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Neuter

NeuterNeuter by Hélène Cixous
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Neuter is a difficult book to read, because Cixous starts where she starts, slightly outside the context of your storied-expectations. Through a series of opening ephigraphs, and outlines of meditations on readings and texts, Cixous draws you deeper into the cramp inner space of story, subjectivity and analyst. Both psychoanalytical and philosophical, Cixous draws the thin null space, the non-existent middle, by which we see the internal dynamic structures that sustain the situation of subjectivity.

This is another way of saying that Cixous desexualizes subjectivity, by further castrating the subject. Rather than posing the master discourse of the universal All-Father, Cixous chooses instead the mother-son relationship, in order to show how a desexualized subject, one that is reversed in their “phallic-essence” is in fact one that is null. From there, she highlights the stakes of the story itself, and the relative positions of analyst and subject.

It all seems pretty mystical though (or musical, if you like), because Cixous walks the line using metaphors and literal meanings of words. Of course words are both literal and figurative at the same time, so she plays heavily with that ambiguity. As part of the writing, the text approaches self awareness, describing its own audience as it creates its own bridges and metaphors. It questions its own page turning, layering for us an introduction that takes us out of the context and turns us back around so that we can leave behind what we are supposed to experience and begin to experience what is there, outside the context of familiarity. This heavy introduction is the chanting part of the text: dive deeper-deeper! as she drops into the very inner void, and places us in the place for a master-text within the master-text, showing us bare subjectivity and bare story as the elements of the narrative are actors in the narrative itself.

Neuter then, is Cixous’s way of castrating the story, taking out the contingencies of names, place and time, by which we read universal “common” experience through each sideline of particularity. Cixous allows us to experience the arbitrary relationships of a story, and she does this masterfully, by turning all its elements inside-out, defamiliarizing the story itself by castrating it of its essential contingencies. In a sense, she makes the story a pataphysical experience of what was previously universal. Neuter is the smallest null space one can get. Neuter is the barest outline of the essential arc. Neuter is the null subjectivity, the zero degree point of view. Truly a difficult and masterful piece of writing, controlled, deliberate and evocative.

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Being and Event

Being and EventBeing and Event by Alain Badiou
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Alain Badiou does something particularly difficult. He provides a nexus of interplay between formal mathematics (in set theory) and ontology as presented in the philosophical tradition. It’s often an understood but unacknowledged fact that explanations don’t really “explain” in so far as they translate between discourses. For this book, that is most definitely true. The intrusion of formalism into philosophy and the intrusion of nominalism into what was before a formalism that cannot name anything because it cannot decide anything on its own. The axiom of choice is “illegal” because it cannot discern nor can it choose anything at all.

In writing this review, I am a little torn between two implicit choices in how to proceed. On the one hand, I want to point out that Badiou allows us to get to the root of discursive meaning itself — in this case the axiom of foundation. In having the ability to choose what stage we enter, even if the choice is “made for us” by us, anonymously, we can extend a generic knowledge about a situation through the act of forcing a choice in which one empty term matches another, thereby in extension, naming a situation. This is a pretty delightful bit of connection here, because it allows us to then, if we want to, absent cardinals left and right. We can take this choice and begin to dissolve various limit cardinals into successor operations, in a sense, assaulting the legitimacy of ontology. On the other hand, we could as Badiou suggested, utilize the formalism of these various mathesis and recapitulate philosophy as we knew it, trace back various events and allow formalism to become a bulwark upon which we encapsulate various points of tension, defraction and inflection within the tradition. The first thought outlined above is akin to being a kind of philosophical assassin, as Deleuze called Wittgenstein. The second thought is akin to being the boring kind of conservative academic who doesn’t at all create but only hangs his hat on work by others. As Badiou said

I have to say that philosophy does not generate any truths either, however painful this admission may be. At best, philosophy is conditioned by the faithful procedures of its times (340).

I don’t find this to be damning but Badiou resolves to make the best of it:

A philosophy worthy of the name–the name which began with Paramenides–is in any case antinomical to the serivce of goods, inasmuch as it endeavors to be at the service of truths; one can always endeavor to be at the service of art, science and of politics. That it is capable of being at the service of love is more doubtful (on the other hand, art, a mixed procedure, supports truths of love). In any case, there is no commercial philosophy (341).

And that, I very much doubt, although this short quote really only betrays Badiou’s own allegiance to a very tradition topography!

I suspect some readers who are desirous to quickly get to the point may feel that this book is unnecessarily lengthy, obtuse and just plain long winded. I found with each turn, such amazement with Badiou’s terse language, his tightly compacted sentences and the immediate grasp with which he had with so many familiar thinkers, but aligned in new ways. One may find his application of set theory to be illegal, or at least not enlightening, but it is a mistake to read this book in solely in terms of set theory or solely in terms of ontology. Badiou wishes to say something about both, as One, and thus it’s difficult to separate the two from each other within imposing the traditional academic borders from which they came. Nonetheless people do so, even though people may insist that this particular set Badiou creates is non-constructible. The only way this can be done is to regulate the set to a position of being undecidable, which is another way of saying that it’s nonsense or at the very weakest, inapplicable because its terms do not align with anything that can be summarily named.

I find, counter to Badiou, I think, in this book a much deeper, darker implication. This implication mainly being that there is no real legitimacy within thought, that our ability to make sense relies solely on our ability to apply categories, to tease out, to decide what the indiscernable is by naming tentatively and then engendering a generic situation fully by extension. What about shows us however isn’t simply that discourse itself is an arbitrary set of conditions that have been formed by the inclusion of itself as an empty signifier–but that understanding itself is the acknowledgement of its own absurd axiom but through the act of repetition… that the only real tool we have for determining the truth of any discourse is the weak form of testing its consistency. Only that which remains most consistent (and applicable) remain what is to be best determined as truth, though to be sure, a truth which mostly depends on what a subject can recognize in the void.

Now, perhaps counter to some postmodernists (I hesitate to suggest that Badiou is a post-structuralist as this is the only book of his that I have read, but being a constructivist does align him with post-structuralism), Badiou does admit to there being some truth, sometimes. To be sure much of various other writers have hit upon this form of truth as contingency too, many characters whose names are probably well known to you, Zizek and Meillasoux to name two. I won’t go over their differences here, but it is suffice to say that we have come around upon a zeitgeist of sorts, wherein we cannot find any outside legitimacy so we start to assume that it comes from thin air. But this is another way of highlighting that we do have a choice in the matter. This decision is understood and made by so many already, that their version of the truth is what ought to be best for us all, if not said in words, than in action. This feels very weak to me, and it’s not where I would like to end. Badiou ends on a note of utopic joy for philosophy. Good for him. He’s started a school, perhaps. But in service of truth, he’s hammered in a procedure that suspends us in a being-in-situation that separates us from the void. If you take Badiou to his supreme conclusion, I think we end up floating in a null space, one in which we end up simply doing what we do because there’s no reason not to.

In that sense, he is right, he has not created any truth at all. He has only shown his the emptiness of nominalism as philosophy, in a way, highlighting how all is axiom of choice, made all the more jarring as it is layered upon the formalism that is set theory.

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The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson

The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson (American Presidency)The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson by Vaughn Davis Bornet
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

While Lyndon Johnson was only president for 5 years he did a great many things–using his experience as a senator to pass more legislation than one might have thought would be possible.

Bornet paint a picture of Johnson as being an aggressive, ambitious determined man whose idealism drove him as president to use the government as a tool for social change…furthermore Kennedy’s death and Johnson’s desire to uphold the legacy of Kennedy (along with his landslide reelection as president) most likely contributed to his desire to effect change immediately. His heavy-handed policies, “Gun and Butter” which focused on internal problems like poverty and civil rights and healthcare and his external problems like Vietnam strained the US economy and social fabric. While the 60s were already set up to be a tumultuous time, Johnson’s radical widesweeping changes eventually backfired on him, as the US wasn’t ready for such change. As Bornet points out, much of the white middle class felt left behind and threatened (their interests ignored) as Johnson concentrated on the poor and non-whites. This head to two things, 1) the election of Nixon and a changing of the administration and legislation from Democrat to Republican and 2) economic problems in the 70s as government spending reeled out of control to fund these new programs (without increased taxation).

So while Johnson did great things because of his experience and skill, he failed on many fronts. The first was that he didn’t communicate to the American public that Vietnam was going to be a long and hard fight. He relied too much on historic precedents where American soldiers in foreign lands win wars (even though there is often a military presence for much longer after the fighting). So in that sense, he set himself up for problems when the reality of Vietnam popped up. The second failure it seems, is that Johnson didn’t understand the national scene. He defunded the Democratic leadership and shuffled unwanted people from the White House and government into positions within the party, leaving a void in funding and planning. This presented much last minute scrambling come the election of 1968.

In some ways, this book, in its current edition, is already outdated, as recently news of Nixon’s backhanded dealings in Vietnam as a candidate for presidency messed up Johnson’s negotiations for peace has become public. Johnson also seems to have bumbled Humphrey’s candidacy at times, which seemed like an incomplete picture which Bornet didn’t really explain too well. He kind of didn’t really talk about the vice-presidency much either.

Over all, this book is concise and well written. At times I wasn’t sure where Bornet was going, but history is often less a coherency than it is a list of events that are chained together through some arbitrary time period or effective event. Bornet paints a picture of Johnson as a man really who stepped up to the plate when Kennedy was unexpectedly assassinated. Johnson did the best he could and was quick to capitalize on change. There were some evident character flaws, but Bornet sides with Johnson as an idealizing hard working man, one who didn’t run for a second term for health reasons but nonetheless sought to leave the country a better place than he left it.

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Through the Language Glass: Why the World Looks Different in Other Languages

Through the Language Glass: Why the World Looks Different in Other LanguagesThrough the Language Glass: Why the World Looks Different in Other Languages by Guy Deutscher
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Interesting and easy to read (clear book) with lots of examples. Deutscher definitely loves language.

He asks the question, how does language relate to experience? Though specific examples, like color, deixis and gender, he attempts to eek out an answer. While historically we’ve assumed language, or at least well formed language, accurately reflects experience, the conclusion of Deutscher’s book shows us somewhat reservedly, that language in fact shapes our experience in very subtle ways. He isn’t saying that language closes off the door for us to abstract concepts, but he does say that language through its internal syntax, or connotations does force us to reveal specific information and suggest certain meanings to us before hand.

This book isn’t too deep, but I did enjoy its anecdotes, well researched information and clear writing. What Deutscher is basically saying however, is that language creates its own reality, as a subtle, filter that then can be used to create whatever concepts we wish to express. He is correct in pointing out, through the example of Orwell’s 1984, that the absence of certain words doesn’t mean a lack of one’s ability to conceive them. Although with the example of British researchers on color and the Guugu Yimithirr about English speakers regarding directions, that speakers generally attribute a lack of word conception as absolutely correlative of another speaker’s inability to convey the same information. An abstraction of this, Deutscher does write can be aptly summed:

According to the dominant view among linguists and cognitive scientists today, the influence of language on thought can be considered significant only if it bears on genuine reasoning–if, for instance, one language can be shown to prevent its speakers from solving a logical problem that is easily solved by speakers of another language. Since no evidence for such constraining influence on logical reasoning has ever been presented, this necessarily means–or so the argument goes–that any remaining effects of language are insignificant and that fundamentally we all think in the same way.

But it is too easy to exaggerate the importance of logical reasoning in our lives. Such an overestimation may be natural enough for those reared on a diet of analytical philosophy, where thought is practically equated with logic and any other mental processes are considered beneath notice. But this view does not correspond with the rather modest role of logical thinking in our actual experience of life. After all, how many daily decisions do we make on the basis of abstract deductive reasoning, compared with those guided by gut feeling, intuition, emotions, impulse, or practical skill? How often have you spent your day solving logical conundrums, compared with wondering where you left your socks? Or trying to remember where your car is in a multilevel parking lot? How many commercials try to appeal to us through logical syllogisms, compared with those that play on colors, associations, allusions? And finally how many wars have been fought over disagreements in set theory?

The influence of the mother tongue that has been demonstrated empirically is felt in areas of thought such as memory, perception, and associations or in practical skills such as orientation. And in our actual experience of life, such areas are no less important than the capacity for abstract reasoning, probably more so.

With this Deutscher comes to the point of the book, and its exploration. While he is simply reciting other examples, theories, other people’s studies, he provides the connective tissue to preform what is essentially a philosophical argument, one that is predicated on a higher sophistication in how we should all deal with one another in our daily lives. This argument isn’t completely overpowering in his book, as the meat of his book is also very interesting. But it is nonetheless a good reason to have written (or to read) it.

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Recent Developments In Autism Research

Recent Developments In Autism ResearchRecent Developments In Autism Research by Manuel F. Casanova
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Interesting collection of essays detailing the state of austism research. This book was published in 2005. I’m not a scientist or a researcher, but I did notice a few interesting things. Because austism is defined by phenomenon, it is difficult to define biologically, as there are many complex effects (through nuture or nature) that create the conditions for austist’s inability to process information like neurotypicals. This book goes a long way in attempting to figure out what the etiology is… I won’t repeat much of the biology talk, but I did find some interesting correlations in how austism is defined and how the various essays speculate on particular abnormalities in neuron or minicolumn or cerebral structures behave (as scanned in EEG or various other ways). Basically because austism is defined through in ability to extend particular behavior into generalities of context, what is known as weak coherency (or the maintenance of social context) researches speculate that weak neurological processes or abnormally formed structures contribute to a lack of larger functioning within the brain. This is to say that while parts of the brain can work well separately, in many austists, these same parts can’t work together as well as a neurotypical’s can.

Now, I have read some speculative literature however, that argues that austists have a more general functioning and it is the neurotypicals reliance on certain hardwired protocols that limit their ability to generalize contexts, but once one takes out a basis for how to measure deviance, one loses the ability to speak of coherency whatsoever. Being social creatures, we need to form group coherency, and while different social groups form coherency differently, the inability to form a strong coherency whatsoever between individuals does make for problems in social behavior. This is defined as austism.

What makes austism studies so interesting is that its abnormalities in functioning reveal to us outlier examples of how our own mind/brains work. What is missing in this austism research book, I thought, was further examples of how the diagnosises defined and cohered what austism is. Certainly the definition has changed over time, and such definitions would impact the study. After all, all this scientific research is an attempt to find a way to determine how it some humans cannot cohere neurotypical social and cognitive extensions… it would be interesting, although perhaps beyond this work to discuss what normal actually is.

Anyway, an interesting read as scientists and researches attempt to find patterns in one area (social behavior and discourse coherency) and correlate it to patterns in another (in this case, brain functioning) or genotypical expression.

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Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition

Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and CognitionKant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition by Umberto Eco
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Umberto Eco starts off in the first chapter with asking why is there something instead of nothing? Although he references much philosophy in this first go around, this is just a way for him to get to a more interesting question (he says that the fact that we can ask this question isn’t to question Being itself, but to question common sense… that Being is the initial condition for common sense). So let’s get to what he really wants to ask. Eco is really asking, how can we know that something is what it is and not something else.

As a semiotician, he is interesting in understanding why we get what we do, and how we come to learn about new things. This is not an easy task at all. While he strings together the disparate discourses of philosophy, piecean semiotics, linguistics, psychology and cognition in a complex and fascinating way, he eventually comes to hinge his articulation on the figure of the sign as a mediating device. He distinguishes between internal and shared external meanings, and then extended intensive “expert” modeling. What makes Eco so impressive isn’t the vast range at which he runs, he also writes clearly and cleverly, demonstrating that a specific formulation of how to get from A to B can have a multitude of pathways, some of them contradictory but all consistent in their own logic.

This can wrap around itself however, as the articulation of new knowledge itself requires the continual deferral of old knowledge in the place of new knowledge. But knowledge isn’t all that he is after; because knowledge is only the expression of an internal understanding. This is to say that he also creates new understanding in order to supply understanding to understanding itself! So in a very reductive way, he can’t fully explain understanding except so much as to describe a possible path. If we accept it internally, then we can say that we understand it. If we reject it, we would claim it nonsensical or that we can’t understand it. While I am getting a little astray from Eco’s formulation, it is safe to say that Eco is best interested in trying to gasp the steps in formulation to get at any difference in deployment of any aspect of formulation.

In a way, I wish Eco had come up with a better conclusion. He did say what he wanted to say, but the crux of his discussion comes to us when we understand that the act of naming a difference is the creation of that spectrum. Between two differences, or between many discourses that may not connect (that he connects) if we are able to articulate a difference between them, then that difference appears. The difference between them is negligible, shrinking to nothing. If we however, do detect a difference then we can speak of it sideways, and that itself is a metaphor.

I think Eco should have encountered the work of Paul Ricoeur. It would have been interesting to see a conjunction between the two of them. Ricoeur is interested in the same things; although as a philosopher of language, a rhetorician, he approaches the formulation from a position of narrative… the root of which is metaphor. The connection of two unlike things is what metaphor is; and that generic connection can be what creates narrative, though the excuse of temporal displacement in which multiple events are strung together as one long “thing”, a string of causation that is complete only if it has all its parts.

But that may be a sideline. Eco eventually ends up in the position of generic objects, which gives us back to semiotics and signs. From there, he utilizes generic objects to set up identity and knowledge. For this, he could connect to Alain Badiou’s work in set theory, with the formulation of “naked” signs that are generic events… with their indiscernible aspect that allow them to be applied multiple times, anywhere without losing their connection to Truth. Once we get to this point, though we are only talking about icons, which are representations in themselves, without actuality. Their difference, their next step “down” is the hypoicon, which names the immediate first object, without representation but only the sensory form itself, which leaves us in limbo.

Perhaps this is why Eco did not write a conclusion. He had none. He could only leave us to our imagination as to how to connect the two. With the visual pun “Mexican on a bicycle” he leaves us to ponder the ambiguity of experience; that contextual changes or hypoiconic changes although different in type leads us with completely different understandings. While he wants to connect semiotics to philosophy (as an anterior buffering) and semiotics to cognition (as an internal marker of order, to relate sense datum to signs) he only at best manages a description. Never can we understand that connection without first naming it. And never can we name it without forcing it to become something other than what it might be otherwise, a way of plugging parts together. Not an easy task by any means for anyone to write about, and Eco does a great job of hammering through what could have been far much denser text.

I suppose this is what we get for being creatures of language. Language lets us model, but it only lets us model generics. When we subtract particularities from the object we get the generic, but adding those particularities back gets us identities, singletons which are unique and yet a different object. Mysterious that we can extract type from tokens and then speak only in types when talking about tokens. I forget where he says it, but we speak in generics even if we mean individual singletons. This is very much a root of racism, or an issue with categorization of how we can know anything, and the limits of what we know can be. And yet, often without really knowing, we are still able to speak and negotiate and navigate to come to new understandings, often without having to completely reconstruct the language we use at all.

This ability is very much a kind of miracle. I suppose then it is best that we can’t find that missing piece that lets us connect the old to new, or create new from old. Lest if we did find it, and examine it, we would end up losing our very ability to create new narratives, formulate new metaphors and ultimately give rise to new words. We would in fact, lose the ability to create new history.

This is very much the wonder I wish to look at, and Eco gives us a great if somewhat long (yet relatively simply written) narrative for which to guide us about pondering this miracle. 5 stars!

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Sexuality & Space

Sexuality & SpaceSexuality & Space by Jennifer Bloomer
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

This is a pretty good collection of essays, even if it was a bit odd. Any title that puts space and sexuality together though, has got to be a little far reaching. Ultimately the themes come out pretty clearly, that space and our ability to create spaces (architectural, inside/outside, domestic) reflect our inhabited notions of sexual identity and sexuality together… This is pretty true. In our postwar American lifestyle that past may be somewhat muted, but it certainly was(is) a consideration still in how we designate what people are for and how we functionally inhabit different positions without a larger social hierarchy… whose mobilization is a narrative of gender roles and displaced positions.

There is nothing more than these positions; the displacement is the position. There is no higher order. And while this level of abstraction is difficult to explain at times, since explanation is often reductive to the next level down, there is no deferral to any other level, as this is the base level. In this sense, many of these essays resort to naming or connecting novel tropes together, creating quasi-figures that haunt the edges of our comprehension of social order… in order words, the authors are often forced into metaphoric language in order to better express the connections that are brought together in their analysis. When this happens, as with examinations of post-modern urban landscapes or musicology, there runs a risk that the reader may encounter a sublime object in the examination of such a diverse heterology. What I mean is that often such an examination runs the risk of collapsing into a trope to stand-in for the argument. Because this is a collection of essays however, and none of the essayists collaborated to share a theoretical angle or system, we don’t often have that collapse. But what is spectacular about these essays is that they run very close to that edge, standing at a position very close at times, to nonsense, all the while creating perfect sense out of that contortion.

Many of these essays are very good. I don’t want to reduce this review into a description of these essays, but in the connection of sexuality and space, we see at times, the introduction of gaze and looking as a figure that denominates both sexuality as an appraisal and distance — both as a mode of determination and control. We also see how viewing itself, through television, windows, and textual synthesis of video and images of architecture differentiate the contours of inside/outside, to define space as it were. We also have the social expression of space, be it an aesthetics of households or aesthetics of architecture, or art and photography as expressive of cityspaces or identity. Either way, this is an inspiring collection of essays all of which really deal with the two themes of the title. Since this is a collection of essays though, I’ll stop. But it would have been fun if somehow a centralized connection was to be made, a concrete metaphor to stand in for both sexuality and space could have been formed. But I suppose if that’s the case, you would need a monumentous figure like Luce Irigaray to do it.

Just the same though, a good read.

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Blonde

BlondeBlonde by Joyce Carol Oates
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

I had no idea what I was in for when I went to read this. Yes fictionalized.

The license Oates has given herself is less the woman who was Norma Jean Baker but more the image of Marilyn Monroe as an icon of the sexualized infant-girl-woman: a figure who is innocent (even in sex), needs love, protection…daddy… and the challenge inherent in humanizing such an image into a flesh and blood woman. Here we have the highest and most abstract of reversals, a woman with feelings trying to be her image, not be her image, and yet in her sometime attempts to escape it and her sometime attempts to fulfill that role, in both vectors she can’t escape. Marilyn only manages to fulfill that role even more completely. The rumors, the insinuations, the mask that she was hidden in — these are the spaces that Joyce attempts to write through, to fill the gap between an actual person and the blind eye society turned to her as a person, and instead forced upon her. At times, I thought this worked out well, but given the lengthiness of the novel and the relative consistency of writing (which I suppose is a display of Oates’s magnificent talent more than anything else) I eventually tired of it…if anything as the story progressed into deeper complexity, if anything, the language itself (I feel) should have reflected that greater depth…if only to build tension in what was already complex tension. I did appreciate, after some thought, that the space between the woman and the image was psychobabble, a void of unwriteable depth, given one’s inability to structure that space coherently…and that space was mainly where Oates meant to dwell the longest. As a result of that impossible stay, much of the other “plot” writing she did do had to rely on structural description of who various characters were, often standing slightly outside Marilyn’s awareness, and yet informing her awareness all the same. If anything, this is a narrator that is not omnipresent but a kind of hoovering Oort cloud that provides the context for the reader to understand what’s going on, while also designating the limit to Marilyn’s psychic space.

Ironically, the designation of this inner space surrounding the unknown core of Marilyn’s actual personal mental space takes the place of Marilyn’s actual mental space as Oates can never really designate an internal limit, as far as where the narration can go…although you can see that having designated an internal limit of real Norma Jean, which is untouchable, that limit shrinks by itself to a position of being outside the narration completely. Thus, Marilyn in this book ends up as a completely neurotic, unstable woman completely haunted by the external factors that govern her image, even while the personal forces that govern her past (outside of Hollywood) only served as an unstable and insufficient bulwark for her to cling to in the construction of a personal identity. Thus, Marilyn’s life spirals out of control as her Hollywood image provides her with limitless validation, an image that accumulates lust, jealousy, anger and spite, but never translates into any actual personal validation in the form of security, money or stable personal relationships. Perhaps that’s about as good an analysis as one can get.

When I read this book I didn’t know anything about Marilyn Monroe. But the paradox of being what other people want while trying to be yourself is most definitely a tenuous position… and Oates manages to capture the complex, painful whirlwind of being caught up in a patriarchal machine that wants one for a very limited surface area all the while discarding any other depth that desired formation unique to an individual subjectivity.

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The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s

The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840sThe Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s by Immanuel Wallerstein
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Once again, Wallerstein looks at great detail into a topic as complex as world systems analysis. This time, he focuses on a big question: What was the French Revolution and what did it do?

His analysis is largely historical, and from, as always, an impressive number of sources. When reading this book though, while the first chapter is devoted to further developing and answering the question, I think this book is a little weaker than its previous two. In part, because Wallerstein answers his question in the first chapter: The French Revolution did not spark capitalism, but was a continuation of it — and essentially did not provide a break in the logic of the world system, only a further point of it… so consequently the rest of the book examines how this time period developed and then exceeded the Napoleonic wars without much interruption. For sure, the French Revolution was a major event. It did give pause to all the actors who then perhaps, changed policy or strategy in order to account for it. But the world was already run by economic consideration, so really, business as usual.

Wallerstein instead locates the French Revolution as the last spasm of the French in their fight against the developing British Hegemony. As always, Wallerstein looks at economic basis and reads how policy responds to attempt to capitalize on this material basis, and whether or not these policies had its intended effect.

What I found really interesting was how freedom and ideology were instead utilized as a narrative to rally an unhappy people — especially in the Americas in part with the British colonies (most of which did not join the American Revolution) and also with the Spanish colonies, whose racial complexity (300 years of interbreeding gave rise to a mixed race that was part of the economic and social fabric) told a completely different story, giving rise to a different response. In part, the liberation of the Americas as political and economic units reflected the level of their economic development and inherent quasi-independence as individual actors in the world economy. Independence then, comes politically because it the opportunity presents itself as Europe goes through the Napoleonic war to reshuffle her political structure to “catch up” with its economic reality. What I would have liked Wallerstein to write more on, was how the rise of nationalism in Europe, something which happened with the French reshuffling, could be accounted for when people identify with their body-politic as an economic realization. Do people become nationalistic because they realize they need to be politically responsible for their economic wealth? I think this is the answer he would give. Reading between the lines it seems so, but if he had said it directly, then that would have been nice.

On the other hand, political instability follows a shifting of economic basis, as with the case of West Africa, China, India, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Now Russia went voluntarily, with that intention, it seems, so that’s a little different but with each other, their inclusions into the world economy were first marked by a destablization of their economic power base, a reshuffling of economic power into a new rising class, and then the dissolution of their major political unity as this new rising class pursued their own agendas rather than keeping social stability. India was particularly interesting as the British eventually tried to keep the country together in order to ensure profitable trade… this did not prove fruitful for them, as the cost was too great, except in keeping India under their control as a route to China which was more profitable.

Within all this, I see the rise of the bourgeois class, with their identity and social ambitions… their taste for exotic foods, goods, and status helped enslave entire foreign populations, and restructured the entire world to learn to acquire the same taste for luxury items… Wallerstein doesn’t look to this as a driving force, at least he doesn’t really mention this in this book. Instead, he concentrates on the economic exploit and the changing political landscape as an attempt to solidify lines of trade, political dominance and military exercise in the name of the former two. If anything, over the last three books of his, he has been convincing me that economics — access to resources — remains the primary motive for individuals and populations. That our political well being and agendas are not due to ideology (it can be for individuals) but it is due in greater part, for our desire to secure wealth for ourselves (or with the masses, at least enough to maintain an accustomed lifestyle).

Seen in this way, the French Revolution like many other revolutions, as Wallerstein points out, was mainly the very poor rising up, caught in the ideology and stirrings of a merchant class that is unhappy with how the ruling class has managed their interests… and then the merchant class taking command of the rising masses (only because they want to direct its growth to secure their own stability, rather than seeing their own place in society like-wise overturned) and then a finally, the installation of conservative governance, or at least a government somewhat conservative, to maintain at least enough of the power structure so as to secure some economic status quo so that resource and ownership are not taken away from the wealth that be. It is in this way that many Latin-America countries have their “revolutions” (that those that benefit most from the existing order would see a revolution that continues to benefit their order), revolutions where the existing economic infrastructure remains the same.

I hang back from giving him 5 stars mainly because I would have liked to see some examination of ideology in this view… something touched upon but not fully developed… if anything a strong view of ideology from an economic position would be to claim that all ideology is propaganda, meant to direct the masses either to overthrowing the ruling class or maintaining some economic basis for those who already have economic power… a weak view of ideology is that it does reflect some new ideas about the role of people, to legitimatize the freedoms that people can gain through mass political action. While this is not Wallersteins thesis in this book, his introduction to his world systems analysis promises a deeper view of world capitalist systems in order to also account for ideology… something which is largely takes a backseat in this book to the actual moves of economic realities… that is to say, save for questioning the role of the French Revolution in the rise of capitalism.

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Dusty!: Queen of the Postmods

Dusty!: Queen of the PostmodsDusty!: Queen of the Postmods by Annie J. Randall
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

Not a biography, this book is both about Dusty Springfield the singer, the business woman as much as it is an examination of what other people thought of her. In fact, as Randall points out, it’s impossible to discern who Dusty Springfield is because even interviewing people about her reveals that the interviewees were also influenced by the discourse surrounding her.

What Randall teases out is that Dusty Springfield enters into the music industry in the 60s as her own person, against the patriarchial system of white males writing about music (that even if you weren’t white male writing about music, the point of view of the industry still takes those values to be neutral values to have). Dusty’s ability to do this muscially, breaking genre boundaries, is also mirrored in her persona onstage and “behind the scenes” in the music industry. As much as she wanted to be private about her private life, this absence of personal data spun the rumor mill, exaggerating the data that was already there, to create an onstage persona that was both larger than life and allowed people to connect to her through her music and performances. In creating a “camp” identity for herself both with soul music and adopted operatic melodrama gestures, Dusty figures, in a big way, as the first postmodern performer, taking cliches from other areas and embodying them as her own just as gay men may “do dusty” to dress as her and sing as her. I thought Randall’s teasing out of this kind formed object of identity in discourse was particularly interesting, although she didn’t need to split this last point until the end.

I am not as familiar with Dusty Springfield as some others might be; she could have opened with a chapter on Dusty’s life. All in all, I think Randall hits her mark in examining the discourse of Dusty through this book… even though I think she could have introduced some more theory background, which was only grazed lightly (such as Judith Butler’s idea of sexuality as performance, something apparent to Randall, as Dusty did much preforming.)… but if Randall wanted to hit a larger audience, (which may be why she went lighter on some theory aspects) I think she could have presented a strong biography, with a narrative hook.

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