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The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money

The General Theory of Employment, Interest and MoneyThe General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

Keynes is often touted as the most famous of economists, mainly because he was most influential as to how governments and economies are run today. We do have to recognize that his theory was the product of his times, and that economics as a whole is still developing.

In a sense though, Keynes is less a creative theoretician than he is a mechanic. If you understand neoclassical economics as a set of relations, Keynes is best understood as ushering a new era of economics in which the “natural” point of equilibrium is no longer viable. This is like the difference between structuralism and post-structuralism. Keynes allows us to understand that given a particular initial context, the “natural” equilibrium could be anywhere else. This allows governments today to twist the economy around so that we don’t focus so much on producer credit as we do on consumer credit. Keynes has found a new way to exploit a market bubble, one founded on consumption.

We are paying the price for his ideas.

Yet his ideas are really only a mechanic’s patch. If the machine works only in certain temperatures, then let us keep that machine in those temperatures. Not revolutionary. Just understanding a limit of economics’ rationalism.

Towards the end of his book he makes a stab at understanding the limits to the formal limits of economics when he realizes that all he is really doing is questioning assumptions in economics. He ends by stating that often economists only go for the logically consistent and easy answers rather than risk being wrong going for an obscure truth. He admires those of the latter but isn’t seemingly willing to build a new theory based off of any obscure truths. In this sense, his questioning of economics rationality is a questioning of his own theories as well. Does he undermine his book? In a way he does. He should have started with this foundation instead. But alas, I guess Keynes is more an academic than anything else.

I did find his writing to be stuffy. His precision is remarkable but his writing is too flat. He could emphasize his ideas better and explicate them by speaking sometimes of an outside of economics.

I think that as an economist he is important to understanding where we come from. After Keynes we got away from all the speculation panics that used to rock the economy every 20 years with its horrid unemployment. Too often, as many of these reviewers demonstrate, that, in not knowing where Keynes is responding to, we only see the insufficiency of his ideas. And so, his ideas are too dated. As a mechanic he helped usher in an era of abundance but this abundance was found on tooling the neoclassical system and “hacking” it to work a certain way, not on building a new theory, one that would ultimately be sustainable. Our current consumer and government debt in sustaining endless demand for relatively full employment is proving to be worrisome.

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The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion

The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and ReligionThe Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion by Pope Benedict XVI
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

This was less a debate than, as the introduction says, an short summation by two thinkers of their thoughts. One secular neo-Kantian, Jurgen Habermas, and one Roman Catholic (to be Pope) Joseph Ratzinger about the necessity of society’s two halves, secular and religious to learn from one another.

Both recognize that the organization of society is in some sense what religion excels at; the mapping of human organization and understanding to solidarity and justification of a statehood. They both also recognize that religion in some sense goes too far in organization; that there are pathologies that religion can force because it is mobilized too far in a particular way.

This gets at the heart of human eusociality. We want to belong. We are made to calibrate with one another. This touches on areas that reason (qua secularization) cannot reach. Societies do need to account for the non-reasoning part of people. People need to have calibrating experiences to be at the same level with one another. Instead, we have ultra-rationalism in the form of markets engineering approaches that do not calibrate people, but instead, allow people dominance and agency over one another. Having a point outside of reason, one that signals for people direction is the function of religion that both thinkers believe secular society can benefit from.

What’s interesting is that historically, religion and culture were the same. It is only through the split offered by reason as a different mode of organization that splits religion and culture apart. A secularized religion, seems to be the synthesis with which both thinkers offer, although the book merely ends with Pope Benedict (Joseph Ratzinger)’s essay.

Short book, but interesting. A quick read.

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Critique of Political Economy, Vol 1: The Process of Production of Capital

Capital: Critique of Political Economy, Vol 1: The Process of Production of CapitalCapital: Critique of Political Economy, Vol 1: The Process of Production of Capital by Karl Marx
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

What hasn’t been said about Capital before? The least interesting parts were the areas where Marx goes on about exploitation. This makes it very obvious that we are supposed to identify with the working class. After all, we all work for a living at something, don’t we? We all have bosses. Yet this does beg the question a little, as this sets up a self-fulfilling situation. Who is it that gets rich off of us? We don’t see them.

One of the angles that is often missed about Capital is that it is a book derived from economic principles. Marx takes it for granted that land and are production and value. He also points out that excess population will keep us poor. Land is always a problem, of course, and too many people does make a job more precious. What is happening now though, is that technology is making labor less and less important. The labor Marx spoke of is just one stage of capital. In “first world” countries we have moved mostly beyond the factory (and some farming) jobs so often cited in this book, into a different kind of economy.

It strikes me that a supplement to Capital would be to recognize that it is not capitalism that is the supreme model for civilization (producing class struggle) but it is in fact valorization and management of production/resources that produces struggle. There is also, the additional factor that class struggle is just one way to slice social antagonisms. The multitude of class and identity conflicts express themselves economically in a variety of ways that aren’t simply class, but also gender, race, religion, disability and so on. In a way, we need a more general account of social production, of which Marx showed us but only presented in a limited way.

He does however, largely through David Ricardo’s work, show us the impossible signifying bond: between exchange-value and use-value. He also is able to demonstrate how credit creates another impossible signifying bond to guarantee further exchange-value, making it a transcendental (pathological) signification. I thought that Capital would be a boring book to read. In a way, the ideas are so extended today throughout so many philosophers that, while rather long, was a snap to read.

I am told that Engels really changed the character of the book, from philosophy to a call for class uprising. I am curious as to how much this is true.

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I am a strange loop

I Am a Strange LoopI Am a Strange Loop by Douglas R. Hofstadter
My rating: 2 of 5 stars

In I am a strange loop Douglas Hofstader asks the question, who am “I”; what is the self?

Consistent with his position as a non-jargonist, Hofstader refuses to accept domain limits on his question. Thus, Hofstader ends up at an impasse with the terms he uses (self, substance, pattern) as these terms “pull in” the domain limits that he refuses to recognize. Rather than allowing his inquiry to asymptotically approach a correct calibration to highlight the cut that outlines selfhood, (which would require that he float his terms into a new mapping), instead Hofstader insists on the reality of his non-jargon words and implicitly runs us into a kind of Kantian paradox in which on the one hand, we have an “I” of personal experience and on the other, we have only the endless repetition of patterns..

By insisting on a lack of limit in his questioning and forcing the terms he wants to apply to every context of inquiry, ironically, Hofstader’s method recreates the very answer he finds ridiculous: “Soul regression”, i.e., “inside me there is a little man who runs me; inside him there is a little man who runs him… ad infinitum”. By insisting on finding a narcissistic trace of selfhood at each level, his inquiry would have us, at every level, produce a trace of self from each domain to its sub-domain and so on.

Is this not an example of how an inquiry through its formal presentation reproduces the structure of the answer they seek? Hofstader rejects the ridiculous implications of soul regression yet he seems willing to only accept an answer that would structurally be its equivalent.

His discard of jargon in an attempt to be more “real” (good ole American pragmatism) ignores the primary fact that not-all queries can be sensible in only some domains. Looking for the self in physics is narcissistic. It’s like looking for ingredients that make a good breakfast in building code. Incidentally, this reminds me of how Kantian scholars look to critique of pure reason as a book about subjectivity, ignoring the fact that Kant’s main focus is about “pure” reason alone. Subjectivity is just another example of a transcendental chimera. Yet, I digress…

Overall, Hofstader’s book is interesting, and well written, as he explains complex ideas without the use of very technical terms. There is another way to debunk Hofstader’s reasoning however, and that’s to note what he takes for granted conceptually and what he questions. It’s of interesting to note that in many examples, Hofstader replaces nonsense terms for the very objects he questions. When questioning the veracity of mental phenomenon, he does this often. His move is to show that a lack of difference (physically) is no difference. This is silly ludicrous as he is basically transposing one term with a specific context into another domain and then demonstrating through the equivalence of nonsense terms that this object doesn’t hook into anything. This makes Hofstader a bad philosophy though, because in essence he is begging the question.

I think the main critique of this book is that if there is ever a point at which we need jargon, it’s to recognize the complex agency of those fields. Jargon words exist to express relationships that are otherwise difficult to apprehend without those jargonistic contexts. Yes, an unfortunate side effect of jargon is elitism, but that’s often the case with people who want to differentiate themselves for the purposes of status through any means necessary, so we will always have elitism, even without jargon. By removing the jargon and consideration of other kinds of logics, Hofstader limits his inquiry to a single domain, one which he recognizes as being overwhelmingly valid. This creates the same problem as mentioned before: he is looking for an answer in the wrong area. It’s like someone insisting that we find a definition for “life” in terms of building code, or trying to find a hadron in terms of biology — and upon not finding this concept expressible in the domain of their choice, concluding that this concept must be bunk all along.

I am not stating that another domain has the answer, or even a coherent answer. I am simply stating that Hofstader ties his own hands together and then through a series of very clever but limited inquiries begs the question over and over to conclude that the self does not really exist because he can’t find it present in all domains equally. What a narcissistic endeavor he has undertaken.

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Reinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global City

Reinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global CityReinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global City by Robert Gottlieb
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Robert Gottlieb considers the city of Los Angeles as the parable of the modern city. The dilemma as he draws it has to do with the conflicting social changes of technology and globalization on the cultural and natural ecologies of the city. Taking Los Angeles as a model, Gottlieb includes an astounding amount of information about Los Angeles in how it developed, changes historically and comes to embody the mixed bag of tricks it is. As a native Angelino I was fascinated by Gottliebs take on the politics and inner struggles of its class, racial and resource management groups.

The weakest part of the book is that Gottlieb splits the conclusion as a non-conclusion. His chapters are fairly strong as he picks certain events to highlight recent developments in the life of the city, particularly with the neighborhood struggles of Latinos. He isn’t however, able to cohere these into one unified vision for what Los Angeles has to overcome. When you contrast this with the strength of his understanding of the ecological struggle (anti-polluters who want to stop people from pollution vs preservationists who want to create more green spaces) you begin to get a grasp of the larger trends that characterize the struggle. When it comes to immigration, gentrification and economics, Gottlieb is a little less insightful and more “just quoting the facts”. In a way, Gottlieb could buffer this area more if he were to introduce a theoretical cut on culture the way he did on ecology.

Additionally, with recent developments in the last 5-10 years, this book could also be updated. The influx of globalization with the housing bubble crash has really hurt working class and middle class families as they are being forced out of the real estate market by outsider money. This added struggle can also help characterize the way in which large cities with their governance and their political cartels allow certain trends to develop.

All in all, not a difficult book to read. But one that was insightful. Much better than some of the other hodge podge urban studies texts that I have examined.

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The Effective Executive: The Definitive Guide to Getting the Right Things Done

The Effective Executive: The Definitive Guide to Getting the Right Things DoneThe Effective Executive: The Definitive Guide to Getting the Right Things Done by Peter F. Drucker
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Peter Drucker outlines wha makes an effective executive. Perhaps understanding and anticipating the role of “technocrats” as nominalized by Galbraith, Drucker notes that effective executives make effective decisions.

A huge portion of this, as Drucker outlines has to do with a few things.

1. understanding the material process a corporation is embedded in (the industry, its market)
2. understanding the needs of individuals working within a corporation
3. understanding the material organization a corporation has for placing individuals

All of this is to structure and effectively limit (yet empower) employees agency for the corporation.

In this manner, effective executives must be able to understand the maximal agency of their own situation, in order to make decisions. Drucker also sagely advises that such executives don’t make decisions lightly but still do so in a timely manner. All of this rests on the maximization of a corporation/departments ability to enact materially. To understand this, one must of course, understand the technical requirements of the corporation/position as lived by people on the ground. In this way Drucker is correct in anticipating a regime of individual whose job is to make decisions from theory rather than practice. In this way, Drucker explains the larger mode of executive apprati, seeing a need for the contemporary executive to “think outside the box” by welcoming greater opportunity to process information, take in points of view, and weight things according to process metrics.

He also correctly anticipates the role of computers in requiring people make decisions more often. You can read this as a self help manual for improving your executive role, in aligning yourself for the corporate world. Or you can conversely see this book as a calibration needed for executives to fit the modern international corporation milieu. Drucker may be a little dated in some ways, with his examples, but on principles, this is still how business is run today.

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Critique of Pure Reason

Critique of Pure ReasonCritique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

So much has been written about Kant. Yes, he’s hard. He’s rammbly. He’s overbearing. But this is due in part to the fact that written in 1781, Kant did not have anyone to talk with. He lacked the ability to find other minds and interface. So in those ten years of silence he talked to himself. And he’s a bit disorganized.

So lets not quibble with the details. Instead let me cut to the heart of what he is saying, in a way that goes beyond any reading of him that I’ve come across yet.

The one aesthetic Kant is after, that allows him to hit a home run, is simply this: All concepts are regulatory.

What Kant is after is to understand the limits of what our regulatory reason can do. This can’t be a function to decide truth. This can’t be a function to decide reality. This isn’t an effort at wisdom. We can use reason to figure out the contours of contingency, of what is given to us. But we cannot use it alone to do anything.

Kant attempts to show us the value of reason in melding together different functions (be it imaginary or understanding or reason) and in this way seeks to highlight the vehicle by which we can come to grips with phenomenon. So weaknesses?

Yes, Alan Badiou is partially correct: Kant’s system requires that he created a negated structure, the noumenal upon which to hang his phenomenon. But Badiou is also partially incorrect. Kant was the first to recognize, through the figure of the transcendental, the necessity of having an apparatus of measurement upon which to solidify a phenomenal field. That is to say, phenomenon cannot interface at a consistent level unless there was a larger field to unify them as equivalent. Hence, this transcendental. Kant laid out the form for us, to quantize, to organize whatever we apperceptive. Historically, this is how Heidigger is able to note that Kant is Modernism Part II. Descartes introduces the need the for a transcendental field (in the form of the mental realm) but Kant completes his thought. Hegel is the application for this field to surject unto Absolute Knowledge.

So we miss the point when we quibble with his mathematics or his bad physics, or how he didn’t understand quantum mechanics. None of his examples matter in their detail. What matters is the principle behind this critique, one which reveals that concepts are regulatory.

And while it’s true, as Kristeva points out, Kant did not “discover” negation (leave this to Hegel as a way for him to bind according to the dialectical-synthesis process) Kant does reach negativity. Negativity is necessary as the limits for a given concept. And if you look at towards the end of this masterful work, and ignore his annoying repetition, you come to understand the antinomies are but examples of the limits of conceptualization itself.

Yes, Dedekind’s cut of real numbers or Badiou’s theory of points belie the same “cut” as Kant’s antinomies. By injecting reason in at various arbitrary positions, we can cut a dichotomy into a mass to differentiate positions. Such positions then become expressive of the cut, which we use as an absolute reference. This reference allows us to orient ourselves. So yes, when only we do not “extend reason beyond the bounds of experience” can we avoid these antinomies, Kant highlights these antinomies as way of showing how reason provides the extension of any given cut, which are always contingent by arbitrary parameters, be they a sensuous apperception or some inherited folly of the imagination. This section following The Ideal of Pure Reason all the way to the end of the work, gives us the apex of Kant’s reach. He was articulated much, but never brought it back around to exploding the limits of concepts themselves. He could only fumble and say, well, they are regulatory.

Not only are they regulatory but they are necessary for the organization, the quantization into phenomenon, inasmuch as the sensuous, as he calls it, is necessary for logic to take a stance. We need contingency to make a mark somewhere, otherwise we get nothing but pure logical presentation without any place for differentiation into a real context. It is this dual refractory nature that presents us with agential cuts to determine the nature of what is real, a mixture of contingent sensuousness and transcendental formalism. This mixture however, isn’t stable, it belies on the context of previous cuts, usually derived from our human need to have agency in limited domains.

This is the start of post-modern fragmentation of knowledge, as each domain acquires its own organizing cut.

But this is also well beyond the context of where Kant was going.

So if you keep in mind the “regulatory” nature of conceptualization, you’ll come to a fruitation that is far more radical than any reading of Kant that I’ve ever come across. I think you’ll find as well, that this radical negativity, necessary to cut concepts out of the larger folds, is why Deleuze found himself returning to Kant towards the end of his career. In this way Kant is still more radical than most anyone gives him credit for… and in this sense, his admiration for David Hume speaks volumes about where he’s going with this critique. In fact, he exceeds Hume in this way, by abstracting Hume’s explanation of human behavior as conventional habit into the modality of regulatory concepts. Kant finds the limit of reason but in doing so he is able to demonstrate how reason is utilized to supplement understanding beyond the bounds of experience. His four antinomies are but possibilities for unfounded regulations, many of which Hume would simply call “conventions”.

To wrap. I for one, am glad to have Kant as a guide. As staunch and “joyless” as he is, there is a core of clear direction within his thought that allows him to calibrate his awareness to a finely tuned point regardless of content. Kant turns rationality in on itself and is able to note the different vectors within rationality as a manifold, a field of its own connectivity. Kant adds these various example, these vectors together, rotates rationality as a vehicle of deployment and is able to find a navel limit within rationality, negativity on the one hand, sensuous apperception on the other, and the chimera of the transcendental dialectic on the third. This groundwork of pure formalism is the striking aesthetic consistency that belies German philosophy post-Kant, while marking the groundwork for the very abstract structural formalism that is to follow in mathematics and science in the 19th century and beyond. Without having the ability to negate all that does not logically follow, or being able to create limited phenomenon within a transcendental domain, we would not have any technological or mathematical achievements today.

This isn’t to say that Kant should be given credit for this because he “invented” this. Rather, he was simply the first to stake out the parameters for the nature of these kinds of endeavors, endeavors which continue to structure human experience and behavior today. No doubt, if Kant did not do this, then someone else would have formalized this exercise, eventually. Still, to one lonely man in Königsberg, thank you.

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Modern Living Accessories: 100 Years of Design

Modern Living Accessories: 100 Years of DesignModern Living Accessories: 100 Years of Design by Martin Wellner
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

This amazing survey walks backwards into the 19th century. Year by year, you see how contemporary design evolved into its basic constituents. Modern works reflect a refinement in the use of materials, such that the deformation of familiar objects at first, geometric and blocky become expressive with a higher resolution in material agency. While many contemporary objects start to break the grey areas of design, where form suggests not only novel movements adhering to a singular force (such as Bauhaus design, where form matches function) but today into postmodern ambivalence where a singular object suggests multiple uses that are sometimes more clever than useful but at other times, far more ingenious as to dissolve the logical categories by which we classify what an object is.

Given in full page color, the short captions, and the short articles give us a brief introductory taste as to the mechanisms of design, the influence of the visions of designers and the continual mastery of material.

With the final works of the industrial revolution having established its conquest of human materialism in production, we have the beginnings of middle class wealth, to support a need for mass export of finished products. Art Deco and Art Nouveau come to the scene with its whimsical forms, to introduce a new level of finish, where product production shares no seams as to its origins. Here we have the advent of a new consumerism, the full split of producer from consumer so that only expert craftsmen and finally engineers and scientists are the gate keepers for designers. For in areas of such refinement, only the knowledge of specialized processes and the abstractness of a designers breaking out of the box lay the condition for the deformation of our modernist categories of contemporary appliances.

One thinks in the near future the inclusion of smart devices will reach a further deterritorialisation of what objects can be, do and coexist with us, further anticipating human need and modifying further the trajectory of how we can be (and have agency) in an environment.

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The Death and Life of Great American Cities

The Death and Life of Great American CitiesThe Death and Life of Great American Cities by Jane Jacobs
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

What Jane Jacobs is really responding to, and criticizing is the spreading of the capital through what John K Galbraith calls the technostructure. Since capitalism’s main drive is technology, as technology reduces cost, affords greater material agency through large capital investments, this is no small subject, although it is a somewhat hidden angle. The megalopolises that exist today are really only possible because of major advances through technology, major investments in infrastructure and major innovations through technological advancement. For this reason, it makes sense that the planners of cities will also invest in the aesthetic of knowledge the technostructure affords us: expression of good design.

Design is really only the highlighting of a particular axis of an independent logical relationship. That is to say, if there are three mutually exclusive choices, their presentation in design as three separate but equatable types is good design. Good design allows us to equalize non-differentials by allowing their containment within logically more important groupings. If we are looking at a series of individuals, it makes sense to present information about these individuals in such a way that highlights through equitable features of however the information is being presented so that these individuals can be arranged to be easily sortable. So that we can make decisions about these individuals. It would make less sense to cram the information together in logically independent relations that have very little to do with our ability to make decisions.

In this sense, much urban design as criticized by Jacobs holds along the axis of decision making for individuals, or at least from the planning perspective, to equate logically independent relationships that have little to do with the ability for common urbanites to make decisions about their environment. For Jacobs, which may be dated these days, urban designers thus, have little understanding of the walkable experiences of urbanities for community building, community strengthening. In short, their knowledge is based more on aesthetically “cold” principles from a bigger view. There’s a good quote from this book: That a region “is an area safely larger than the last one to whose problems we found no solution” In other words, such bureaucracies are too abstract to understand small problems, thus their knowledge and their creation of models is based on these “cold” aesthetically split models that do not demonstrate interactions that stand outside of their modeling. They “average” out too much data, and end up with an impoverished but clear picture that is unsustainable as it is not supported by an exterior topology their model cannot account for.

Galbraith uses the term techostructure in order to denote the melding of planned economies with technologies. This means that administrators and managers need to be able to organize their information according to technologies and functional uses. While regional governments will lag behind the development of new technologies, their division along previous lines of technological influence, their division according to technological functionality will deny the collected effects of their management. Such administrative bodies deny confluence. Early on in the book, Jacob goes to argue that it is in the intermix of diversity, technologies, and mixed uses (where an area is used one way by a population for a time, and then later on, has a different use at a different time) that creates a strong community, enriches its citizens and promotes good economic and social growth.

One of the geniuses of Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx was their recognition that value and phenomenon are created synthetically. This is to say that all topographies are determined by their exterior. As Jacobs notes, communities are generally held around a few key socialites who are able to navigate the interstices of different circles of interest that are geographically aligned by otherwise do not mix. These key individuals carry with them an excess of value since they provide the nexus to which communities and built around and attain cohesion of vision, value and identity. These individuals, like key spaces, be it a park, a mall or otherwise, are not the product of a singular focus, but a mix of logically related cues that deploy individuals together, forcing them to interact, create friendships and build trust.

In a technostructure kind of language we can claim that the very thing any technologically influenced management structure — that relies on the creation and management of specific “expert knowledge” — must necessarily miss the very object they are attempting to manage as a whole. There is department of community, or department of individuals — there is no management of human interaction (socially or economically) as these are the very values that a techostructure wishes to maintain. Rather, this element is destroyed by a technostructure as it is split between departments that have conflicting authority to manage their immanent spheres. The result of this, is understood as chaos as each sphere of influence manages its immanence but in the process of doing so impacts (through the excess of its immanence) other spheres as this influence organizes parts of society that impact other spheres of influence. This excess of planning can only be understood as chaos in reference to the rigorous “planning” of each sphere… what is unplanned is the outside impact.

While Jacobs does not talk about society and cities too much at this abstract a level — her book is more examples of various principles along separate dimension (each chapter is a meditation on each logically independent feature, such as streets, parks, sidewalks, age of buildings, and so on) I think her book would have been more cohesive if it were able to address the issue from a large standpoint of aesthetic philosophical division, as a concept like technostructure would afford. Nonetheless, while dated in some examples, and in use of language, Jacob’s book remains a good marker for the consideration of the interstices that make up society, that any logically independent axis is in fact not truly independent in how that value is created even if we organize it along lines of presentation that appear to be wholly independent. Cities die and grow by chaos, even as this chaos is technologically created through capitalism, forming new social alignments all the while, it is poor understood by existing bodies that use dated models. One wonders how this would have played out should Jacobs had written this in the present age of the internet.

So the 4 stars is really only because she lacks a unifying feature of the book explicitly, even though it is beautifully thought out, and written with rigorous passion. This book is somewhat dated and will be even more so in the near present.

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The Affluent Society and Other Writings, 1952-1967

The Affluent Society and Other Writings, 1952-1967The Affluent Society and Other Writings, 1952-1967 by John Kenneth Galbraith
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

I am definitely a fan of Galbraith…and I don’t say that about many authors. While not a complete collection of his writing, this is definitely a good selection of what he was about as an economist.

What I find fascinating is that The Affluent Society and The New Industrial State come from an American economist (or Canadian if you like) and yet support many of Marx’s conclusions about merchant ideology. The sense that merchant capital extended to producers and consumers alike (producers since the Dutch in the 1600s and then, to consumers after WW2, as state backed consumerism) guarantees the use value that makes production monetarily sound (completing the material dialectic of merchant capital) ex post facto is astounding. That Galbraith extends this idea by recognizing that technology is the key to capitalism, in terms of production and social disruption, something not yet recognized by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo or Marx is will worth the read. If communist minded individuals and Marxists alike read more of Marx and actually kept their minds open instead of being reactionary we might have a deeper understanding of our state backed capitalism.

While Galbriath does not advocate revolution, he definitely insists that we need to change our values if we want to survive in a degrading environment and do more with our lives than make the anonymous bureaucrats wealthy (technocrats of our technostructure as he calls them).

Despite this insistence that humanity use its powers for more than making wealth and endless production and increased poverty and degradation, Galbraith adds with this thought a heavy analysis of the inner workings of state and industry as a unity that transcends the explicated boundaries of American politics. He understands that we are not really free anymore; that our freedom is limited to our consumerist subjectivity. While this analysis does miss some of Marx’s social understandings (that a change in material relations means a change in societal arrangement) Galbraith does add a refreshing view of how economics and infact higher education is complacent in arguing for the status quo. For why should they bite the hand that feeds them?

Furthermore, as we specialize deeper and deeper into fields of study, we lose the ability to connect the more general dots. Our world becomes fragmented across many areas. Specialists cannot see where they are going, much like those economists who eschew math appear less rigorous. People doing specific tasks will more likely see their world through the filter of that task, and be unable to comprehend outside of it. As our complexity in our world rises with each year, it becomes less and less likely that there is anyone driving the wheel. This is how we can see the technostructure, as an faith that promotes itself so that we become less and less able to break from it as time goes on, as our specific interests (employment, leisure, study) becomes less and less able to identify the nature of our cage — as an over arching planning structure. Much like how the planning system in the Soviet state was run by anonymous bureaucrats in a state apparatus, our planning system is run by anonymous technocrats in various corporate chains backed by a state system.

I won’t continue on about how this is reflective in our worldview of modernism — our production of epistemes — but there is a direct link here, between how our knowledge is formed and our value system is driven by philosophical, educational and economic concerns for no other reason than to develop itself further, for us to be more completely mired in its logic and its mindless production of demand desires and status on various corporate and civil chains of our own unthinkable making.

We live on this Earth, and fulfill the needs of the very game we create in order to live together on this Earth without ever really looking up and acknowledging that we have created extreme wealth and extreme suffering with no end in sight… if only so that one can be satisfied at the expense of another, and for what? So we can die together and leave the world a slightly more ugly place?

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