of discipline and the most unabashed eagerness to learn something new. This is also a reminder that math is not formal procedure as we learned long division in our elementary grades. Rather, math is the unabashed conceptualization of formal arrangements in their absolute complexity. In this way, even understanding how highly educated mathematicians think of math is illuminating to how you and I can understand something (ourselves and the universe) in new light. That alone is worth reading this book.

So do read this book because it’s beautiful, but also read this book because it’s another way of considering something you already think you know. After all, learning isn’t a matter of facts. Facts are boring; the world is full of facts we can never memorize (such as where your car was on such and such date and time. Kind of useless, except in special cases, such as in the immediate). Learning is the mastery of how to conceptualize, how to arrange information and how to further that arrangement through metaphor of what is.

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Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics

Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, PoliticsDeleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics by Paul Patton
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

From the translator of Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton takes on Deleuze as a thinker, and sums up much of his work, comparing him to Derrida and (surprise) American analytic philosophers like Rawls and Rorty. Patton also brings to light the scattered understandings of Deleuze about the event, a specific principle not often spoken of when examining Deleuze’s work. I thought much of Patton’s examination aggressive, intense and very interesting — certainly an above par review of Deleuzian concepts, although not complete in the sense that most books on Deleuze concentrate on one or two of his ideas, eschewing an examination of the complete picture.

The application of American philosophers then, is a way in which Patton “applies” Deleuze, allowing us to step back from the hypnotic twists of Deleuzian language and see where this particular kind of conceptual arrangement can get us. This is far from a complete exposition however, and it may be likely that Patton decided to concentrate on lesser examined concepts of Deleuze in order to streamline the book and present a stronger punch. Still, I like his exposition of Deleuzian ideas and intend to return to them when I want inspiration on a particular thought.

In particular I like Patton’s exposition on “events” and how he ties these to sense and history. His application of Deleuze’s use of colonization as a expressive metaphor is also interesting — and in some sense serves as a defense against critics of Deleuze who would accuse Deleuze of being Euro-centric in his expression. Patton’s inclusion of “What is Philosophy?” was also refreshing as this book is sometimes overlooked in favor of the rich conceptual precision of Deleuze’s previous collaborations with Guattari. Patton’s choice of examining Democracy was also illustrative of Deleuze’s anti-transcendetal approach, although this can be critiqued further.

All in all, a good book to read on Deleuze, although it feels pretty selective. Overall I think Patton does a good job at grasping Deleuze’s utopian aesthetic.

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Universal Principles of Design: 100 Ways to Enhance Usability, Influence Perception, Increase Appeal, Make Better Design Decisions, and Teach Through Design

Universal Principles of Design: 100 Ways to Enhance Usability, Influence Perception, Increase Appeal, Make Better Design Decisions, and Teach Through DesignUniversal Principles of Design: 100 Ways to Enhance Usability, Influence Perception, Increase Appeal, Make Better Design Decisions, and Teach Through Design by William Lidwell
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

While this book may seem like a motley alphabetical list (because it is) of design “principles” what this book is really about is about how people chunk information. Each of the monikers isolates a “principle” according to the metaphor that logically independent relationships are separate axioms of organization. The book isn’t meant to be deep, or tell you why something is, it’s simply meant to be an inspiration, a guide to help one organize how to approach a project. The key to this book is that it tries to explain how best to approach each of axiom of organization, how it leads people to digest the presented information.

It’s of particular interest that many of these design principles aren’t so much about even presentation of design, but also include how to design (what processes, kinds of procedures). Design is one of those areas where everyone thinks that they are a designer, that what intuitively makes sense to oneself should make sense to everyone else. That if it’s obvious to “me” then it is obvious to everyone else. This is not true. Good design requires a channel to unpack potentially complex bundles of information, find out what message one wants to impart, and then present that message through the organization of those bundles of information in such a way that the message comes across as the immanent sense of that organization, that most people will select for the criteria presented as being what that information is rather than understanding it in a different way.

In this sense, the optimal organization of a specific complexity for a particular deployment is what design is. This book doesn’t talk about that though, it assumes we understand this already, and goes ahead to present the “meat and potatos” of design through a list of design principles. The authors were keen to also point out that the rise of design as a profession requires the vast accumulation of different areas including “art, science, and religion…the basic workings of nature” to solve a particular problem. I’m not sure that this is exactly what design is (in this sense, anyone who solves problems creatively is a designer…a little too vague) but I think design has to be understood as “cross-disciplinary” simply because what is necessary for a successful designer is the ability to unpack complexity and then select the best presentation for the most optimal deployment of that complexity to serve a purpose. Design in this way is related to philosophy via the organization of information — the unpacking and realigning of complexity — not the academic jargon that philosophy is so often wrapped in. The selection of various “principles” then bridges the desired message and the nature of the material to be presented. Really, quite a complex procedure which needs one to also understand the target audience’s framework intimately. Doubtlessly there can be no simple book about such a procedure.

This book could be better explained through what I just said, the meta-aesthetics of design. But in lieu of that, the authors don’t go much deeper. Instead, I think, they aim to be more practical and throw a bunch of stuff at you, to get you to think… which is misleading because they claim this book is good for teaching. And while throwing a bunch of junk just be what a designer needs to get his juices flowing, it may not be appropriate for a teacher!

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The Nature and Properties of Soil

The Nature and Properties of SoilThe Nature and Properties of Soil by Nyle C. Brady
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

We may not think about it, because we treat the ground we walk on as a surface to get around from place to place. But the soil is the collection of what earth’s crust. Mixed with chemicals and chunks of matter collected from geological, meteorological, cultural, technological, social and the soil becomes a matrix reflexive of more than just “recent” geological and climate events but it also comes to mirror the action of man. The depth of our knowledge of the soil correlates with the noticed differences in phenotypical expressions of plants, animals and society. We build on the soil, so we need it stable, we grow on soil, so we need it fertile, we live on soils so we need it to be productive, expansive, beautiful and natural. Natural here, acts as a term to stabilize this collection, as we recognize soil as what it isn’t by what we need it to be. Thus, our knowledge grows deeper and deeper as we track (un)desired changes in the areas of (un)welcome surprises. Plants don’t grow as good, or they have a discoloration. Floods happen. Buildings and roads collapse or crumble. Soil is one of the areas which has an influence, as soil is foundational to all aspects of human existence, as all life comes from it, all stability is attributed to it, without it we wouldn’t have a place to be. We are made of it. It makes us, and returns to us our waste as useful, life and abundance (at least before there was too much, and too great a variety).

Thus, this textbook’s depth reflects the depth to which humankind has become knowledgeable about the soil because we have traced our needs back to the soil, to this depth, that this 1000 page book is just the beginning. Yet even with its multitudinous diagrams, rampant calculations, redox equations, and geological terminology to nominalize difference in types, origins, natures of soil; you can still find hearty admonishments, and mentions of what humans use the soil for, what humans want from it, how humans mistreat it because it costs too much, or we were once ignorant. Our dependency on this prime earth is foretold in these pages by the amount of time, devotion and study it has taken to amass this depth of knowledge. And there are still things we don’t yet know about the soil but hope to find out! Our reliance is truly unending.

Along the way, you’ll find that much of this information is classified into chunks. But the parts of these chunks interact with one another, in dimensions the book still tries to highlight but obviously holds to be less important than the consistency of what has been chunked. Likewise, the soil itself has bands of interference as influences from one area, say climate, or another, say, by a farmhouse, all intermix. This is the nature of soil, that soil is a collection of anonymous particles that share similar constraints. For example, while the book mentions resistance in soil, this resistance is mostly due to contextual factors, such as what other influences of climate, geology, industry in its “surrounding” shall also claim influence. The creation of these contexts are the mutually shifting ground of shifting soil, as there is no soil; soil is what stays the same regardless of changes, and that formulates a substantive basis for naming them by what stays mostly the same.

Perhaps in some order of decades we may want to consider additional soil types, but this may not happen as our knowledge of the soil and our knowledge of our reliance on it, has introduced some movements whereby we wish for maintaining the soil, or even improving its functions in the aspects we deem to be desirable for the soil. This too is a sliding scale. As our knowledge increases, so we do find more ways in which our actions and treatment has influenced the soil heretofore unseen. The collection of our actions is a retroactive synthesis, ex post facto, of the true nature of our actions, not just in how we know but also how we are ignorant.

This differentiating edge of what soil can show us in our own knowledge highlights two aspects, both of which are parallax. On the one hand, we create our knowledge as an imprint (extension) of what we are… not just expressive of our desires but also expressive of aspects of our person as are unaware of being. On the other hand, this highlights the need for a post-rational approach to conceptualizing our frame. Following the work of Humberto Maturana, we can understand that “life is knowledge” and thus knowledge is the conceptual correlation with the extent of our ability to comprehend and appreciate what we are. The parallax isn’t simply that human consciousness is the limit that defines our fields of knowledge, but that the limit of our knowledge is the extent of our human differentiation from the manifolds of soil, flesh and matter. It follows then, that our discursive practices are the materialization of our knowledge. The two go hand in hand as more than epiphenomenal, as the correlation isn’t causal but it is a literal surjective distinction that expresses itself from the zones of ideational substance and material abstraction.

Following this, we can draw parallax lines in a projective geometry between economics as a rational material quantifiability, the internal classifications of which are on the level of value-form as espoused by the ideology of merchant capital and the post-structural conception of the void as the abstraction to which we ground all concepts immanently within a transcendence characterized by the value-form of the void, as the zero-phoneme signifier is the only position from which we can measure all determinate fields of knowledge against. We sacrifice knowledge of the union of a parabola’s curvature at the apex if we understand the apex as necessarily coinciding with the zero degree angle of measurement of a cartesian y-axis.

We can also understand the correlation of depth between our bodily elements and the elements adopted from a soil polluted with those reactive elements. This is akin to an expression of a generic within a transcendental field. Only within that field can we note the presence of a generic as a nominalisation when a functional value operates through blind procedure to highlight the operate distinction as reflective of a knowledge about the other domain. In other words, because we like our monoculture more, the stress of the soil is reflected in the diminished quality of vegetation, although we may notice first the diminished quality within ourselves.

Thus, the poverty of our soils knowledge is the poverty of our own organisms, as we attempt to master the earth; for it is not the individual human that struggles against the earth but the earth that struggles with the entire mass of humanity as we collectively shape our planet. Thus, the form of our knowledge as a discrete mathematics, the collective metaphor of set theory spacializes and flips the metaphysics of presence from a substantive position of a classical era in which knowledge was knowledge of material, but rather the formal interrelatinos become the means by which knowledge is generated. Thus our place of observation becomes part of the network of knowledge. In a post-rationalist conception, we understand where we are by where we want to see, intersubjectively, as stated by Vittorio Guidano is also explicated by John Galbraith in economics as a self referential series of groupings which create identity and sublimate actions for group subsistence. Although this post-rational approach developed by Guidano goes beyond economic justification for uber-production as outlined by Galbraith, we can see although with Badiou’s set theory that the formalization of knowledge is reflective of classifications and their attendant distinctions. These distinctions formalized as separate chunks that reify dimensions of the context for consideration is reflective not only of how humans understand themselves in larger organizations (family, clan, tribe or seniority, department, branch, corporation or citizen, city, county, state, nation) but also in impersonal relations such as within soil, or in symphony or other unified “fields” of experience. Of course we would study that which we found to be useful to us! And of course our study would be reflective of who we are and what we do.

In this way we can understand the our desire to learn about soils is our desire to relate to the other of us, that is, the matrix from which we come and to which we return, the soil.

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Can’t and Won’t: Stories

Can't and Won't: StoriesCan’t and Won’t: Stories by Lydia Davis
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Lydia Davis is a joy to read, especially in her shorter works. She considers the larger possibility of connection, and draws lines between aspects of things, what you would expect of a situation, what occurs in that situation, and how that occurrence makes sense of what happened but simultaneously is always-already different from your expectations. Often this has to do with what people expect of us, other times its what we expect of them, other times its through various musings in which we see that they aren’t quite where they could otherwise be. These stories are almost like micro-stories, in that their happening takes place at a subterranean level one which we understand intuitively but often dismiss because such partial occurrences are irrelevant to our every day aesthetic of what counts as experience.

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

An Enquiry Concerning Human UnderstandingAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

The style might be dated, but this amazing work did more than wake Kant up from his “dogmatic slumber”. While its true that Kant’s Critiques set off modern philosophy by providing an inflectional structure for us to better consider the nature of phenomenon, it’s also arguable that Kant’s critiques did not in fact adequately address Hume.

This thick, and well thought book of Hume can be summed in one statement: “If it needs explicit statement then it is not natural” While our conception of natural-ness today has been modified — meaning more (and less) than what Hume would have meant, Hume’s genius lies in grasping that what is common sense, or given as the way of things, is often a way of justifying what is. This is to say that the supposed nature of things is often a little more than a ruse, a stablizing point for social relations… that all things moral, ethical, valuable reflect our human need to determine difference of social standing between one another. It follows then that even our highest conceptions which are to provide elucidation and stability in our norms and practices are in fact methods of convention dictated by mistaking cause for effect.

This is to say that often our reasoning works backwards, to justify what we want to be, rather than working from a position of generality and finding what principles operate on the broadest terms. In contemporaneous terms, Meillasoux would all this Ptolemy’s Revenge as Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” works not to debunk a human centered universe but works explicitly to guarantee that the universe require human consciousness be at the seat of all understanding.

For this reason, many thinkers today (Deleuze seemingly the first) return to Hume as a way to balance out the “waking dogma” of Kant and his successors.

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Eragon

Eragon (The Inheritance Cycle, #1)Eragon by Christopher Paolini
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

This book was pretty predictable, and familiar. Still, it’s written clearly, the world is interesting, even if the characters seem pretty standard. There also seems to be a lack of character development, as they appear fully formed. Still, the interest was there. Strangely enough, I gobbled it up. There’s something oddly comforting about a world where things have named inscribed in the universe, and things can make sense. Pure escapism, when a world has a set hierarchy that is unquestionable. In this sense, fascism must be pretty comfortable.

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Maxims

MaximsMaxims by François de La Rochefoucauld
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Rochefoucauld is an interesting guy. He provides some interesting meditations on the inconsistency of human behavior, asking that we consider in the formation of knowledge, not only what is presented to us, but what remains bracketed. What I mean is that inherent in Rochefoucauld is a dichotomy, in that if one presents one side to us, asking that we consider them in a given way, we can only really understand the fullness (in a Newtonian sense) by asking where did the opposing reaction for this presentation go?

It occurs to me that the main thrust in these maxims isn’t so much as a reversal of “natural philosophy” as far as common sense goes, but that Rochefoucauld merely asking us to look deeper into why people do what they do and why we reason the way we do. Often, if we carry our thoughts on to an extreme, we would find ourselves arguing against the very position we seek to support as the argument dissolves itself into insensibility. In that way, Rochefoucauld isn’t simply insisting that we are all greedy, self centered and narcissistic, but that we consider people may be so, and that in their innocent perpetuate lies about themselves through sheer vanity.

The most annoying part of dealing with another person, is having to deal with what is essential about that person, which from a position of an other, remains what is simply inessential to our own conception. People lie or bend the truth because they want to be liked, or want to think well of themselves. Often this is self defeating, especially when we see that being liked or not being liked often has less to do with ourselves than it does with the other person’s essentially inessential part of themselves. For who is anyone to us, but their role? And if they should fulfill that role, their esteem of themselves would be what is not required.

His extended thoughts on his maxims are less interesting as he has a tendency to twaddle on a point. His biography should be of interest. I think I will look for one.

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The Visible and the Invisible

The Visible and the InvisibleThe Visible and the Invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

Too much negative dialectics, although, his goal seems to be to put us back into the flesh… not just as an embodiment of a singularity at the level of the subjective but at the level of flesh. He goes out of the way to try to die our sensory experience with our ability to create and formulate ideas; something echoed earlier in Hume. But nonetheless, a nearly impossible task. The few pages he leads to trying to tie the immense chiasm between sight and texture itself seems impossible. Given the different platforms for sense data, it does seem miraculous that we are able to synthesize a coherent experience from these two threads. Compound the difficulty of the subject with the unfinished nature of the manuscript, this makes it even harder to read. I suppose I will return to this after reading more phenomenology. This is perhaps understandable, since the back of the book states that this is a boom to read if only for the insight into the working mind of a philosopher. Not a strong recommendation for coherence.

Not having read Maurice Merleau-Ponty before, I wonder (but strongly doubt) that in his polished works, he writes with such a stream of thought, with at times, such an ill defined context. In some ways though, this text (in the 60s) is a late expression of a bygone era, since structuralism was nearing its heyday, existentialism had long past relevance, and the early post-modern era was in full swing (but not yet named, with post-structuralism on the horizon). In a way, Merleau-Ponty can be thought of as a kind of throwback then, to Husserl, the true heir to Kant, in the sense that we can be subjects embodied as we accept the transcendental field as absolute… something that was sure to get shaken up soon enough, although Merleau-Ponty didn’t get to see that happen.

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In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture

In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of CultureIn My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture by Kwame Anthony Appiah
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Kwame Anthony Appiah successfully describes the difficults involved in relating lived experience in Africa with the globalized agency of Africa as a group. Without hammering the post-colonial apparatus too heavily, Appiah navigates the difficult area of defining what makes Africa Africa from as many points of view simultaneously. For Appaih the post-colonial condition is characterized by a variety of competing identities, groupifications from tribal, regional, racial, national, ethnocentric, religious, eurocentric and otherwise. All of these necessitate that the individual successfully navigate as many areas as possible in order to figure out who they are. Identity is destablized because after we reject nationalism as a modernist aesthetic derived from european identity of the 18th+ centuries, what have we got to replace it with? In post-colonial countries, there is a harsh identity that the educated elites begin to have problems with creating — as their uneducated peers do not have access to the same historic basis to define themselves. Yet having a historic basis means losing the very centeredness of those “good ole days” when we were young, and life seemed very clear and stable.

We experience some of this daily, in non-colonized countries as well, but our sense of legitimacy is different. The problem of post-colonialism is that all groupings of identity are competing and yet equally legitimate, in some sense. One can’t deal with the world and completely ignore how the world sees one. The problem is complicated by the fact that many Africa groups do not identify with one another, coming from incompatible worlds, speaking a variety of incompatible languages with incompatible customs. The epilogue Appiah provides detailing his father’s identity and how his father’s death presented a complicated problem dealing with different competing sensibilities of how to honor the man and yet submit to the variety of powers that be.

All in all, a good read, one which suggests that the solution is of yet an unnamed composite identity that only time can seal. Appiah is aspecially adept at navigating the different areas of art, capitalistation, globalisation and identities that characterize a contemporary Africa, a final global limit of capitalist hegemony that is constructed from the top down, leaving the middle confused as to the desired orientation. It’s not a matter of having too many choices, it’s a matter of not even knowing what the proper choice can be, as the competing value systems require constant renegotiation, differentiation and redifferentiation depending on the the multivalience of the identities of the actors on the ground.

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