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Unbearable Lightness: A Story of Loss and Gain

Unbearable Lightness: A Story of Loss and GainUnbearable Lightness: A Story of Loss and Gain by Portia de Rossi
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

This is a very engrossing book. Portia De Rossi reveals much about herself in the process. While its obvious from the beginning that she needed to be in a different place than where most of the story takes place for herself to be even considering writing such a book, she does take us to the mindset where she was originally for her own struggle to be possible.

This is a particularly cogent tale, one that reminds us that self acceptance is perhaps the most important aspect to being well, who we are. And that taking care of ourself (or caring) is, as early Heidigger stated over and over, the very nature of being and existing.

While I appreciate the clarity with which her writing presents itself, some of her struggle and transformation do seem to be clipped. I suppose one can’t really write about it except factually, to a degree, which exemplifies the narrator’s very rational and direct mind. This is a frightening story about how the contextual baggage of seeing ones self is often all we have. This story does have a happy ending. I am glad to have read it.

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The Language of Mathematics: Making the Invisible Visible

The Language of Mathematics: Making the Invisible VisibleThe Language of Mathematics: Making the Invisible Visible by Keith J. Devlin
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

This is a fairly concise book. Devlin attempts to show us the construction of mathematics by its application and by demonstrating its conceptual genealogy. Of course, history of how a field grows is going to reveal its construction to us, although the language itself is at the highest level, hopelessly erudite.

Devlin’s prose is concise, easy to read and yet sacrifices very little complexity for its clarity. The task he has undertaken however is a difficult one. In striving to show us applicability, Delvin allows us glimpses of what math can do for us in the daily routines of the world in which we live. Delvin doesn’t strive to make a philosophical statement about math, yet it seems that he wants to posit mathematic’s reality as being on par with the one in which we live. To do this would require a more concise approach, directed by principles. The chapters in this book suggest that Devlin wishes to pursue such an endeavor and yet at times, he seems unable to present us little more than examples and applications. In fact, his last chapter, about the ‘Hidden Patterns of the Universe’ seems to attempt to encapsulate an argument that Mathematics is as real as the universe is; although Delvin never makes this remark.

I don’t have a problem with his content, or how he talks about it. I do have an issue with his organization. If anything, he seems to want to make his argument without making it; to throw at us a barrage of ideas so that we submit. Unfortunately, in his presentation of this massive amount of data, he lacks any kind of metaphysical or over arching ideal by which we can grasp that mathematics is real. Isn’t it his point that inductive examples, examples by experience there may be plenty of, but a real proof is one that rationally equates two values so that their identity of relation is assured?

If we were to take mathematics as being as real as the universe, we would have to see a mathematical proof of it somehow. And so to that end, Devlin does not make this statement, although he seems to suggest it with many vague chapter titles and ruminations on how various patterns in the universe are at least explainable in mathematics. Devlin does not, however, explore that all patterns are explainable in mathematics, just that math is so applicable. Such an undertaking would be, in a sense, near impossible without a cogent understanding of exactly what a pattern is in the first place.

Still, I did enjoy reading this book, and learned a few things in the process. If you think this is an interesting topic, you may also enjoy reading this book.

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Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995

Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995 by Gilles Deleuze
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

Since this was published after his death, one mustn’t be too harsh. There is obviously very little coherency here. We get glimpses at some of Deleuze’s brilliance, shown unevenly because he didn’t refine much of this for publication. If you are starving for Deleuze, you should reach this book. You’ll grasp that he is a much more disciplined writer than Guattari. His clarity is of course, delightful, as always. There are gems here, such as Deleuze’s conflation of thought and life, transcendence and immanence. The title is compelling, but of this collection of works, there is little to show us of Deleuze himself — beyond what he has already given us in his refined publications.

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The Archaeology of Knowledge

The Archaeology of KnowledgeThe Archaeology of Knowledge by Michel Foucault
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

In many ways, this book serves as a pause for Foucault. It’s a mostly incomplete work in the sense that he describes what he has done and what he is going to do. And that’s all. So I guess I am saying this is very much a kind of aesthetics manifesto, or a discipline manifesto.

This book is also extremely influential for cultural criticism, as it highlights an approach to discourse, citing what discourse is and how discourse is to be understood as its own field.

What makes this book annoying, and in my opinion incomplete, is that while Foucault is able to say what he is intending to do and what level of “cut” Foucault is taking to be the object of study, Foucault is still unable to unexplain how or why this occurs or of what benefit it will be. In a real way works like Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things allows Foucault to see a connection of language that is a consistency in its own right, but he is unable to account for how to really understand what this level of slice means or how it fits in.

All he is able to say at this point is, look what this new and strange view of things is. Now that I see it, watch me go forth.

In a way, Foucault studies where he knows best. Discourse. Language. Knowledge that formulates itself and in that formulation shapes itself and its object of study. Where or how or why this happens is beyond Foucault. And that is kind of annoying. This discursive approach is a calibration to its own (in)consistencies, seemingly for its own sake. The Order of Things while more mysterious is far more ambitious that this work, which in a way, is a backwards step for Foucault to re-orient his approaches.

I suppose that in its time, this was cutting edge. This book was a major influence. Now it feels like staring at shadows.

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Being and Time

Being and Time (Contemporary Continental Philosophy)Being and Time by Martin Heidegger
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Society in general demands that the truth of our being come from others. Our cessation given our individuality demands the truth of our being come from our self. It is these two tensions that inform the work of early Heidigger which presents an impasse for Heidigger. he is unable to resolve these two tensions.

Middle period Heidigger returns to Kant’s critique of practical reason in an attempt to find the root of freedom in our will. That given pure practical reason — the law of our being proceeds from a rational moral core, from which our freedom can be recognized as a real. If we had no rational moral center, our actions would forever be characterized by environmental contingencies and we would have no way to recognize our free will.

It is then Heidigger’s mistake to assume that our rational moral core, the truth of our being, our authenticity, be determined as a conflation of statehood and individuality. That the alignment of both is the ideal state of authenticity. This difficulty comes back to being and time when Heidigger mistakes the temporality of being with historicity. This is why Kant avoided empirical answers; that environmental contingency will always color the takeaway of rationality; that empirical reason will distort pure reason in as much as pragmatic reason (induction) can never be proved given that the future is always presented as a foreclosure of possibility; ie, out of a bag of unknown colored marbles, my taking 5 black marbles may just be a fluke. With empirical reasoning I can always be fooled by randomness.

We shouldn’t necessarily spend too much time critiquing Heidigger’s mistake of picking Hitlerian Nazism as authenticity. Standard critiques aside, as Zizek points out, despite the obscenity of the statement, Hitler’s actions do not go far enough. Hitler’s actions are reactionary. Despite attempt at genocide and his deploring bourgeois German complacency history has shown us that Hitler’s role in power was to keep as much of this bourgeois complacency the same; that the mechanizations of socialism under Hitler changed as little as possible, proving that Hitlers ideas could never have moved the German people to realize any other logic, other than that which he preached against.

The main flaw with Heidigger’s procedure is simply that Heidigger does not understand that the determination of ones resolution of being isn’t only found with the threat of death. but that a resolution of being to determine who and what we are is always a struggle given the instability of language. Heiddiger’s assumption that language is stable presents, in the Lacanian sense, a psychotic world where being is left trapped as a foreclosed possibility. Heidigger’s assumption of the stability of language leads to his annoying twists of worlds to be as literal as possible, beating on language’s door as if words have any hidden truth that can be eeked out through literalness alone. Like Heidigger’s assumption that history is a rational trace of being, something that can be mined for the truth of one’s self, his mistake of temporality for history reduces the temporal process of self realization into an impossible stance.

Thus on the one hand, we have veiling, and on the other hand unveiling. This (un)veiling is a reflection of his own ideological assumption that there being comes and goes, that the metaphysics of presence only attains its fullness when language and dasein coincide (authenticity). It would have been better perhaps, if Heidigger was able to understand the fullness of dasien in daily life as a localized distortion in history rather than the fulfillment of history. His quasi-dialectical assumption of (un)veiling is proof that this distortion lies within the presence of being itself, something that struggles within the confines of itself rather than within the confines of they-self. in terms of Lacan, Zizek is correct to say that the gap isn’t as Heidigger assumed, between mitdasein and dasein but within dasein itself. This also carries forth that there is also a constituent gap in mitdasein itself, that language is not complete, that the demands of the other (statehood, and so on) are never authentic (consistent or complete).

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On the Shortness of Life

On the Shortness of LifeOn the Shortness of Life by Seneca
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Seneca was a very influential thinker. One of the early romans he was also the teacher of Nero. As a stoic, one sees that they approached life reasonably, taking the aesthetic of rationality derived from their Greek heritage seriously. They made that mode their way of being.

There are no lofty concepts here. Only an attempt to exercise being without ego, life without excess, keeping ones feet on the ground at all times. Through examples from history and some personal history, (even on writing to his mother about his own state ordered suicide) Seneca orients us to live not out of fear, want self satisfaction but out of being what we are; a spot on change to go forth and be the best person we can, no more no less.

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Hannibal Lecter, My Father

Hannibal Lecter, My FatherHannibal Lecter, My Father by Kathy Acker
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

I agree with much of the other commentators. The interview at the beginning was well worth the read. The selection of other works afterwards appear to be padding to exemplify the interview and also by giving us more of Acker’s work, but of works that may be less known.

Still, her methodology and philosophy come together in her interview and presents itself as a force. At first a critique, and then with the yet to be Pussy: King of the Pirates the making of a new mythology. Acker did manage to mature as a writer, not to destroy and create but to end with creating.

In some ways, I wish I read this first, before reading some of her other works, especially when she was churning them out in a way, the same book over and over at some point in the middle there.

It is telling to see how as a mere writer, she was able to provoke so much “bad touch” in the areas of culture, when government and legislation were involved. We cannot hide from that which we do not understand only because there is so much more we do not, cannot understand.

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Essentials of Processing Assessment

Essentials of Processing AssessmentEssentials of Processing Assessment by Milton J. Dehn
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

There’s not much to say too much about a textbook. Or in this case, a guide to the various kinds of assessments of human potential/capability.

It’s interesting that the rationality of psychology in the area of assessment would echo itself in terms of tests. While Dehn is careful to say that these tests don’t mean anything in themselves — that capability is a relative term — what we see here is the fragmentation of assessment as the ability to recount, move and process material difference. Different kinds of processing is tested differently, as though this is all that a human being is. The coherency of intelligence per se, may be found in fluid intelligence or g but these are admittedly difficult to test. We are more comfortable with mechanical tasks in terms of accuracy and speed as those are easily rated and compared.

The overall picture though, of an assessor as scientist, is not to judge but to try to reconstruct from the fragmented volley of tests the individuals entire capability. As Dehn pushes this philosophy of a unified human mind, he also remarks that often it’s not necessary to envelope a subject with the endless number of tests to be taken. We should only test when we think there is a need to help a subject do better in a subject matter or with social issues.

While this is directly applicable to school, this ends up being entirely applicable to our human condition. We want everyone to be calibrated properly, to excel. A nation of healthy minds to do what we need to do. This is not a bad ideal but its negative quality, that of degrading what cannot be tested, what cannot be captured, of ignoring potentials that are not easily capturable through rout rationalisation is not a good thing.

This is not a heavily critical book, but as such, it reveals the undercurrent of its own judgement by trying to be as faithful to what we need processing assessment for, and how we ought to utilize it for the good of the subject.

Of course, we should not shrink from doing what we think is best, of doing what we can for others, just because we might hurt them in ways that we cannot yet understand.

All in all, an interesting reflection of how justifiable fallibilism is possible given the way a field of knowledge wraps itself in terms of how it knows what it knows through its own immanent metrics.

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The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe

The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the UniverseThe Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe by Roger Penrose
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

In this amazing book, Roger Penrose looks for a very fundamental issue.

He is looking for a single metric to describe everything.

This is not a unit of reality, however, although this is how he poses the issue.

The problem with selecting a metric, as he shows us over and over, lies in how different metrics arise from localizations on various manifolds. As these metrics are extended beyond the localization, the very structure of these metrics will threaten to buckle. In many instances, the metrics (and their attendant relationships) will no longer be applicable. What this means, in the Kantian (and Badiouian sense) is that these relationships’s applicability will become “undecidable”. In some extreme cases, the relationships may even break down. For instance, black holes are a problem because the expressed relationships that emerge from physics experiments prove to be untenable in black holes (and the big bang) as these relationships decohere and infinities and zeros pop out everywhere.

This search for a metric leads Penrose to reject string theory as a viable relationship form. Each dimension is an extension of the 3 + 1 dimensions of space and time. For instance, gravity is a dimension, weak force is a dimension. Each dimension is an independent mathematical vector of a different “inertial” influence. Additionally, the mathematics of string theory, as well as other theories, proves to be too illusionary. As with post-structural critiques of modernism, Penrose points out that the consistency of string theory relies on theoretical supplements/signs that are attached onto the positions of various types in order to maintain coherency. For instance, superpartners, which have no physical correlative. In other words, the mathematical proliferation of dimensions as well as its immanent affects proves to be unweldly to Penrose because the coherence of the relationships are maintained by theoretical enforcement rather than any direct correlation of math and physical experimentation.

If Penrose was familiar with Badiou, Kant and Derrida, he would be able to recognize that the undecideability of supersymmetry and string theory result from these theoretical supplements. The supplements provide the missing pieces to cohere the theory, so physical experiments prove to be incomplete in their testing. As Penrose points out, string theorists in failing to find superpartners can always push the calibration of their theory to include these partners, just at higher energy levels, which can always lie beyond the ability of technology to generate.

In this sense, it seems to me that string theory and supersymmetry are antinomies of the Kantian variety. Penrose falls fault to this when he theorizes that Quantum Field Theory can be modified (rather than the Einstein’s general relativity) by changing the cut off metric. This is in line with all his discussions to “renormalize” the math so as to remove the variance accumulated by extending localized relations from beyond the area of origin on the manifold. We can always enforce a consistency of a given domain in two ways.

1. To provide a “superpartner” to supplement the terms, to keep phenomenon visible to one another within the domain, as a motion of immanence, as Derrida suggests.

Or.

2. To encapsulate a domain by limiting its identity to its other. From there, we can radically reduce the other to zero, thereby hiding the limitations of a domain, as with Moffe & Laulau with their Hegemony or as with Badiou with a basic atomic “cut” to center the domain as with Being and Event II.

Both of these strategies amount to the same kind of forced coherency by mapping a domain rigidly.

Penrose does offer his own favorite solution; his Twistor theory, which removes the need for extra dimensions beyond 3 + 1. Additionally, he considers this theory by collapsing all the different vector differences held cosmically in string theory into immanent relations that are founded on the very “knots” of space, so that the pre-space twistors contain the information that wider “vibrations” are meant to express. Both theories are incompatible in this regard because of their huge difference in scale.

And while Penrose admits that twistor theory adds nothing physically; that it’s just another way of viewing a situation mathematically, he also realizes the need for us to see things differently than we have.

It is this adherence to a particular view that causes all the problems in the first place. If you look at how these different views are constructed, you’ll see the mathematicians switch from one domain to another through various class equivalences whenever it suits them. When they need to express vectors they will jump to a manifold model, or a more generic (abstract) deformation of an algebra. In other words, we lack enough views. So we supplement the one we have in an attempt to normalize them.

Curiousier still is Penrose’s tiny discussion of consciousness in which he attempts to “renormalize” consciousness in terms of objective reduction. He theorizes that the waveform reduction that collapses due to quantum gravity may be at the seat of consciousness’s ability to complexly surject different sensory views into coherency. This suggestion is of the same kind as his forced synthesis of twistor theory. The satisfaction of trying to find a single metric, a single complex knot of relations that cannot be unraveled but contains all the “moves” is like a physicist trapped on a chess board recognizing the orthogonal formation of board, or as in Futurama the Professor discovering the smallest unit that constitutes the universe is the pixel.

In a real way, Penrose seeks to calibrate physics to the mathematical domain. He doesn’t want beautiful math that doesn’t apply, that is in excess of physics. This is why he creates that chart twice, in which the mathematical is the Truth of which the entirety of the physical is mapped; although mentality is generated from the physical and mathematical/Truth is generated from that.

The Platonic ideologue he insists on lies on the equivalence of function, on the purity of the sameness of process from point to point of the same type. Never-mind that the subatomic particles we find today are largely generated from artificial means. Penrose would assume as sameness of process that forces a universalization, but that is the way metaphysics and science both work, to equate different phenomenon as being identical based on narrow definitions of rational equivalence. This may work in some areas, but as we see, all relations are born locally, within a limited scope. Their extension cosmically creates the basis for which we start to see a degradation of relation qua variance (pollution, or various forces of form-fitting). After all, we can have no irrationality without first being able to posit a rational sheet of complete consistency.

Nonetheless, although this is a lengthy book it is still beautifully written. I wonder who Penrose’s audience is, for he approaches much mathematical complexity in such a short time, talking about basic principles like polynomials and trigonometry before jumping into Lagrangian manifolds and so on. Still, if you hunger for complexity and abstraction, here it is. Much of his explanations of very complex concepts are very clear, although at times we could use more handholding. His pictures are also very interesting and complement his point nicely.

Well worth the effort to read.

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Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Anarchy, State, and UtopiaAnarchy, State, and Utopia by Robert Nozick
My rating: 2 of 5 stars

Basically Robert Nozick argues for small government because there is no process by which any intervening distribution could be fair.

In fact he may go so far as to be saying that there is no legitimate fairness at all, other than a given impersonal process of arbitration (none of which could ever guarantee fairness).

In essence, he supports small government because there is an absence of genuine legitimacy.

The fact that Nozick supports any given neutral process even given the context of contigency shows us that Nozick is really formally a bureaucrat in disguise.

Nozick however, creates an antinomy here by confusing 1st order phenomenon with 2nd order judgement. For instance:

Fairness is only possible because there are things that are unfair to begin with. I don’t think we can dispute that there isn’t any source of legitimacy. If there was a source then we wouldn’t have to worry about fairness at all. If there was a source (any given source) no doubt it would most likely be arbitrary in its absoluteness. Fairness like beauty is better as a metaphysical guide than an enforced physical standard. That is a difference with 2nd level orders, that they do not exist at the 1st level.

Other than this small quibble, which strikes at the heart of this book, Nozick is concisely written and clear headed. I have a feeling that his obscuration of fairness is deceptive, but that would impart ill-intention on his part. I do however, think that his pursuit of an analytical analysis stems from the same kind of ill-fated kind of origin as logical positivism in its insistence that its transcendental logics be of the same level/kind as the phenomenon it seeks to explain.

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