« Posts under manifesto

The Baphomet

The BaphometThe Baphomet by Pierre Klossowski
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Klossowski writes beyond our sense of realism, to bring about meditations on life, death, morality and so on, from the depths of gnostic heresy. The mix of breaths reveals the hallucinatory experience wherein hermeneutic literalness exceeds our sense of self. This is the gap inherent within language and the gap inherent within ourselves brought to page.

It’s difficult to write about this book, since it defies any sense of genre. Obviously people would say this is experimental. But it succeeds in convincing us that this view — of the intermix of personal, interpersonal, political, social, and so on — that reality is interconnected with knowledge and morality. How we live and exist among others is not an actual reality the way most of us believe, but an intermix within the gap inherent between us and others, within us and within others. We navigate this interstice often with blind faith. When we start to question the fundamentals of an ideology, or when we expect that within a view the truth will be apparent, that is where we become more lost than ever.

Although this book is a fiction it shows us something of how we are by showing us how we illicitly exist within the gaps of our knowledge by extending everything at once and contradicting itself in the point of the other.

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The Diamond Age: or, A Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer

The Diamond Age: or, A Young Lady's Illustrated PrimerThe Diamond Age: or, A Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer by Neal Stephenson
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Perhaps this is a matter that Stephenson is a programmer, but despite the amazing awesomeness of his expansion, the concept of creating a whole only from formalistically aligned agents is the only apparent limitation of this book.

What is the most futuristic about this book is what’s most interesting: beyond consciousness is material agency. Beyond technology is the conflation of agency and consciousness. Here we get a primer that reflects back the sum total of various social memes, presented as a subversive text that aligns to a developing consciousness. In a sense, primers have existed, but always under master guidance: tarot cards, for example. Or gnostic religious texts. Such high level manipulation of form is today, only given within a technical division. What is necessary for a developing consciousness though, is the ability to abstract patterns and then run their consistency forwards and backwards. From there, the partial worlds aligned by agency and ideology are at a loss as to the next direction.

This is where Stephenson turns to the mysterious seed, which is little more than a view espoused by a nanotech engineer. This view is the necessary meld of programmable reality, a belief in the completeness of human conception to manage material universes ideologically.

Where Stephenson ends mysteriously is in Nell’s subversion of the primer’s creator’s view, to reject a totalized agency of human consciousness/sexuality — where humans are little more than computational components. She releases from that mix individuality, and in that sense, subverts the primer completely.

Diamond Age is a view of human consciousness; whats at stake is our very freedom, to be ruled completely by managed eusociality (through the Victorians, or otherwise). Stephenson subverts the logic of his text in this ending, by choosing human freedom. In that sense, this utopic vision is dystopic because he shows us how it is limited, how it collapses, and is hypocritical to those who grew under its auspices but do not understand that the world they grew up in is an answer to a past problem, on that may no longer be relevant for today.

In that sense, as the little sisters show us, those of us raised by a system become formalized — indoctrinated within that system. This is not the answer to human consciousness as it is not a solution for adaptability. What we want is for people to grow up able to choose for themselves. To this end, Stephenson shows us that the primer used mechanistically as a mass solution shows its formalistic weakness. Like stock market strategies that profit only in the hands of the few so truly subversive systems only work when they are hidden.

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The Archaeology of Knowledge

The Archaeology of KnowledgeThe Archaeology of Knowledge by Michel Foucault
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

In many ways, this book serves as a pause for Foucault. It’s a mostly incomplete work in the sense that he describes what he has done and what he is going to do. And that’s all. So I guess I am saying this is very much a kind of aesthetics manifesto, or a discipline manifesto.

This book is also extremely influential for cultural criticism, as it highlights an approach to discourse, citing what discourse is and how discourse is to be understood as its own field.

What makes this book annoying, and in my opinion incomplete, is that while Foucault is able to say what he is intending to do and what level of “cut” Foucault is taking to be the object of study, Foucault is still unable to unexplain how or why this occurs or of what benefit it will be. In a real way works like Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things allows Foucault to see a connection of language that is a consistency in its own right, but he is unable to account for how to really understand what this level of slice means or how it fits in.

All he is able to say at this point is, look what this new and strange view of things is. Now that I see it, watch me go forth.

In a way, Foucault studies where he knows best. Discourse. Language. Knowledge that formulates itself and in that formulation shapes itself and its object of study. Where or how or why this happens is beyond Foucault. And that is kind of annoying. This discursive approach is a calibration to its own (in)consistencies, seemingly for its own sake. The Order of Things while more mysterious is far more ambitious that this work, which in a way, is a backwards step for Foucault to re-orient his approaches.

I suppose that in its time, this was cutting edge. This book was a major influence. Now it feels like staring at shadows.

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On the Shortness of Life

On the Shortness of LifeOn the Shortness of Life by Seneca
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Seneca was a very influential thinker. One of the early romans he was also the teacher of Nero. As a stoic, one sees that they approached life reasonably, taking the aesthetic of rationality derived from their Greek heritage seriously. They made that mode their way of being.

There are no lofty concepts here. Only an attempt to exercise being without ego, life without excess, keeping ones feet on the ground at all times. Through examples from history and some personal history, (even on writing to his mother about his own state ordered suicide) Seneca orients us to live not out of fear, want self satisfaction but out of being what we are; a spot on change to go forth and be the best person we can, no more no less.

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The Name of the Rose

The Name of the RoseThe Name of the Rose by Umberto Eco
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

As always, Umberto Eco is impeccable in the detailed twist of his own imagination and intellectual prowess. This tale starts off from a place of reason, in the cloister of an abby in Italy, the centerpiece of calmness in the medieval world, and ends with the full force of unreason pouring down. A mystery that is solved and revealed to be nothing more than a non-mystery in the sense of an evil master, and the chaos that ensues when we strive too deeply for what we desire.

The happenings are mysterious and too great to be recounted in a way. Towards the end, you may wonder what is going to become, how can Eco wrap this up? He does so in a way that is satisfying too. The folly of wisdom and the necessary strength of faith. Not in ourselves but as a reference to anchor us.

In a way, we still fight over the nominalisms of various movements. We take too seriously the differences we make of each other and ignore the fact that the center changes with each movement. Very poetic ending, Eco.

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The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe

The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the UniverseThe Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe by Roger Penrose
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

In this amazing book, Roger Penrose looks for a very fundamental issue.

He is looking for a single metric to describe everything.

This is not a unit of reality, however, although this is how he poses the issue.

The problem with selecting a metric, as he shows us over and over, lies in how different metrics arise from localizations on various manifolds. As these metrics are extended beyond the localization, the very structure of these metrics will threaten to buckle. In many instances, the metrics (and their attendant relationships) will no longer be applicable. What this means, in the Kantian (and Badiouian sense) is that these relationships’s applicability will become “undecidable”. In some extreme cases, the relationships may even break down. For instance, black holes are a problem because the expressed relationships that emerge from physics experiments prove to be untenable in black holes (and the big bang) as these relationships decohere and infinities and zeros pop out everywhere.

This search for a metric leads Penrose to reject string theory as a viable relationship form. Each dimension is an extension of the 3 + 1 dimensions of space and time. For instance, gravity is a dimension, weak force is a dimension. Each dimension is an independent mathematical vector of a different “inertial” influence. Additionally, the mathematics of string theory, as well as other theories, proves to be too illusionary. As with post-structural critiques of modernism, Penrose points out that the consistency of string theory relies on theoretical supplements/signs that are attached onto the positions of various types in order to maintain coherency. For instance, superpartners, which have no physical correlative. In other words, the mathematical proliferation of dimensions as well as its immanent affects proves to be unweldly to Penrose because the coherence of the relationships are maintained by theoretical enforcement rather than any direct correlation of math and physical experimentation.

If Penrose was familiar with Badiou, Kant and Derrida, he would be able to recognize that the undecideability of supersymmetry and string theory result from these theoretical supplements. The supplements provide the missing pieces to cohere the theory, so physical experiments prove to be incomplete in their testing. As Penrose points out, string theorists in failing to find superpartners can always push the calibration of their theory to include these partners, just at higher energy levels, which can always lie beyond the ability of technology to generate.

In this sense, it seems to me that string theory and supersymmetry are antinomies of the Kantian variety. Penrose falls fault to this when he theorizes that Quantum Field Theory can be modified (rather than the Einstein’s general relativity) by changing the cut off metric. This is in line with all his discussions to “renormalize” the math so as to remove the variance accumulated by extending localized relations from beyond the area of origin on the manifold. We can always enforce a consistency of a given domain in two ways.

1. To provide a “superpartner” to supplement the terms, to keep phenomenon visible to one another within the domain, as a motion of immanence, as Derrida suggests.

Or.

2. To encapsulate a domain by limiting its identity to its other. From there, we can radically reduce the other to zero, thereby hiding the limitations of a domain, as with Moffe & Laulau with their Hegemony or as with Badiou with a basic atomic “cut” to center the domain as with Being and Event II.

Both of these strategies amount to the same kind of forced coherency by mapping a domain rigidly.

Penrose does offer his own favorite solution; his Twistor theory, which removes the need for extra dimensions beyond 3 + 1. Additionally, he considers this theory by collapsing all the different vector differences held cosmically in string theory into immanent relations that are founded on the very “knots” of space, so that the pre-space twistors contain the information that wider “vibrations” are meant to express. Both theories are incompatible in this regard because of their huge difference in scale.

And while Penrose admits that twistor theory adds nothing physically; that it’s just another way of viewing a situation mathematically, he also realizes the need for us to see things differently than we have.

It is this adherence to a particular view that causes all the problems in the first place. If you look at how these different views are constructed, you’ll see the mathematicians switch from one domain to another through various class equivalences whenever it suits them. When they need to express vectors they will jump to a manifold model, or a more generic (abstract) deformation of an algebra. In other words, we lack enough views. So we supplement the one we have in an attempt to normalize them.

Curiousier still is Penrose’s tiny discussion of consciousness in which he attempts to “renormalize” consciousness in terms of objective reduction. He theorizes that the waveform reduction that collapses due to quantum gravity may be at the seat of consciousness’s ability to complexly surject different sensory views into coherency. This suggestion is of the same kind as his forced synthesis of twistor theory. The satisfaction of trying to find a single metric, a single complex knot of relations that cannot be unraveled but contains all the “moves” is like a physicist trapped on a chess board recognizing the orthogonal formation of board, or as in Futurama the Professor discovering the smallest unit that constitutes the universe is the pixel.

In a real way, Penrose seeks to calibrate physics to the mathematical domain. He doesn’t want beautiful math that doesn’t apply, that is in excess of physics. This is why he creates that chart twice, in which the mathematical is the Truth of which the entirety of the physical is mapped; although mentality is generated from the physical and mathematical/Truth is generated from that.

The Platonic ideologue he insists on lies on the equivalence of function, on the purity of the sameness of process from point to point of the same type. Never-mind that the subatomic particles we find today are largely generated from artificial means. Penrose would assume as sameness of process that forces a universalization, but that is the way metaphysics and science both work, to equate different phenomenon as being identical based on narrow definitions of rational equivalence. This may work in some areas, but as we see, all relations are born locally, within a limited scope. Their extension cosmically creates the basis for which we start to see a degradation of relation qua variance (pollution, or various forces of form-fitting). After all, we can have no irrationality without first being able to posit a rational sheet of complete consistency.

Nonetheless, although this is a lengthy book it is still beautifully written. I wonder who Penrose’s audience is, for he approaches much mathematical complexity in such a short time, talking about basic principles like polynomials and trigonometry before jumping into Lagrangian manifolds and so on. Still, if you hunger for complexity and abstraction, here it is. Much of his explanations of very complex concepts are very clear, although at times we could use more handholding. His pictures are also very interesting and complement his point nicely.

Well worth the effort to read.

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On the Improvement of the Understanding / The Ethics / Correspondence (v. 2)

On the Improvement of the Understanding / The Ethics / Correspondence (v. 2)On the Improvement of the Understanding / The Ethics / Correspondence by Baruch Spinoza
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Perhaps it is the repeated exposure to Deleuze’s Spinoza and readings of this slender collection that leaves me a little blank on what to say. Spinoza remains the imminent thinker of substance. Pre-Kantian, he shows us a world where relation and thought interact as pure geometry. His aesthetics for human understanding and interaction remain inspiring, even after all these years. While he encapsulates his system through the excessive nominalisation of God, Spinoza is able to return for us not a transcendental limit, of a lesser obscurity, one that reflects our limitation as beings of finiteness. This is different from a transcendental completeness, in which inconsistency is hidden through contingency. For Spinoza, there is only one manifold of infinite variety but of the same substance. Spinoza still preaches a completeness through God’s perfection but he shows us that inconsistency is only given our modality as finite beings.

Still strange and interesting is his conception beyond Good and Evil, in which these are layers of human localisation. This is almost Buddhist in conception. What makes Spinoza a philosopher is His calibration to the “faculty” of rationalism as the modality for emotion, understanding and modal being. His religiousity is instead, an extension of his thought, a characterization of the common mode of relation available for him at the time. If Spinoza were alive today, he might as well extended his geometric volume from pure relation of substance to algorithmic functionality.

His correspondence is interesting though, as it is able to show how he deals with a variety of different people and points of view.

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Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge

Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge by Paul Karl Feyerabend
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Feyerabend writes a difficult book here, but one which is necessary. Taking a radically different perspective on the aesthetics of what theory is, Feyerabend attack one of the scared cows of science and mathematics — that of consistency.

In some ways, Feyerabend could have raised objections more metaphysically — that ideas have at their germination roots outside of a given domain — that culture plays a role in utilizing domains in one area to influence another — that science is a socially generated practice, on that mistakes methodology for reality — but in other ways, Feyerabend does well by sticking very close to his topic. His use of Galileo as an example is of interest, since he returns to it often but it is in his later chapters that his critique really stands out.

Basically Feyerabend shows us that knowledge is always procedural. Knowledge and theory are generated through processes of agency. By attempting to manipulate or influence a specific phenomenon, we generate procedures to gain access to that phenomenon. This requires that we calibrate our actions to an appropriate cut. Nonetheless, any cut we calibrate to is simultaneously a distortion of the very object of study, because it casts it in a certain relationship. Thus

Expressing it differently, we may say that the assumption of a single coherent world-view that underlies all of science is either a metaphysical hypothesis trying to anticipate a future unity, or a pedagogical fake; or it is an attempt to show, by a judicious up-and downgrading of disciplines, that a synthesis has already been achieved. This is how fans of uniformity proceeded in the past (cf. Plato’s lists of subjects in Chapter vii of his Republic), these are the ways that are still being used today. A more realistic account, however, would be that ‘[t]here is no simple “scientific” map of reality–or if there were, it would be much too complicated and unwieldy to be grasped or used by anyone. But there are many different maps of reality, from a variety of scientific viewpoints’

One should be quick to realize that Feyerabend is not against science at all; in fact he encourages it in his “irresponible” and “anarchist” ways. What Feyerabend is objecting to is the imagined consistency/consensus of science, a “sacred cow” of science all the more because science doesn’t need such a “petit object a” in order to function. One of the underlying criticisms that Feyerabend levels is that all social institutions (including science) are in fact first and foremost, social institutions. We understand this to be even more true when we realize that the academic/scientific community often operates as a ranking system more than as a theory generating procedure; that grants and individuals are awarded more for position than they are for work. That the entire procedure of science is one of self promotion (through the modality of whatever science they are using) more than anything else.

In some ways, Feyerabend does well to criticize past methods in order to highlight inconsistencies in how they are aestheticized and presented. But this of course, will stop no one, because past procedures are in the past. After all, aren’t we better now?

I cannot stop praising his book, because there is so much in here. I appreciate the clarity and freshness with which Feyeraband approaches this topic. On a more abstract level, one that I think Feyerabend would appreciate, is that we should approach all polemics and theories understanding that they are generated through the auspices of their own consistency and meaning. We often reject theories and ideas just like we reject people — they either don’t make the cut due to some personal inclination, or they are competitors for the same social capital. Often, these are the same thing. I whole heartedly agree with Feyerabend. With the lack of any “true” authority, one that “naturally” supersedes whatever authority we could imagine here on Earth (as there is none like that), we ought to utilize any theory that allows us to increase our agency. Should we not desire any particular agency, we should embrace any idea for what it is worth, at the time that we need it. Of course, some ideas will become undecideable should the foundation for that idea be incommensurable with our own foundation. But that is not a fault of that idea. This is merely the fault of our own localization. Sometimes, a question simply isn’t available from a given point of view because its context is not available.

This is of course, in a big way, where Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason steps in, and it is at this point that Feyerabend stops short. He doesn’t wish to get into the logistics of what is reasonable. He only wishes that we set ourselves free of the chains by which we adhere to an image of what good science ought to look like so that we can do better science. And for that, I find that there is a resonance with martial arts, or with music or any other technicality/agency. We must learn the basics to define what the modality is. From that point on, mastery begins when we start to release ourselves from technique in order to be more appropriate to whatever situation we find ourselves in, simply because technique is a pedagogical tool, and its rigid organization will make certain acts impossible because they are incommensurable with that technique.

Ultimately, consistency is how we make sense of a localization for the purposes of ordinance (organization). We must never mistake the map for the territory since the territory is always changing as our desires/designs and agential relations change — so we too change.

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The Timeless Way of Building

The Timeless Way of BuildingThe Timeless Way of Building by Christopher W. Alexander
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

In this thoughtful book, Chris Alexander takes an approach to architecture that understands it through the filter of human (and non-human) agency. He understands that the most useful buildings are ones that are created by the maximization of agency of the people involved, with the utilization of language based patterns that we inhabit to organize our behavior. He writes this book almost as if talking in a dream. Reading this book is a visceral experience of stepping into the a shower.

It’s quite a masterful work, one that deals with the aesthetics of embodiedness rather than the more mundane (but necessary) considerations of budgeting, and so on. In a way, this a book of one who is entering a mastery of the craft, where the detailed considerations fall to the wayside as the considerations of that pure level of agency come into full consideration.

Alexander’s method is more meditative and thoughtful, one that seems geared towards his process of consideration and his familiarity with the “pattern languages” that he utilizes more than anything else. What I find most interesting in this book is that he utilizes spaces from other cultures all the while remarking that such patterns are built into our native language. Are they then, really more a function of our cultural-mind? He suggests we know this intuitively, and yet most people cannot build accordingly as buildings cannot be formed from a poverty of our languaged patterns. So that seems like a big epistemological-cultural hole. But at the same time, his thoughts are so compelling, you want to believe in them. That there is a potentially rich environment of knowledge and consideration that we can dig from, only if we were in tune with it!

It’s no surprise then, that he originates in the Berkeley area, as San Francisco is the hotbed of such hippy mysticism. Still, there’s something to be said for his approach and his “method” which takes a much less mechanical view of building. We should gear our use appropriately to the individuals for whom a building should embody! Our culture is impoverished due to the fragmentation of disciplines and the jealous guardians who don’t want to share with their economic competitors! In a very real way he is talking about Taoism. I look forward to reading more of his work.

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Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”

Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” by Judith Butler
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Here Judith Butler expands on the agental role that “queering” performativity allows for the creation of individuals beyond sexuality. While most of the book is geared towards shoring up (and critiquing) psychoanalytic roles of sexual determination of identity and subjectivity, Butler also includes a few complex examples of how marked positions within the sexual dichotomy as it relates to phallics and sexual identity is problematized.

Although at times with terse sentences that sometimes say too much in one bite, I feel that Butler successfully sees both sides of the issue and navigates through this minefield with a fresh outlook on how sexuality plays a role in determining how we consider ourselves and how we consider others. Using the various figures of transgender and drag and so on, Butler ultimately demonstrates that the agency relationship of performativity still requires that dichotomous hetereosexual cut. Although the performative natures of drag and trans, “queering” normative roles is always a subversive possibility, the reliance of the dichotomous hetereosexual norms as a queering always has the possibility of retroactively reinforcing rather than subverting. Put on the street, a gay pride rally may make non-normative hetereosexuals express themselves with aplomb but it will also allow conservative types to dig further into their entrenchment simply because the dichotomy is always invoked as a way of identifying who we are and where we are located.

This transcendental cut is a difficulty with queering, one that Butler does not seem able to resolve. In a way, this has to do with the fact that despite performativity’s power in one’s ability to redefine one’s self, this is always in relation to how others can define one’s self through their acts. Thus her chapter on “lesbian phallus” and the straight woman as a melancholy lesbian or the straight man as a melancholy straight man is a way to note that all positions are “queering” when we begin to eradicate the normative judgements socially and understand the relations on the sexual “phallic” transcendental as mere positional exchange. We may want to inhabit certain positions above others, and in that sense all identity is performative and “queering” when understood through alternate filters.

In a way, Butler stops in an appropriate spot. She doesn’t go too deep into critiquing transcendental reason (as obviously this would take us afar off field) but she doesn’t shy away from mentioning either, when appropriate. I feel that her ending could be tighter, as she takes a very long time to conclude where she wants to end, but she does the best that she can in outlining the fact that identity is created through sexual performativity as blind truth procedure rather than as an ontological given. She engages feminist theorists to this end in a way that is appropriate, although I feel she spends a little too much time with psychoanalysis, simply because she needs a bulwark that is hetereo-normative in order to sexualize the field in order to make her point.

The twist from ontology to procedure is really the takeaway key here, to how Butler redeploys social identity for all of us. Taken in that approach, in theory, we could have avoided sexuality all together in performativity, but the charged nature of sexuality as a key to identity allows Butler to tackle the subject all the more strongly. Bravo.

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