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I am a strange loop

I Am a Strange LoopI Am a Strange Loop by Douglas R. Hofstadter
My rating: 2 of 5 stars

In I am a strange loop Douglas Hofstader asks the question, who am “I”; what is the self?

Consistent with his position as a non-jargonist, Hofstader refuses to accept domain limits on his question. Thus, Hofstader ends up at an impasse with the terms he uses (self, substance, pattern) as these terms “pull in” the domain limits that he refuses to recognize. Rather than allowing his inquiry to asymptotically approach a correct calibration to highlight the cut that outlines selfhood, (which would require that he float his terms into a new mapping), instead Hofstader insists on the reality of his non-jargon words and implicitly runs us into a kind of Kantian paradox in which on the one hand, we have an “I” of personal experience and on the other, we have only the endless repetition of patterns..

By insisting on a lack of limit in his questioning and forcing the terms he wants to apply to every context of inquiry, ironically, Hofstader’s method recreates the very answer he finds ridiculous: “Soul regression”, i.e., “inside me there is a little man who runs me; inside him there is a little man who runs him… ad infinitum”. By insisting on finding a narcissistic trace of selfhood at each level, his inquiry would have us, at every level, produce a trace of self from each domain to its sub-domain and so on.

Is this not an example of how an inquiry through its formal presentation reproduces the structure of the answer they seek? Hofstader rejects the ridiculous implications of soul regression yet he seems willing to only accept an answer that would structurally be its equivalent.

His discard of jargon in an attempt to be more “real” (good ole American pragmatism) ignores the primary fact that not-all queries can be sensible in only some domains. Looking for the self in physics is narcissistic. It’s like looking for ingredients that make a good breakfast in building code. Incidentally, this reminds me of how Kantian scholars look to critique of pure reason as a book about subjectivity, ignoring the fact that Kant’s main focus is about “pure” reason alone. Subjectivity is just another example of a transcendental chimera. Yet, I digress…

Overall, Hofstader’s book is interesting, and well written, as he explains complex ideas without the use of very technical terms. There is another way to debunk Hofstader’s reasoning however, and that’s to note what he takes for granted conceptually and what he questions. It’s of interesting to note that in many examples, Hofstader replaces nonsense terms for the very objects he questions. When questioning the veracity of mental phenomenon, he does this often. His move is to show that a lack of difference (physically) is no difference. This is silly ludicrous as he is basically transposing one term with a specific context into another domain and then demonstrating through the equivalence of nonsense terms that this object doesn’t hook into anything. This makes Hofstader a bad philosophy though, because in essence he is begging the question.

I think the main critique of this book is that if there is ever a point at which we need jargon, it’s to recognize the complex agency of those fields. Jargon words exist to express relationships that are otherwise difficult to apprehend without those jargonistic contexts. Yes, an unfortunate side effect of jargon is elitism, but that’s often the case with people who want to differentiate themselves for the purposes of status through any means necessary, so we will always have elitism, even without jargon. By removing the jargon and consideration of other kinds of logics, Hofstader limits his inquiry to a single domain, one which he recognizes as being overwhelmingly valid. This creates the same problem as mentioned before: he is looking for an answer in the wrong area. It’s like someone insisting that we find a definition for “life” in terms of building code, or trying to find a hadron in terms of biology — and upon not finding this concept expressible in the domain of their choice, concluding that this concept must be bunk all along.

I am not stating that another domain has the answer, or even a coherent answer. I am simply stating that Hofstader ties his own hands together and then through a series of very clever but limited inquiries begs the question over and over to conclude that the self does not really exist because he can’t find it present in all domains equally. What a narcissistic endeavor he has undertaken.

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Runaways, Vol. 1: Pride and Joy

Runaways Deluxe, Vol. 1Runaways Deluxe, Vol. 1 by Brian K. Vaughan
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

I enjoyed this story. The artwork was good, and the characterization was pretty strongly aligned. No weak characters, although like all comic books, the characters are bitingly logical when they need to be, and able to speak their mind plainly. I like that this story deals with how teenagers understand their parents. It has a kind of rag-tag feel but I think that’s appropriate for runaways. The twist in the end though, is a little heavy handed as it feels too forced. But I guess comic books like to wrap things together in a tight package.

The smattering of kids was very politically correct, which in some ways, is to be expected. All in all, a solid B comic. Reminds me of being a teenager and wanting to be part of a group… and finding yourself part a group that is well, put together through an odd way. But what groups aren’t oddly formed?

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The Timeless Way of Building

The Timeless Way of BuildingThe Timeless Way of Building by Christopher W. Alexander
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

In this thoughtful book, Chris Alexander takes an approach to architecture that understands it through the filter of human (and non-human) agency. He understands that the most useful buildings are ones that are created by the maximization of agency of the people involved, with the utilization of language based patterns that we inhabit to organize our behavior. He writes this book almost as if talking in a dream. Reading this book is a visceral experience of stepping into the a shower.

It’s quite a masterful work, one that deals with the aesthetics of embodiedness rather than the more mundane (but necessary) considerations of budgeting, and so on. In a way, this a book of one who is entering a mastery of the craft, where the detailed considerations fall to the wayside as the considerations of that pure level of agency come into full consideration.

Alexander’s method is more meditative and thoughtful, one that seems geared towards his process of consideration and his familiarity with the “pattern languages” that he utilizes more than anything else. What I find most interesting in this book is that he utilizes spaces from other cultures all the while remarking that such patterns are built into our native language. Are they then, really more a function of our cultural-mind? He suggests we know this intuitively, and yet most people cannot build accordingly as buildings cannot be formed from a poverty of our languaged patterns. So that seems like a big epistemological-cultural hole. But at the same time, his thoughts are so compelling, you want to believe in them. That there is a potentially rich environment of knowledge and consideration that we can dig from, only if we were in tune with it!

It’s no surprise then, that he originates in the Berkeley area, as San Francisco is the hotbed of such hippy mysticism. Still, there’s something to be said for his approach and his “method” which takes a much less mechanical view of building. We should gear our use appropriately to the individuals for whom a building should embody! Our culture is impoverished due to the fragmentation of disciplines and the jealous guardians who don’t want to share with their economic competitors! In a very real way he is talking about Taoism. I look forward to reading more of his work.

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Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science

Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive ScienceComputation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science by Zenon Pylshyn
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Zenon Pylshyn presents a strong foundation for how cognition should be literally thought in terms of: cognition. He provides a functional approach to understanding how humans can be generic thought machines. We seem to have the ability to parrot the functioning of processes themself. His later chapters in which he provides evidence in cognitive studies as to how people seem to follow a process oriented algorithm is the strongest push for this.

Having said that, looking back, it’s apparent that most of his book was simply describing the inner workings of computation and arguing that cognition needed to work on a symbolic level anyway; that the physical materialism was only the vehicle for the functionality that the functionality is what we want. In some ways I am reminded of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell’s attempt at providing a mechanical notion of rationality. Zenon doesn’t go as far, but he wants to provide us a coherent and discrete value system upon which to weigh cognition. This isn’t a bad idea, but it appears that people don’t often make decisions on purely discrete values. We are capable of doing so, but whether or not we do so, especially outside of scientific tests, which always tests for discrete values if possible, is another matter entirely.

This is my second time reading the book. The first time was about ten years ago, and I am not sure I understood the latter parts of it. In a way, Zenon should have probably reversed the order of some of his chapters. He should have provided the cases arguing for cognition as computation with an emphasis on how cognition is process oriented based on functional equivalence, and then provided the chapters on functional architecture’s inner workings. I understand however that he was most likely providing the functional architecture first as a theoretical basis, so that we can understand what we see later on in terms of the theory…but since his book was geared towards arguing for functional architecture as the mode of consideration, it may make more sense to work towards the argument first, rather than having some cognitive proof later on as a BTW, this stuff can be explained by cognition.

In a way, what’s missing about this work is the null state of cognition. That is to say, once we get the system going with equivalences, that’s fine and good. But what mark do we make in order to start it going, where we come to identify as a self? This is perhaps troubling theory but Pylshyn does not get into this. He also seems to think that computation is the literal process of cognition. I would rather consider, in the spirit of functional architecture, that we can’t ever know what the literal process is, we can only denote equivalency in functionality. I guess that makes me fallibilist. It’s suprising that Pylshyn isn’t a fallibist, since he takes some of the question as to how memory works exactly or how processing works exactly as not being important since equivalency trumps actuality when it comes to trying to make sense of how this could work. It doesn’t matter how it works specifically, what matters is that it does in these kinds of algorithmic steps. Perhaps in this sense, this book isn’t that radical after all.

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Reinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global City

Reinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global CityReinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global City by Robert Gottlieb
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Robert Gottlieb considers the city of Los Angeles as the parable of the modern city. The dilemma as he draws it has to do with the conflicting social changes of technology and globalization on the cultural and natural ecologies of the city. Taking Los Angeles as a model, Gottlieb includes an astounding amount of information about Los Angeles in how it developed, changes historically and comes to embody the mixed bag of tricks it is. As a native Angelino I was fascinated by Gottliebs take on the politics and inner struggles of its class, racial and resource management groups.

The weakest part of the book is that Gottlieb splits the conclusion as a non-conclusion. His chapters are fairly strong as he picks certain events to highlight recent developments in the life of the city, particularly with the neighborhood struggles of Latinos. He isn’t however, able to cohere these into one unified vision for what Los Angeles has to overcome. When you contrast this with the strength of his understanding of the ecological struggle (anti-polluters who want to stop people from pollution vs preservationists who want to create more green spaces) you begin to get a grasp of the larger trends that characterize the struggle. When it comes to immigration, gentrification and economics, Gottlieb is a little less insightful and more “just quoting the facts”. In a way, Gottlieb could buffer this area more if he were to introduce a theoretical cut on culture the way he did on ecology.

Additionally, with recent developments in the last 5-10 years, this book could also be updated. The influx of globalization with the housing bubble crash has really hurt working class and middle class families as they are being forced out of the real estate market by outsider money. This added struggle can also help characterize the way in which large cities with their governance and their political cartels allow certain trends to develop.

All in all, not a difficult book to read. But one that was insightful. Much better than some of the other hodge podge urban studies texts that I have examined.

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The Consolations of Philosophy

The Consolations of PhilosophyThe Consolations of Philosophy by Alain de Botton
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

As so many other reviewers have noted, this book is a strange mixture of philosophy and self help. Like the other De Button books I’ve read, it is clear, expressive and makes a driving point. I thought it more like a cliff notes told through the personal lives of these men, more than anything else. De Button wishes to present these at times, difficult philosophers as fodder for how philosophy can be useful. In some ways its appropriate to understand that these ideas came from individuals who had to experience and embody them. In other ways its inappropriate to lessen the force of the ideas in order to humanize them (and use these figures as puppets for their thoughts). I am strangely not liking this book, but at the same time, I also find it to be an interesting and quick read.

Definitely something you can do when you are bored and want some easy distraction. I feel that his chapter on Socrates and Seneca to be the strongest. His chapter on Nietzsche and Montaigne were fairly weak, as at times these chapters seemed an aimless collection of ideas that are somehow related. So in this sense, this book is more fitting as an introduction than anything else. What makes me give it three stars even though its a light introduction is that there isn’t much consolation at all. He should have dropped the self help theme unless he wanted to end the chapters with a stronger sense of self help.

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Being and Other Realities

Being and Other RealitiesBeing and Other Realities by Paul Weiss
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

Paul Weiss gives an interesting take on Being. He offers a content-level split on the domains of Being as a recognition that we cannot have a “flat” experience since so many facets of human experience today are incompossible, on different levels, that do not meet.

Nonetheless, he carries with himself a strong notion of Kantian transcendentalism as a mark on how to appropriate Rationality and Dunamis. What he calls Dunamis is simply contingency, the actualization of being itself. In a way, I think he misses a more elegant picture, one that doesn’t allow for a simple numbering of different domains through various kinds of relations, as he calls each marked by “Ultimates”: “Voluminosity, Coordinator, Affiliator, Assessor” In introducing these terms, Weiss leaves it very vague. Perhaps these are explained in past texts, but he lacks a direct explanation here, and I for one would have liked more direct talk.

It’s great that he wants to bring Being back into the world of humanity, with culture and science. In this sense, he works as a kind of heir to Heidigger. Unfortunately, wanting to say something and being too aloof to say it doesn’t help his argument. The main pull he makes that is different, I believe, to be his attempt to include agency: praxis, as one might call it. Much of what he says however is still too vague to be of use, and it’s simply a translation of what we already know about the world into the philosophic terms he wishes to utilize. In a way, I was at times embarrassed reading this book because he tries so hard to be deep, that he mystifies his relations a little too much. I don’t mind poetic language or mystification but I do not find it useful if you want people to utilize and fully embody the project as you wish to color it.

Weiss however is right, that philosophy is a deeply personal endeavor, one fraught with difficult and self revelation. A difficulty in writing a book like this is being able to effectively convey what you want to say. He doesn’t throw too much history of philosophy at you, or too much jargon, which comes at first as a relief, but very quickly becomes a failure of the book to explain itself better.

What I got out of it was merely a reinforcement of traditional philosophy as I understood it. He needs to demonstrate the feasibility of his terms more as they differentiate and influence one another. Having 4 terms named as he does doesn’t help, since he spends most of the book waxing about the different areas of human experience (nature, cosmos, individuation, culture and so on). His first chapter was very good, however.

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Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”

Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” by Judith Butler
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Here Judith Butler expands on the agental role that “queering” performativity allows for the creation of individuals beyond sexuality. While most of the book is geared towards shoring up (and critiquing) psychoanalytic roles of sexual determination of identity and subjectivity, Butler also includes a few complex examples of how marked positions within the sexual dichotomy as it relates to phallics and sexual identity is problematized.

Although at times with terse sentences that sometimes say too much in one bite, I feel that Butler successfully sees both sides of the issue and navigates through this minefield with a fresh outlook on how sexuality plays a role in determining how we consider ourselves and how we consider others. Using the various figures of transgender and drag and so on, Butler ultimately demonstrates that the agency relationship of performativity still requires that dichotomous hetereosexual cut. Although the performative natures of drag and trans, “queering” normative roles is always a subversive possibility, the reliance of the dichotomous hetereosexual norms as a queering always has the possibility of retroactively reinforcing rather than subverting. Put on the street, a gay pride rally may make non-normative hetereosexuals express themselves with aplomb but it will also allow conservative types to dig further into their entrenchment simply because the dichotomy is always invoked as a way of identifying who we are and where we are located.

This transcendental cut is a difficulty with queering, one that Butler does not seem able to resolve. In a way, this has to do with the fact that despite performativity’s power in one’s ability to redefine one’s self, this is always in relation to how others can define one’s self through their acts. Thus her chapter on “lesbian phallus” and the straight woman as a melancholy lesbian or the straight man as a melancholy straight man is a way to note that all positions are “queering” when we begin to eradicate the normative judgements socially and understand the relations on the sexual “phallic” transcendental as mere positional exchange. We may want to inhabit certain positions above others, and in that sense all identity is performative and “queering” when understood through alternate filters.

In a way, Butler stops in an appropriate spot. She doesn’t go too deep into critiquing transcendental reason (as obviously this would take us afar off field) but she doesn’t shy away from mentioning either, when appropriate. I feel that her ending could be tighter, as she takes a very long time to conclude where she wants to end, but she does the best that she can in outlining the fact that identity is created through sexual performativity as blind truth procedure rather than as an ontological given. She engages feminist theorists to this end in a way that is appropriate, although I feel she spends a little too much time with psychoanalysis, simply because she needs a bulwark that is hetereo-normative in order to sexualize the field in order to make her point.

The twist from ontology to procedure is really the takeaway key here, to how Butler redeploys social identity for all of us. Taken in that approach, in theory, we could have avoided sexuality all together in performativity, but the charged nature of sexuality as a key to identity allows Butler to tackle the subject all the more strongly. Bravo.

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Love in Idleness

Love in IdlenessLove in Idleness by Amanda Craig
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Despite its slow start, with seemingly an impossible number of characters, Craig pulls this story together in a surprising way. We know it’s based on Shakespheare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream. And even still, she still manages to delight and surprise us. In a strange way, what comes out of this is a middle class critique of the wealthy. The loss of influence of the wealthy matron, and the rise of a single mother seem to be the inevitable pact that Craig makes. We admire the wealth. We want the lifestyle, and yet, this is only made possible due to the presence of the wealth and the exotic location of being somewhere (rich and idle) that this story could even happen. Despite the valorization of the middle class value of working for your own way, this story isn’t possible for middle class people.

All the same, Craig manages to make this a compelling read for me, despite the sloven pace. She finds her tempo towards the end, and even though we can tell what the ending will be, it’s still steam rolls forward with all the fury of a comedy. Perhaps this is due to the writer’s energy more than anything else.

The only complaint I have about the story, other than its pacing, is that her attempts to speak for the daughter seem too much. She doesn’t speak through the daughter’s voice, but overlays onto the daughters attitude observations worded concisely as an adult would make. This is a bit detracting, for the “magic” of the People seem only possible through the eyes of a child, and those eyes may, at times, feel a bit contrived.

The burdens of modern motherhood also feel a bit overlaid. The character of Polly and Meenu both add a dimension of reflexivity that doesn’t detract from the story, but adds ruffage that make the entire cast seem more real as people. In a strange way, Polly and Meenu thus “switch places” though this seemed more accidental than planned, since Polly didn’t reflect on this positional twist whatsoever.

Craig’s “twist” with the husband too, didn’t seem terribly put on as an afterthought but it did seem a little deus ex machina. The little brother’s explanation of his big brother also seemed too much like a reflexive self justification. So I thought that Theo’s storyline could have been explained better. In a way, the “update” of Shakespheares work was truly an update, as it told the story through the normalcy of a sitcom cast, meant to appeal to idle upper middle class liberals, who would want a happy ending for everyone.

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Critique of Pure Reason

Critique of Pure ReasonCritique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

So much has been written about Kant. Yes, he’s hard. He’s rammbly. He’s overbearing. But this is due in part to the fact that written in 1781, Kant did not have anyone to talk with. He lacked the ability to find other minds and interface. So in those ten years of silence he talked to himself. And he’s a bit disorganized.

So lets not quibble with the details. Instead let me cut to the heart of what he is saying, in a way that goes beyond any reading of him that I’ve come across yet.

The one aesthetic Kant is after, that allows him to hit a home run, is simply this: All concepts are regulatory.

What Kant is after is to understand the limits of what our regulatory reason can do. This can’t be a function to decide truth. This can’t be a function to decide reality. This isn’t an effort at wisdom. We can use reason to figure out the contours of contingency, of what is given to us. But we cannot use it alone to do anything.

Kant attempts to show us the value of reason in melding together different functions (be it imaginary or understanding or reason) and in this way seeks to highlight the vehicle by which we can come to grips with phenomenon. So weaknesses?

Yes, Alan Badiou is partially correct: Kant’s system requires that he created a negated structure, the noumenal upon which to hang his phenomenon. But Badiou is also partially incorrect. Kant was the first to recognize, through the figure of the transcendental, the necessity of having an apparatus of measurement upon which to solidify a phenomenal field. That is to say, phenomenon cannot interface at a consistent level unless there was a larger field to unify them as equivalent. Hence, this transcendental. Kant laid out the form for us, to quantize, to organize whatever we apperceptive. Historically, this is how Heidigger is able to note that Kant is Modernism Part II. Descartes introduces the need the for a transcendental field (in the form of the mental realm) but Kant completes his thought. Hegel is the application for this field to surject unto Absolute Knowledge.

So we miss the point when we quibble with his mathematics or his bad physics, or how he didn’t understand quantum mechanics. None of his examples matter in their detail. What matters is the principle behind this critique, one which reveals that concepts are regulatory.

And while it’s true, as Kristeva points out, Kant did not “discover” negation (leave this to Hegel as a way for him to bind according to the dialectical-synthesis process) Kant does reach negativity. Negativity is necessary as the limits for a given concept. And if you look at towards the end of this masterful work, and ignore his annoying repetition, you come to understand the antinomies are but examples of the limits of conceptualization itself.

Yes, Dedekind’s cut of real numbers or Badiou’s theory of points belie the same “cut” as Kant’s antinomies. By injecting reason in at various arbitrary positions, we can cut a dichotomy into a mass to differentiate positions. Such positions then become expressive of the cut, which we use as an absolute reference. This reference allows us to orient ourselves. So yes, when only we do not “extend reason beyond the bounds of experience” can we avoid these antinomies, Kant highlights these antinomies as way of showing how reason provides the extension of any given cut, which are always contingent by arbitrary parameters, be they a sensuous apperception or some inherited folly of the imagination. This section following The Ideal of Pure Reason all the way to the end of the work, gives us the apex of Kant’s reach. He was articulated much, but never brought it back around to exploding the limits of concepts themselves. He could only fumble and say, well, they are regulatory.

Not only are they regulatory but they are necessary for the organization, the quantization into phenomenon, inasmuch as the sensuous, as he calls it, is necessary for logic to take a stance. We need contingency to make a mark somewhere, otherwise we get nothing but pure logical presentation without any place for differentiation into a real context. It is this dual refractory nature that presents us with agential cuts to determine the nature of what is real, a mixture of contingent sensuousness and transcendental formalism. This mixture however, isn’t stable, it belies on the context of previous cuts, usually derived from our human need to have agency in limited domains.

This is the start of post-modern fragmentation of knowledge, as each domain acquires its own organizing cut.

But this is also well beyond the context of where Kant was going.

So if you keep in mind the “regulatory” nature of conceptualization, you’ll come to a fruitation that is far more radical than any reading of Kant that I’ve ever come across. I think you’ll find as well, that this radical negativity, necessary to cut concepts out of the larger folds, is why Deleuze found himself returning to Kant towards the end of his career. In this way Kant is still more radical than most anyone gives him credit for… and in this sense, his admiration for David Hume speaks volumes about where he’s going with this critique. In fact, he exceeds Hume in this way, by abstracting Hume’s explanation of human behavior as conventional habit into the modality of regulatory concepts. Kant finds the limit of reason but in doing so he is able to demonstrate how reason is utilized to supplement understanding beyond the bounds of experience. His four antinomies are but possibilities for unfounded regulations, many of which Hume would simply call “conventions”.

To wrap. I for one, am glad to have Kant as a guide. As staunch and “joyless” as he is, there is a core of clear direction within his thought that allows him to calibrate his awareness to a finely tuned point regardless of content. Kant turns rationality in on itself and is able to note the different vectors within rationality as a manifold, a field of its own connectivity. Kant adds these various example, these vectors together, rotates rationality as a vehicle of deployment and is able to find a navel limit within rationality, negativity on the one hand, sensuous apperception on the other, and the chimera of the transcendental dialectic on the third. This groundwork of pure formalism is the striking aesthetic consistency that belies German philosophy post-Kant, while marking the groundwork for the very abstract structural formalism that is to follow in mathematics and science in the 19th century and beyond. Without having the ability to negate all that does not logically follow, or being able to create limited phenomenon within a transcendental domain, we would not have any technological or mathematical achievements today.

This isn’t to say that Kant should be given credit for this because he “invented” this. Rather, he was simply the first to stake out the parameters for the nature of these kinds of endeavors, endeavors which continue to structure human experience and behavior today. No doubt, if Kant did not do this, then someone else would have formalized this exercise, eventually. Still, to one lonely man in Königsberg, thank you.

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