Semiotics: The Basics

Semiotics: The BasicsSemiotics: The Basics by Daniel Chandler
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

As titled, this book is an introduction to semiotics. I honestly can’t image the book to be written any clearer. As an introductory text, Chandler does an amazing job navigating the tangled web of methodologies and conceptual frameworks that both define semiotics as a field as well as separating out the various schools and limitations inherent in each framework.

As a structuralist practice, semiotics is largely incomplete in the sense that semiotics tries to find objective kernels to tie down sense-making… these kernels are often come in the method of form — which while helpful for a particular sign, is not helpful when many signs are considered in a chain.

Thus the last chapter of this tight book approaches the “non-basic” methods, which include grounding a reader in the text, either in the form of a subject or in the form of other texts. Semiotics works well intrinsically as its own code, but is sorely limited when external constraints are imposed in the particular approaches to reading that we take daily… which is where post-structuralism starts (analysis of ideology, connection of form as a background to foreground ideological relations)…. and of course, the analysis of how semiotics creates a reader, or imposes relations on readers, and those ideological positionings of subjectivity.

Chandler’s exegesis explains these complex fields as well, touching on their differences from structural semiotics while clearly highlightly the benefits of these other approaches (which, one assumes is not basic). I was very impressed with his approach, and his ability to keep several methodologies clearly different even while many of them overlap (but also diverge) in their use of terms and meanings.

All in all, an impressive textbook. My only thought, in the manner of helping readers who are less metaphysical however, Chandler might assume a painting or a short story to show how different semiotic analysises could overlap.

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Truth, bullshit, Identity(ego) and Bullshit

If you take words like Truth seriously, you’ll find yourself going into a beyond. Because Truth with a capital T is a place, not a specific content… it’s an empty position, which means only itself. The narrowest point of all, it is also the most distant, the axis around which discourses circulate as satellites.

This “north star” only operates as itself, without meaning because it is completely itself… (meaning is always the deferral of meaning, words leading to more words, thus when it is itself, it is without meaning, an irrational point standing in for nothing but itself). Truth, must remain outside of discourse to organize discourse.

Truth is the opposite of bullshit.

First, bullsit:

I spoke with one of best friends about this. Bullshit is machine language. It’s code. It’s a self-enclosed, self-referential discourse which does not connect well to outside discourses. Thus bullshit, which is always encased in a system (of bullshit) which generates bullshit is like Truth in that it does not refer to anything but itself, it is also equally irrational.

The difference though, is that when you participate in bullshit, when you have a stake in it as an identity in it, it is no longer bullshit, it is meaningful.

For example, you can think that as a college professor, your mission is to educate young minds. Educate them. But the colleges themselves operate on a different level. Colleges rank themselves, compete with each other for funding, create complex apparatuses which organize their departments in the form of hierarchies, ranking its employees and so on. So while a college professor can identify themself like dead poet’s society — through discourse and elucidation, a college will foist on its professors a different identity, one encoached in metrics of grading, ranking, preening and processes… all of which generally serve the college’s needs directly and only the students indirectly, if at all. Such a professor will protest this hijacking of his identity (“I am not a cog in your machine”) and thus the system and its output will be seen as “bullshit”. If you were a college administrator, or a teacher heavily invested with the system and the college’s needs, you may see yourself as both elucidator AND a position within a rank in file within the college — also a representative of the college, befitting the needs of the college. In that case, you won’t see such output as “bullshit” because your identity will be wrapped up within the logic of that hierarchical discourse.

So, other forms of bullshit also depend on identity positionings. If your identity does not fit an imposed external discourse, you will see that discourse as bullshit. You might as well be a mechanic looking at a doctor’s chart, or a doctor looking at a mechanic’s documentation of a ship’s engine. Both discourses are separate from each other, self referential with its own semiotic chains, its own indexical peculiarities, its own bullshit.

In a way, bullshit is the system itself, seen from the outside. No bullshit is bullshit unless you don’t identify within its meanings at an unconscious level. But Truth, is the standin axis for all discourses… in a way, an attempt to contain discourses within one rubric. In our fragmented postmodern world, we generate many self referential codes. Law codes, building codes, computer codes, academic codes, bureaucratic codes, administrative codes, tax codes, stock codes, logic codes, mathemes… all of which are only meaningful within their own self reference. How many tv shows create their own jokes, create their own meanings by referring to an encyclopedia of history? Comic book wikis, Star Trek wikis, Star Wars wikis, Doctor Who wikis, Lost wikis… the list goes on and on.

In the age of information, we create nestings of code in an attempt to attract people to join our languages, our plateaus of sense and reason, and thus invested they exist in a 2nd Life, Sim, fanbased community for which there can be nearly no beyond because self referentiality forecloses interaction between outside discourse. At least, online that’s the case. In person, your neighbors intrude, your economics intrude, your politics intrude and disrupt these fragile sensibilities, reminding us of a larger discourse.

For example, the master discourse today is not spoken in words but in money. Economically, with the current money laundering laws and identity theft laws, our financial institutions seek to mire us within their own code, so that we cannot escape their domain. Everything needs a bank account, or a social security number. We may have gained some autonomy to create separate spheres of influence, but the larger appratuses of capital also seek to dominate us by forcing us to psychically invest in credit scores, tax returns, and to play the game their way… their Truth of course, is money, which is meaningless in itself… Money is the petit object a, of the discourse of money, as it stands only for itself, a zero sum signifier, to guarantee that we are within the system of money, that all things can be exchanged for money as a kind of Money.

This locking of us into this immobility also involves slowly locking us out. Cities have started to impose “good neighbor fees” on home based businesses, so that only the residents can work at such home based businesses. Already in a post-industrial economy, our material dialectic is split by market mediation. We are purely consumers, purely meant to work as employees and consumers. The early 20th century saw the leftovers of consumer culture recycled back into the producer’s side of the cycle… but that divorce only increasingly locks us out of that side… the masters of production seek to keep newcomers out of competiting for production as a way of retaining their access to profit by imposing more power against those who might do otherwise. People who seek to do business on their own face increasing challenges, a nest of laws that would prohibit and limit access while increasing information cost (compliance laws) and start-up costs, raising the amount needed to start a business. People who would be in business see these external constraints as “bullshit” because they do not recognize that the system’s imposition on them as being central to what they are trying to do or who they would to be… that business people see themselves doing transactions (marketing, service or production, shipping) rather than seeing the outside state apparatus demanding of them a piece of their action before they even do anything.

This kind of dialectical opposition through identity is very illustrative of how the category of bullshit is created from the self’s position within a discourse that would locate the self in a different position than where it thinks it ought to be.

Second, Truth:

So if bullshit is being outside of a discourse of self-referentiality, then what is Truth? I sought to take such terms seriously that I looked into meta-language, philosophies, in order to clarify what Truth might be, or how it might be attained. In doing so, you examine words. Language. In doing that, you start to notice words and how they work, what they mean.

When you notice words as words, reality and language start to separate. This is an odd phenomenon, after all, as Lewis Carrol has been so often been paraphrased: Take care of the sense and the words will arrange themselves. The reverse is equally telling. Take care of words themselves, and the very thing you seek (sense itself) will slip from your grasp. When you reach a point that words like Truth mean only what they mean, and that their nest inevitably refers back to itself, you will hit reach the limits of language… for language can explain the objects in language — language moves such objects, manipulates them, for what else is language for, but the negotiation of meaning and personal position among Others — but language cannot explain itself, just as the thinker cannot think itself. This quote from Slavoj Zizek (from Less than Nothing) is useful:

In the opposition between the symbolic order and reality, the Real is on the side of the symbolic—it is the part of reality which clings to the symbolic in the guise of its inconsistency/gap/impossibility). The Real is the point at which the symbolic itself, mutilating it from within: it is the non-All of the symbolic. There is a Real not because the symbolic cannot grasp its external Real, but because the symbolic cannot fully become itself. There is being (reality) because the symbolic system is inconsistent, flawed, for the Real is an impasse of formalization. This thesis must be given its full “idealist” weight: it is not only that reality is too rich, so that every formalization fails to grasp it, stumbles over it; the Real is nothing but an impasse of formalization—there is dense reality “out there” because of the inconsistencies and gaps in the symbolic order. The Real is nothing but the non-All of formalization, not its external exception.

So as discourse is unable to cohere completely, make things what they are, we get the gaps and distortions in things within the symbolic discourse itself, always as an indexical “beyond” representation to stand in for the distortion which is only “true” as it coincides with the un-able to be symbolised formation. Where Truth as a marker of stablization sets in the discourse, it acts as the single sign that is itself, to tie in the external inconsistency/gap of the Real back to the symbolic force. Another quote from Zizek, to continue the thought:

Since reality is in itself fragile and inconsistent, it needs the intervention of a Master-Signifier to stablize itself into a consistent field; this Master-Signifier makes the point at which a signifier falls into the Real. The Master-Signifier is a signifier which not only designates features of reality, but performatively intervenes into reality.

Our loss of a Master-Signifier, as Zizek puts it, from the modern to the postmodern marks the fragmentation of discourses today, unable to cohere together as they split into their own alignments. Nonetheless the modern world exists today, through the auspices of Money and in its spectral form.

So how does Truth and bullshit tie together?

Third, Identity/ego:

For each of us today, as we develop identities and egos, we invest in different discourses, hoping to find one that is legitimatized and mostly compatible through whatever other discourses people around us engage in. Example of such discourses abound: a church discourse, a video game clan discourse, a fraternity discourse, academic discourse(s), economic work discoures… legal discourse(s)… these all intersect at the body of identity, bombarding us with fragmentation and contradiction. Coming to find one’s self, or to “discover yourself” is another way of saying, “I need to find an image/position immanent within a discourse where I can fit in, and become myself…” Spoken cynically, “I need to become the image others will then see as me, so that I may belong to a discourse, without the gap/distortion/inconsistency inherent in being a personality whose psychal investments connect to nothing.” Losers are narcissists for whom their meanings only mean something to themselves… no one else, no outside discourse recognizes their meanings/connections as being inherently meaningful.

Fourth, Bullshit:

And of course, noting how Truth itself functions within a discourse, radically itself because it is irrationally itself. Everything is contingent, although Truth only exists as itself, an emptiness within discourse but not of it (the center is not the center) to guarantee an anchoring of discourse. All is contingent, including the fact that sometimes necessities come out, but only do so contingently. In other words, dissolving words into words instead of reality forces us to lose the very thing we seek to gain… we lose our place because the functionality is localized into an objective model that is not-us. Truth becomes truth, and discourse becomes bullshit.

Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up

Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add UpMismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up by Joseph E. Stiglitz
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

To put it bluntly, economics is the study of how to make decisions effectively, what goes into decisions and how to be effective.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has often been used as an indicator to try and decide how well a nation is doing at managing its resources and caring for for its population.

This small book attempts to tackle why GDP isn’t an effective measure for policy makers to determine if the economy is doing well. In fact, this book is quite adamant that GDP is not the way to measure the economy.

I guess another way of saying this is simply: our economic models are not yet sophisticated enough to make sense of what’s actually important to us as a species. We don’t know how to maximize utility… and we don’t exactly know what this utility is or how to measure it.

Traditionally, we have taken money as the objective indicator, but it’s become clear that money is unable to capture much of the intangible “utility” that is important to us. (Such as love, trust, happiness…)

So in this book, there are three proposed indexes which an effective “dashboard” of indicators should ultimately relate to: How productive we are, how happy we are and how sustainable we are.

This sounds great at the onset until you realize that this book is only outlining the principles for what such a dashboard should be… it’s not out to provide a turnkey solution, as we are a long way off from understanding what effective measurements should be.

So while economics is about making effective decisions (maximizing utility), this book is less about actual economics than it is about how to determine the actual constraints upon which applied economics should function… basically, humanity has reached the point of realizing the Earth is not unlimited. As such, we can no longer act as though we are in a “sandbox” (free to play and experiment as we please) because we are in a sandbox (a closed environment with very limited resources).

What throws an even bigger wrench into this situation is that even if we were to determine what indicators should be measured on such a “dashboard” there remains the question as to what these indicators would mean… that is, if one of these indicators was the amount of CO2 we were pumping into the air, what amount of CO2 is healthy? What should we aim for? If one of the indicators of well being was longevity, how long is too long, before quality of life goes downhill? If one of the indicators was how many newborn infants die due to air pollution… how many infants dying should be considered “healthy” for the economy?

The deeper question not tackled in this book is, what exactly is “well-being”? They do a good job at taking apart what “sustainable” means, in the fact of limited stocks, and technological disruption (which may make certain unimportant resources more important in the future, or vis versa)… and they are right to point out that even if we were to be able to accurately provide indexes on such resources, we wouldn’t necessarily know what such indexes mean, or what should be the desirable range.

All in all, the ambitions of this book, which is really, only to set out the outline of such a project, outstrip the current abilities of humankind to really answer any of these questions effectively… but I suppose it’s good to point out the problems now, so we can solve them later.

Where this book begins — dealing with GDP — is a good place to start. GDP does have huge issues associated with it… and we shouldn’t use this number as an indicator to determine how well we are doing, because it is an incomplete indicator and misses the three proposed indexes as stated above…. indexes… to put into numbers… the very important values to our well being as nations and as human beings.

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Designing Courses and Obstacles

Designing Courses and ObstaclesDesigning Courses and Obstacles by Pamela Carruthers
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

This book is a book on the principles of designing horse obstacle courses.

First, a disclaimer: Because of the subject matter, I can’t imagine too many people reading this.

Secondly, I don’t ride horses. I don’t watch sports. I picked up this book off the “free” books at a bookstore.

Nonetheless, this book is intriguing, with diagrams, and measurements and odd little bits of advice on what to do.

While small, this book covers 4 types of competition. All of them not only have to do with time (who can do it quickest) but more importantly, they deal with form. While you compete, you must keep the proper form. Rider and horse must perform with one understanding about how to maneuver and take instruction from one another.

For this reason, the courses must be designed to provide a challenge for the riders, but also be skill level appropriate. The challenge must be great enough that the competition fans out, with the poorer performers on the bottom and the top performers on top. You don’t want the majority of the riders to be clumped in one area. And you don’t want a trick course that doesn’t provide enough variety of challenge to favor riders who are not well rounded.

You also need to provide excitement for the audience and enough form tests (and good enough views) for the judges. The course must not be too stretched out, so as to be a gallop, nor do you want the course scrunched with many odd angles. In short, the course has take the group of competitors and blindly test their aspects to come up with the best formed pair.

The designers go so far as to talk about how to create the obstacles, what kind of construction to use, and what principles one should follow when examining jumps, so as to not be tricky and confuse the competitors. The jumps should be “attractive” (all the designers say this, although I’m not sure what they mean) yet the jumps should not be confusing as to where the dimensions lie.

Thus the art of course designing is formed through all these external constraints (and the official guidelines of the sport) so as to create the proper obscales… to test skill, not luck. Discipline and proper rigor — and not brute force. Consideration must be given at all times to the each kind of participant (competitor, judge, audience).

I suppose in all sports, the measure of competition is to see who can come out meeting the goals yet also fitting the rules best. What’s intriguing here, is that the competitors are half man, and half horse. A riding assemblage to territorialize the course as it is given.

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Pedagogy of the Oppressed

Pedagogy of the OppressedPedagogy of the Oppressed by Paulo Freire
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Although a small book, Freire’s tight analysis of oppression as it dehumanizes or forecloses oppressed subjectivities from fully forming is astounding.

Freire’s thesis is fairly simple: Freedom can only be attained when people are clear on how they are not free. Thus, only though education can one attain the proper human freedom of realizing one’s place in the world.

This isn’t as simple as it sounds. One’s place in one’s world is tied to who one thinks they are, and how they are. People’s identities have a solid anchor in their subjectivity. They often do not seek liberation by way of questioning their own hidden assumptions… rather they often seek liberation by attempting to become in the form of their own oppressors.

Although he doesn’t fully go into the philosophies behind his writing, it’s clear that he’s read Hegel and Marx, dived deeply into dialectics and come back with the same credo so many philosophers before him have acknowledged: radical freedom is only attained through the re-coding of who one is, of understanding the implicit choices we do have instead of limiting one’s self by not being the proper subject. So often does not simply not allow oneself permission to be simply because of habit, or social standing… The implications of new agency aren’t simply in discourse, or social hierarchy, but also in resource and labor division. Freire seeks to bring about revolutionary action through real education… on the street education, where one lets the people speak, and gives them agency to speak.

Strangely enough, much of what he says does echo cognitive psychology’s development of ego in the spiral dynamics model. One can only realize who one is, after one has realized the conventionality of being, stumbled into the negation of post-conventionality and come back with a better understanding of how we are all in this together.

I won’t echo all of his book on here, I can’t. Although less than 200 pages, Freire has not wasted a single sentence. He has cut out so much of what is inessential to emphasize what is essential.

Rarely do you meet an author who has come across such forceful passion AND thought through his message with such clarity… it was such a pleasure to read this.

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X-Men: X-Cutioner’s Song

X-Men: X-Cutioner's SongX-Men: X-Cutioner’s Song by Scott Lobdell
My rating: 2 of 5 stars

As comic book companies became more and more corporate, sales needed to be key. One of the ways these companies did this, was to have cross-overs. You sell more comics per month, introduce readers who are already familiar with one universe to experience other casts… and thus cross-overs reigned supreme in the 90s.

I haven’t read comics in a while, but used to as a teenager. X-men was one of my favorites. So while I am familiar with most of the cast, I actually don’t know who many in the other groups.

What makes this series a little confusing is that it’s mainly an internal affair. A mystery happens, and the groups ban together to race around trying to figure out who the culprit is. So much of the first half is pretty disorganized, confusing and full of odd twists and many familiar bad guys get introduced into the mix. Finally you get some inking of what’s going on, and then the story ends. Why? Because this series was to be a prelude to introducing another line of comics, this time starring Cable.

So the story is a little uninspired… and the ending not completely satisfying. Cable was already a mysterious character. Now he gets even more mysterious.

The art is pretty good. The dynamic layouts of the panels and some of the dialogue intriguing. Still this is no Genosha island. And the plot could have been better put. At the very end you see some of the more basic struggles of the bad guys, which are basically bad because their egos have run amok… which is different than saying they have no morals. The good guys, however, are the ones who respect others… and want to protect the weak and innocent. So there’s not much else there.

Still, I did enjoy reading it, most of the time.

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On incidental Truth, consistency and belonging

The reversal of Doxa (“opinions/metaphysics”) and Episteme (“truth/knowledge”) happened around the time of the early 20th century. The theory of relativity seems to be the discovery that sparked it, but really this theoretical discover is merely the “best example” of the reversal in knowledge types that I am pointing out.

Once Newtonian physics lost its bearing as being Truth — which coincided with the scientific method being formulated as a method for truth — incidentally, we also gradually lost our ability to speak from a position of privileged reality.

This loss happens historically, at the same time in which capitalism as a form of economic, social and political expansion also started to intrude enough on non-capitalist people that such these peoples also began to became capitalist, and started push back. Their entry into the capitalist market bore with it a host of signifiers and meanings that at once altered what was once a solely European narrative. At this time, capitalism as a marker of progress also, in theory, stopped being as such, and started to alter its form to become capitalism without a strong and explicitly European narrative. I don’t mean to say that the signifiers of “Enlightenment” or “progress” ever ceased to be relevant, but that such narratives only became secondary to the flow of capital, that making money became primary… that while people still today talk about “progress” and “rationality” such notions are not defined independent of the market place, but only echo it’s occurrence, that is, whatever happens in the market place is “rational” rather than rationality being the primary impetus for the flow of resources. The separation of capitalist moves from social narrative’s logic forced two effects, which are arguably the same event: 1. Europe (but mostly America) lost its sense of culture as it became the “norm” for capitalism. In other words, American culture became arguably invisible to many Americans. and 2. Capitalism as a system refined/transformed its logic to become able to sustain the creation of its own symbolic Real — for example, the movements of the financial markets are based solely on itself, without any reference to “real” activity outside of its own sphere.

Whether we want to claim that the scientific revolution sparked this separation when the theory of relativity suggested that reality itself was simply beyond our ability to measure it, that our measurements are mostly, if not purely, self-referential, OR if we want to claim that the influx of non-European cultures caused capitalism to eventually separate from the master narrative of European tradition of progress, the result is really the same.

Either way, we see a separation (parallax gap) between the “outside” happening and the “inside” activity inherent within a logical system/discourse. The result is that when the outside world becomes just a thing, when science or capitalism vanquished the over-coding of traditional narratives onto “things”, we get a world full of objects that can become whatever we want them to be. In late capitalism, we are free to manipulate products, produce environments and synthesize an entire new way of interaction with the outside. Blame this on science, or on industry, but when production is hidden from the consumer, through technology, bureaucracy, finance, or any other meaningless Symbolic Real codes that refer only to themselves, we detach from the environment and end up floating in a postmodern sea that constantly spits out signifiers… signifiers that are devoid of any hard points for navigation because we are unchained from any specific environment. In short, the world becomes the reverse imprint of who we are, and what we say.

The implication of this result is best captured by the work of Karl Popper. Although Popper is a scientific philosopher, his work is best characterized as a realization that theories exist solely through their ability to be consistent (ir)regardless of experimental results. A huge question in his work revolves around sophisticated justificationism — at what point does a scientific theory become unable to be justified? At one “key” experiment (the significance of an experiment always being after discourse has been disrupted by it), or when a theory faces of other completing theories that have more explanatory power?

The basic idea through Popper is that theories have a distinctive “shape” or formative relationship inherent within their primary parts. As this “shape” is extended, it should be able to predict results from experiments not yet performed… of course, various experiments often create auxiliary hypothesises, theoretical asides, until at some point the self referential kernel of the theory can no longer sustain the added modifications, allowing the space for a new theory will come about that will be adopted with a more refined core kernel.

What is revolutionary about this model of scientific theory is that the role of induction is minimum. In fact, Popper insists that induction is not at all needed. This is amazing so let me reiterate: Popper’s claim is that science can progress solely on the level of theoretical consistencies. Each competing theory presents a pure sheet of relations, that can be used to over-code the total field of experimental results, both past, present and future. The theory that is the most consistent despite (or because of!) disruptions from other experiments should be the theory that we adopt.

This means that removing theories due to experimental results is only incidental, given the presence of other consistencies. In other words, the primary mode for selecting a theory is its “standing power” in relation to other theories. Experiments and their results are only included as one of the judgments for which theory is most sexy.

What I mean to do now is expand the understanding of consistencies beyond the initial domain of Popper’s work and apply it to all relations and all logics of discourse.

There are various theories about the logic of sense. Among them are Hegel, Zizek, Lacan, Saussure, Mikhail Bakhtin, Charles Sanders Pierce, Roland Barthes, Derrida, Roman Jackobson, and Hjelmslev… although the most general of them remain, for me, Deleuze and Guattari. To avoid all this philosophical jargon, I will paraphrase Zizek’s use of Lacan, although at times I will interject other terminologies where it may be useful to highlight specific relationships not given in Lacan’s meta-language.

All subjectivities/egos/identities (I know the terms are used differently but bear with me) are constructed out of the logic of negation. In the formulation of the ego, through a self-differentiating process analogous to autopoiesis, the self carves a space out of intersubjective symbolic space to understand its role among others. At first, it may want to be belong — to follow part of the group. Eventually, it may want to lead the group and be recognized as itself.

To also interject the language of Deleuze and Guattari, in the process of autopoiesis, selves carve out vast territories for which there exist collections of intensities, black holes, and other erotified zones. Black holes, in particular, exist as indexical signs (Pierce and Jackobson) that signify/refer to the outside of a system. Such black holes, exist on the territory of the human face, such as the eyes and mouth. In terms of profiles, for a subject, the signifier/d “father” may also cover such a black hole. Such zones are unique to each individual, depending on how they have pushed meaning from term to term. Although individual distinction of such psychial positions may differ depending on a subject, the event of such positions is the effect of autopoiesis as much as it is the intersubjective space differentiating population from population, group from group, or meta-group from meta-group. We create these piles to bracket meaning as a foundation so that we can go about the business of our lives, to create empty space to move freely. The weaker the ego, the less space it carves for itself flourish, and the more easily it is threatened by its own internal inconsistencies (which are also antinomies found in the world, in itself, and in its own immanent verticies).

As Lacan was so quick to point out, through his example of the Edgar Allen Poe’s Purloined Letter, the existence of such intensities pre-dates the “accident” of encountering such intensity. If you have issues with your father, you may have created, in the image of your father (and by extension all Fathers) a repository for the entangled meanings that you have discarded. In order to create a clear sense of self, or a clear space for yourself to exist, certain meanings such as being a “loser” or other similar undesirables may be buried inside such intensities, wrapped up in the particular of “father”. Such intensities, buried as they are, may be incompletely buried so that they create such a sinthome, that the encounter of a resemblance may bring about again, a threatening of this knot so that the ties of this knot, that hold together the topology of the subject may threaten to become undone. A non-psychoanalytic example of how the creation of such a place in discourse creates the space for the verification of this discourse through its encounter with the outside. Hegel uses the example of a man, Ceasar, to illustrate this. Ceasar created such a revolutionary space for himself so that even after his actual death, that space he created persists under the his moniker. All others after him, would become Ceasar, a subset of being marked as he had been/was/is… and this verification reifies their position as Ceasar, as the centerpiece of Roman political life.

This kind of incidental verification occurs often, beyond scientific theory. In fact, the reaction of individuals that are “out of proportion” with their circumstance bespeak the tripping of such sinthomes since they have encountered (through happenstance), a particular antinomy particular to their identity construct (which is also their singular world view).

The general rule, however, to understanding this is that this merely doesn’t happen in regard to individual encounters that are out of proportion… an encounter with an other/object/not-me is always an encounter with discarded meanings, constructs that have been laid aside through autopoiesis. When I see an other, I am actually seeing my construct because I am seeing an other. This isn’t to say that our senses deceive us (although they do, on a different level), or that one who is different isn’t different in how they appear. But the meaning of what they appear to us, is a meaning that is inscribed in the very heart of how we have created our-self, through either our identification of them, (you are like me, we are of the same/similar group) or our rejection of them (you are not-me, you are an other).

Of course, history and political discourse abounds with such examples, which can be expanded upon later.

The primary extension of this notion of sense, lies in how individuals through political discourse (or discourse in general) are able to weave a super-structure of meaning that is independent but also of, how they encounter the world. In an environment where very little is prized as being key, “the discourse” of different consistencies with different constructs can be brought forward by individuals whose only claim to being true, is the very consistency inherent in the logic of their discourse. Stephen Colbert’s “truthiness”, as it were. The “facts” as they are, often only function as incidental but “meaningful” accidents that verify/validate discursive claims for-itself. In other words, when you are within a logic of discourse that supports your sense of self, objects will speak to you of their truthiness and seem to mean the things you need them to mean. When you are within a particular consistency, the strength of this consistency will be that you fit the lifeworld and the lifeworld fits you. In short, the illusion is that you (and your view of the lifeworld) are validated by external markers that seem to speak for themselves when in fact you are speaking to yourself what you mean for them to be, and what you mean to be, through them.

This ability of consistencies to swallow “facts” through (invisible) dialogical reasoning is of course, the problem with pundit discourse — the same fact can be used to deploy alternate/contradictory meanings depending on which discourse it has been deployed in. While statements can be taken out of context, the fault lies less with the original context of the fact itself, than with the differences in context given different discursive logics, different worldviews and different identity constructions that need to be preserved differently.

In other words, even when encountering a beloved, a prized pet, or a car, that beloved is only such because of their place in how you construct the meanings surrounded your own identity. The looser your inscription defining such position that the prized beloved incidentally aligns with, the less meaningful such incidental occupation of such a position will be… and the less pleasure (or pain) you will have when the validation is (or is not) affirmed.

So, “life” affirming memes, or posts, telling you that life is precious, go surround yourself with good, beauty and truth… is really just telling you to create a situation where the positive “hot-spots” in your psychial world are fulfilled by any other who can fill them, while not challenging your world view. In this model, the strong case for discourse consistency is that truth is really only about the you using the outside validating what you’ve always wished to be the case… not about finding something new. The weaker case for discourse consistency is that truth can only exist when the outside coincides with a position in the psychial consistency… so that the discourse is “useful”… whether that position is desirable or not, is irrelevant.

This ability of the mind to sublimate facts in-itself is not a bad thing… but given the impermanence of even change itself… chances are your consistency is not rugged enough to survive for very long if you venture away from your nest of like minded associates (which given technology, is both easy and hard). The energy it takes to constantly redeploy and maintain such meanings can be very astounding, depending on how desperately you hang onto your identity construction. When you start to understand how you are blinding yourself, when you see your own internal cause is the root of external meaning, most likely you won’t be able to identify with such a construct any longer, because you can see how things could be different. When the magic goes away, you won’t find any good reason why what was, was at all possible… even if you remember how plausible, wonderful and orderly it all seemed to be.

The Political Mind

The Political Mind: Why You Can't Understand 21st-Century American Politics with an 18th-Century BrainThe Political Mind: Why You Can’t Understand 21st-Century American Politics with an 18th-Century Brain by George Lakoff
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

I was first introduced to George Lakoff through his work in 2nd language acquisition. His thoughts and work in that area was quite impressive, so when I ran across this book I was eager to look into it.

First let me say that this book isn’t really academic. Yes, it is written by an academic, but it’s also meant for general consumption. I didn’t read the reviews below before reading this book, but in skimming them, I am surprised by how people had to mention how academic it was or how technical it is. Honestly, I wish it was more technical.

Also, I had a hard time starting this book because it sounded too much like a liberal griping about conservatives. The way the book eased into framing really annoyed me, because it read too much like loose rhetorical/discourse analysis. I didn’t care about discourse analysis, since I’ve read much more substantial ones… but then surprise: Lakoff made a claim about cognition in terms of discourse.

Suddenly things were not words anymore. He was talking about not only how we think with regular structures, but how invoking those internal structures through language was how people got to emphasize different aspects of cognition.

There are three takeaways for me.

The first is simply that arranging words in ever new ways allows people to process things differently. Providing substantial framing through the use of culturally familiar metaphors isn’t simply window dressing to invoke stolid logical relations… those metaphors also allow the speaker/writer to slip into other arguments by analogy. Lakoff has obviously first worked this out in more academic ways, which would be very interesting to look at… but then, rhetorical analysis has always taken the approach of analysing metaphors and reoccurring tropes as how writing and communication are structured. And the use of rhetoric in this fashion was well documented since early orators from the beginning of human history. Only because of the age of Enlightenment have we instead thought that somehow pure thought was only relational, devoid of excess entanglements… and that understanding supersedes the actual differences in types of expression or kinds of anything… that the categories themselves are more real than the expressions… but really this can’t be true since anything that is the same as anything else is simply the same thing, unable to be distinguished… from itself. By tossing out information or being reductionist, we lose part of the picture. The question of course, is always what context, which part is itself the operant part?

The second takeaway from this book is itself rhetorical, in a way. Lakoff insists that the beyond of language lies solely within the cognitive structures of our neurons… while he seems to imply that such structures are too difficult to decode (neurons fire too quickly, and are too small and numerous to keep track of) He calls quite often, mostly in the latter third of the book, for a New Enlightenment, one that at first, seeks to find the deeper structures of our minds through the use of framing… that we can get at these deeper cognitive structures through intensive rhetorical analysis, much like Chomsky’s deep structure of grammar. I understand this book is not academic, so I am left understandably, a little vague as to how this would exactly work. He dismissing Noam Chomsky’s Universal Grammar (UG) project as constrained by “Old Enlightenment” thinking… although he highlights UG’s project structure as a model for a new field of study.

Lakoff is serious about merging discourse analysis with cognitive computation. He cites numerous thinkers like Charles Fillmore and the school of the Neural Theory of Language. With this, Lakoff is, in a way, still working within old Enlightenment aesthetics of thought. If language itself is how we process thoughts (which I think him correct), there can be no real deeper structure to thoughts since they pick the expression that is best suited to being what it is. I am not saying that this area of study isn’t worth studying — it is — but people can think in Math symbols, in body movements, in melodies… in other kinds of directly encoded formula instead of just language. Furthermore, tropes and metaphors are specific to groups. The study of such fields will inevitably change them. As memes come and go, so will the study itself always shadow the area of study. To codify those areas of study with academic jargon, which is also inevitable, will inevitably introduce distortion as frames used to discuss those areas themselves formulate the field of study… this is of course, start of a different discussion: the philosophy of science and justificationism, which is beyond the point of this review.

The third takeaway, which I find very invigorating is that poetry and philosophy, through this field, will be seen again as socially valid. Both of these areas have been somewhat repressed by our current capitalist frame, as neither directly contributes to producing or retaining wealth. Yet the deeper reasons for such repression may very well be that such fields of semiotic slippage are also fields which revolutionize and alter perception ever so slightly… loss of these areas of the language arts amounts to a loss of our ability to step out of much of our framing. People can’t rebel against what they can’t see. And people can’t effectively rebel if they do not realize a way out. I don’t mean to suggest that bands of poets or bands of philosophers rove downtown office buildings across first world nations to “blow people’s minds”. And even if they could, there isn’t any reason to do that. After all, people who do want to see alternatives will eventually find them. It’s just that there’s a reason why much of these two areas is difficult to comprehend. The transformative power of both poetry and philosophy have been well documented throughout history even if today they are often dismissed as being irrelevant by “serious professionals”. Lakoff dismisses classical philosophers as “Old Enlightenment” and perhaps they should be dismissed in that way, but the Cliff Note’s version is only our socially accepted “conclusion” of what amounts to lifetime upon lifetime of work by society’s best and brightest. As one who reads Enlightenment thinkers, I must say that their writing does often leave one to see how they turn around objects, create auxilitary objects and speculate the pure relations between collected bundles in an attempt to make sense of the world… In effect, you can learn from their learning… You can make better sense of the world through watching others attempt the same thing. The lesson here isn’t always the content itself, but how the content is formulated… while not itself a matter of “Framing” very much a matter of the creation of context and structure, roots of framing.

Lakoff’s book can be read as a call to action against stolid ways of thinking, against conventionally tried methods of making sense. How much sense do things make now? We race our cars around polluting the planet, we spend our health and our youth to make wealth, only to spend that wealth to try to regain youth. We make tons of waste every year, from products that historically wouldn’t be looked on as trash. And we bury this stuff in our own backyards. Yes it’s true that Lakoff prizes being a progressive against being a conservative. But even those progressive frames are the products of the very systems that compel us to behave the way we do. I understand, one step at a time. But all the same…

Perhaps it’s time for us to return to such areas, in an attempt to find our own freedom, so we won’t simply be money spending-money making machines.

All in all, you can tell that Lakoff is just getting warmed up. He very obviously intended progressives and progressive strategists to take into account cognition in politics, not as a call to step out of thinking in old familiar frames. Instead, let’s use the ones we have to push forward progress. After all, Lakoff did after all help find the now defunct liberal thinktank Rockridge institute. Even at the end of this book, you can tell that he will write another.

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Existence and Existents

Existence and ExistentsExistence and Existents by Emmanuel Levinas
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

I’m not well versed in Heidigger’s work. And as for Levinas, I’ve avoided him for as long as I have heard of him.

This work however, is one of his first, and well worth the read. Much of it stems from his working closely with Heidigger. Heidigger restarted after the mess Hegel and Kant left, understanding that one cannot think through Being, he instead started to think around Being. This book works in much the same way, as Levinas begins with a critique of Heidigger and ends where it seems, he will work through on his own issues separate from Heidigger.

What was surprising for me, is that Levinas develops the same dialectical twists to talk around being as do other masterful dialecticians, such as Lacan, Zizek and the like. Although Levinas first starts with moods, explains the originary ground of such feelings like fatigue in order to highlight where one ends and the world begins, as a relationship to the world, Levinas quickly establishes being as independent of the world, as the ground of the self that is not incorporatable by the self or the world… ending with the there is, the limit of what can be thought… the same limit that Kant reached poised at the limit of the phenomenological.

This brief excursion (brief in page numbers) then takes a sharper turn as Levinas expands on how the self relates to the world in the last chapter. I’m not certain if hypostasis is a concept he turns towards later on in his career, but this last chapter is again, the respelling of the limits of existent in various axial dimensions, such as space, time and of course, language. His rhetorical device is dialectics without being obviously enamored with negation but he spells out a particular parallel between the I, and the present moment vs the existent and existence as a field. This thought remains the limit of the rest of the book, where the irruption in anonymous being of locationalization itself is best expressed temporally as the engagement in being on the basis of the present, which breaks and then ties back to the thread of infinity, contain a tension and a contracting. It is an event. The evanescence of an instant which makes it able to be a pure present, not to receive its being from a past is not the gratuitous evanescence of a game or a dream. A subject is not free like the wind, but already has a destiny which it does not get from a past or a future, but from its present. If commitment in being thereby escape the weight of the past (the weight that was seen in existence), it involves a weight of its own which its evanescence does not lighten, and against which a solitary subject, who is constituted by the instant is powerless. Time and the other are necessary for the liberation from it.

In other words, not only is each being anonymous, but it is also a unique and indistinct instant, a brief encounter in infinity like all other encounters, only this one is mine. You see that Levinas is suspended between questions of one and infinity, unable, at least in this book, to resolve the very question he succinctly ends with: The event which we have been inquiring after is antecedent to that placing. It concerns the meaning of the very fact that in Being there are beings.

Very nice place to end. But one curious thing he brought up at the very beginning regarding how existence and existents were separated: that the existent and existence are understood as separate because life needs to be struggled for; that existence needs to be earned, be it at the level of 19th century biology or immanent within the economic order. While he set this as the stage for outlining fatigue, I think this young Levinas could have been better served to understand how the order of a priori necessarily arises as a special case of the a posteriori… but that is a different approach, a different school, one of the domain of semiotics and dialecticians of the negative (such as Zizek). It will be interesting to read more Levinas and see how this book fits into his work about transcendence and the encounter with the Other.

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Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies

Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four EcologiesLos Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies by Reyner Banham
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

In this stunning work, Reyner Banham breaks out and challenges many of the norms of his time for urban development and how architecture should be considered. The work isn’t academic, because it doesn’t examine other people’s positions, but it does wax poetic about how great Los Angeles is.

When I combined reading this book with his video, “Reyner Banham Loves Los Angeles” you get a very different but complementary message. The point of this book was to convince others, his professional peers, that Los Angeles was worth considering. He wants to showcase how this vibrant and oddly made city, the product of its short history and global world economy expansion allows for the sense of freedom and wonderment that LA embodies. His video was much in the same way about the same thing — although through his emphasis of lifestyle I got a more complete picture.

Los Angeles was also talked about by Baudrillard in his book America, as the example of hyperreality. LA got its hyperreality because it was starred in films that were shot here (because of the weather, and the open space). These films attracted stars to live here, and so we get the superficial image of wealth and status, where LA was the place to make it. From there, you have Banham’s observation that LA was a place where anything could happen, architecturally or culturally.

In this way, Banham is, in a synecdoche-analogous way, celebrating capitalism’s fruit as he celebrates LA and explores the social, economic and political pressures that made LA… it’s kind of telling too, that in the film he says how Watts improved (as if to dismiss LA’s inclusion in the history of racial prejudice, yes yes there are poor people, but they get watts towers)… and how in the book I am reviewing, he doesn’t even mention racial tension at all, except in passing. Obviously the fruits, and the technological mastery that is LA should be cherished, enjoyed, although whoever paid for these fruits to be extracted… should not be given much thought at all.

While this definitely scars the book, as Banham did write it to direct us to how LA got to be the way it is. I am thankful for his sections on its local history, and historical politics (which has greed and corruption)… but Banham probably didn’t think so far as to analyze the cultural milieu of Los Angeles and ITS origins… which while arguably just as important as the physicality of Los Angeles, is just out of Banham’s professional range, as he teaches Architecture, he isn’t a philosopher. I do appreciate his insights, however. The range of research involved, travel, the pictures in the book, and his witty and engaging writing make this book easier to read, than it actually may sound. Given the domain of the book, it actually is quite good — and living in Los Angeles — I do note that some of his observations (physical and cultural) are dated.

However, if ecology were to be true to the sense of the word (rather than simply a metaphor he employs to cluster architectural infrastructures), Banham should have talked about the underpinnings of capitalism, its exploitation and the people who suffered, as much as he waxes about the fruits of capitalism as expressed in Los Angeles.

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