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Descartes; Spinoza (Great Books of the Western World (Vol. 31)

Great Books of the Western World (Vol. 31 - Descartes; Spinoza)Great Books of the Western World by René Descartes
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Descartes is the father of modern philosophy. Descartes is the father of modern math. What do they have in common?

He gives us his rules for the mind, his meditation on first philosophy — that is, the very method by which he seeks to find for us the truth. This method, described in part by Irme Lakatos as analysis-synthesis brings to us the very foundation of both math and philosophy. In fact, together, math and science form the same pair bond for analysis-synthesis paralleling each other’s formulation as each provides inflection points to form the other. Descartes’ method is no longer in vogue however, as it relies too much on a hidden conjecture to get to first philosophy but his methodology and its grounding assumptions still stand.

That is to say, with Descartes we get the calibration of a cut. If you read his philosophy or how he formulates his analytic geometry, one piece is used to measure the other. The model is calibrated to itself. The split predicate of “i think” therefore “i am” work in the same way that he uses lines through euclidean angles in order to measure parabolas in order to calibrate them to each other. The description of parabolas through their roots is a way in which we define the “zeros” of the coordinates in a domain. In a way, although Descartes was looking for some absolute referent (in philosophy) he found also in math, the arbitrary referent becomes the absolute referent! This missing link isn’t provided as any given cut can work, if treated with the proper methodology, but rather is raised to a metaphysical level as being an expression of the model of the cut to be made. If you read between the lines in Descartes treatment of the matter, especially in describing his methodology you’ll see how he breaks down the process into a series of chunks (cuts) and then those chunks inform us how to synthesize them back together, so as to be sure that this is in fact the only way to do so. I owe this analysis in part to Irme Lakatos. The analysis gives you the synthesis in part, and that assured nature that is self reflexive is a powerful aphrodisiac. I am sure Descartes sees his eternal truths quite well after experiencing how magically the pieces he made fit back together again.

I did not read Spinoza’s Ethics also contained in his book, as I aim to read Spinozas’ work in a different book.

Still, we owe Descartes much. Reading him verifies the basic root of his method, so that we can then use his thoughts as fodder for calibration of modern thought to itself. With these cuts, we can begin to see the unsupported cut as being arbitrary but also as being absolute, when we continually cut with consistency so that the entire situation comes to be constructed in terms of that arbitration. This is a way for us to recognize the constructed nature of our knowledge, as it has been continually refined, to the point at which knowledge becomes fragmented because each discipline interjects their own cut, following their own scientific truths as each attempst to reify each respective field as an absolute domain of self sufficient a priori presentation.

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Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mathematics, Science and Epistemology

Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mathematics, Science and EpistemologyPhilosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mathematics, Science and Epistemology by Imre Lakatos
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Lakatos stands at the edge of a vast tradition, and in his conservative way, decries those who would draw demarcation lines along those of community or traditional ideas of how discovery, math and science should be drawn as they always were. In seeking truth that is independent of human observation or valuation, Lakatos would fall along the same issue that Zizek would bring to many others — the lack of a transcendence. This much is so; Lakatos is as much a former Hegelian as much as it is a decrier of non-useful knowledges (like vulgar Marxists). What I admire most about Lakatos is that he isn’t afraid to approach the former basis of the formulation of math and science — in philosophy, and tackle the Cartesian synthesis as a modality of providing the basis for its own verification. This ties together the many aspects of Lakatos’ careful research work, his scholarly devotion to what others have said, and how they said it, and how they were (un)able to understand and respond to one another.

In other to be able to understand where Lakatos comes from we need to be able to understand that (ir)rationally he would have to disavow himself of those who he was most like in order to be distinguished from them, essentializing them by a singular disavow he found distasteful (or superfluous, thus discarding them as being superfluous). In this manner, his rejection of Marxism appears to be because of the implicit use of their historiographical techniques in order to highlight the logical difference their ideology makes, a technique he often uses to highlight competing and often contemporaneous schools of science. By revealing the shifting of sense making demonstrated by the cuts of history, we will always be able to detect minor unaccountable differences in understanding that question any possible aesthetic validity to the foundation that the use of human reason can be independent of superstition and wholly reliant on the strictest of causation.

Lakatos notes this is the unanswerable question of Hume: Can there be causation that is not mere induction? This is a question whose answer is to show its own impossibility, that human laws seem wholly immanent on itself rather than on principles that are consistent and surjective to the universe itself.

In fact, this lack of assurance is the very project Lakatos wishes to show, marking him as a philosopher of science, an inability to know what real in the naive classical sense is (should we encounter it). Many of his longer essays are devoted to this subject matter — the instability of the acceptedness of a theory despite or even because of its foibles and its refutations as understood from various points from its inception.

One of Lakato’s favorite mentions is that new theories are always immediately refuted before they are accepted. In other words, there is a lag between when a theory is too new to be validated or even understood before it is accepted as unequivocally true. There is a lack of resolution in this issue because we have no real way of measuring what was accepted only what at least a few individuals were saying at various times. So the question becomes even more precarious because what we know of a theory and what we know of a theory differ from each other depending on context. The unaccountableness of this change is where Lakatos organizes his conception of truth and epistemology in response to other’s certainties. In fact, where he is alike with Popper and structuralists, is that Lakatos is formulate an immanent critique of various logics, such as Newtonian, or mathematics, or Quine or Tarski or Toulmin in order to lead us to grasping what is excessive in their ideologies, as the overriding weight/basis for a judgement on verisimilitude. This requires a more rhetorical formalistic reading on Lakato’s part, in order to understand a curve in reason as being local to itself rather than to the material at hand; given the possibility at various points of inflection to determine opposite alternate possibilities. This is perhaps his greatest lesson from (and disagreement with) Karl Popper — that falsification of science can happen alone at a plateau detached from any concordance with induction. (Lakatos wanted at least weak induction, Popper thought that induction was not necessary).

If we were to believe that progress was in fact measurable, it would be the in theory detectable since there would be a steady retreat of the amount of uncertainty of the nature of nature as time progressed. We might expect that with the retreat of uncertainty we would find more concordance — but this has been shown to be untrue as the very nature of the universe is still to be questioned, as to what we can expect of it or how we should understand the nature of time or space itself (not to mention quantum mechanics and so on). In a way, Lakatos should have written a book, as his ideas criss-cross in a variety of manners, showing an immanence of understanding and relevance that this nest of ideas’ connectedness is nearly sustaining (Although no one essay really encapsulates the entire range).

What we see here, is the most nihilistic of philosophers, one whose field is technology itself — knowledge which is useful, and we get that not even from the point of view of knowledge can knowledge maintain consistency with itself. Lakatos gets that science is impacted from the outside, as all knowledege is, and because of this, insists that science be accountable to society even though science itself is amoral.

In a strange way, Lakatos nearly refutes himself, as his search for validity on the order of its own logic (and impossibility) becomes negative as he understands the aesthetics of the search to be about more than some academic scholarly immanence. Rather, our understandings become an allegory of itself, tainted with the atmosphere of its origins. In this strange way, we might understand this as a formalism of knowledge, if that expression is Hegelian or otherwise centered on its own difference. Lakatos can never find his own answers to his own questions by looking within just like he can never fully justify the lemmas of hard research programmes that came to be completely acceptable and then suddenly out of favor. Marred with this in-transience between different fields, Lakatos may be ranked with many post-structuralists as being trapped outside or inside a tradition, for if they speak from the outside it is because they, in the mystifications of Lacan, are “Cogito ergo sum,” ubi cogito, ibi sum. I am not, there where I am the plaything of my thought: I think of what I am where I do not think to think. In this same way Fichte was right to point to Antoss as the cogito’s inability to think where it is, but by pointing it out, Zizek demonstrates that Fichte too was not where he could think to think, meaning Antoss was but petit object a. In this same manner, Lakatos finds himself settled in “the third way” in the interstice of what can be nameable, in the (in)articulated depths of Wittgenstein’s language games where its successful performance is autonomous, detached and wholly invaluable/invalidable because they are strict reference points to absolutely itself.

Lakatos then, if we were to fling him from his comfort-zone, would be speaking of various inarticulable truths that appeared as marked events throughout history. Each zone is distinguishable only by itself, and wholly uncapturable by each other. We see zones of interference and resistance, characterized by contingency itself, when it reaches the highest levels of verification only by being repetitious enough to become a thing, a difference unto itself.

We end up with territories of language genres, a truth that perhaps Lakatos wouldn’t have wanted to acknowledge as being the strong version of science’s fallibility, that its champions, its expert-elite should get the acknowledgement they want, for their being individuals rather than for some autonomous process that could be drawn in the sand when in fact, that rockstar elitism can only insist on a community’s shared immanent ideology, a pack of thieves among any other pack of thieves, a distribution system that sustains itself, only this time with the indebtedness of verisimilitude. Lakatos was rather that we were impersonal, cut throat and yet responsible to more than just science when we be a philosopher and a defender of science from its own communal excesses.

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Philosophical Papers, Volume 1: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

Philosophical Papers, Volume 1: The Methodology of Scientific Research ProgrammesPhilosophical Papers, Volume 1: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes by Imre Lakatos
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

After the enlightenment, people started to seriously make a distinction that how they distinguished what they really knew from what was really going on around them. The actual knowledge, epistemes, were favored over “opinions” or doxa. The debate that surrounded that amid the turmoil of increasing technology and religious unrest eventually flipped around: doxa became the norm with epistemes being questioned as being attainable. With this flip, after the revolution of special and general relativity, scientific theory became the norm rather than dogmatic scientific truth.

The examination of the flip, and the proper aesthetic form that scientific theory can be generated — namely via scientific method — is the subject of inquiry in this short but very very dense book. Lakatos examines how different critiques determine how the line should be drawn, be the line negative through the lack of connection between phenomenon or should it be drawn through what degree of unfitting the phenomenon before we should consider the distinction wrong? He also asks the question, through scientific inquiry, can we know anything, and if we can, how can we think we know it (or at least feel justified that this is the best we can do)?

In short, this book is pretty packed with terminology and illustrations of those terminologies. To be clear, Lakatos highlights what moves thinkers and scientists made and perhaps why, and what moves they could have made and what meaning they generated distinguished from the meaning they didn’t generate. You can imagine how much thinking, research and effort this must have taken. Lakatos also challenges other thinkers of scientific history, naming how their different explanations of scientific movement falls short, miss-explains theories and massages meanings and histories in service of their pet theory. He also explains how his teacher Popper formulated the scientific method through language rather than classical induction and why we should consider science as being more than formulations in language although Popper disagrees — that scientific theories are only different consistencies in language (surprisingly much like Deleuze and Guattari’s plateaus).

At times, Lakatos also slips into the terminology he uses, applies them to other scientific philosophers, although that is dependent on what other researchers think and find and eventually collaborate as well. Lol.

See, really, how we know things is pretty important, and why we should know one it through one theory vs another theory changes how we can coexist together in the final context, to best get along with one another. This is a sophistication far from what people are taught in school as being what a justifiable belief is. In a way, this book is more philosophical than metaphysics, or doxa or opinions… Lakatos is talking about how we might construct a view of the world around us that is reasonable, the most accurate view. Objects of science are assumed to have an existence and consistency independent of what we observe of them. People are also assumed to have an existence and will independent of what we observe of them. So in a way, this too is applicable to people, although we shouldn’t experiment on them. What I mean to point out is that the forms of this book can be worked through a variety of life situations, as a kind of guide to how to understand what is going on. Simultaneously, this kind of deep examination is kind of a paranoia, where we need to look into every detail and possibility while also being a kind of hysteria, where we don’t know what we are looking at/for… because of course, we deal with the limits of knowability, making it up as we go along… though if Lakatos is right, we only need to follow his general methods.

Really Lakatos falls into the idealist who believes that we can know everything (a positive maybe for Lakatos)… while he can’t do science, or at least doesn’t in this volume, he can help smoothen the irregularities of how scientific truth can be found out… so we don’t waste our time on distinctions that don’t make any knowable difference, such as religion or critical theory… but that’s really his opinion or doxa… although he hopes you’ll find it to be as solid as an episteme. ;).

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